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Abstract 
 
Numerous theories have been constructed to provide reasons for economic growth 
differences between countries.  As data became more readily available, cross-country 
empirical studies identified a set of variables that contributed to economic growth, including 
variables such as the investment in human and physical capital.  Although most of the 
identified variables provide some support to economic growth, they still do not fully explain 
all growth differences.  Furthermore, the analysis of these variables does not disclose, for 
instance, why two countries receiving the same amount of aid would spend it differently.  
The New Institutional Economics (NIE) accepts the importance of the variables identified, 
but extends the analysis of growth differences between countries to the link between policy 
choices and economic growth.     
 
In the NIE literature it is widely accepted that policies should support the 
minimisation of transaction costs and the protection of property rights.  It asks the question 
of what lies behind different policy decisions and explores why different countries take 
different routes to growth and development (or alternatively to economic stagnation).   
 
Policies originate as formal institutions, i.e. the “rules of the game”.  These formal 
institutions come into being due to various reasons and are mostly in support of groups in 
society that have the power to influence decision-making.  Important also are the informal 
institutions, which encompass the culture, norms and codes of conduct that have been 
present for some time in the specific country.  The effect of different existing informal 
institutions makes it impossible to duplicate formal institutions between countries and 
expect these formal institutions to lead to the same outcome. 
 
How do countries establish institutions that support the minimisation of transaction 
costs and the protection of property rights?  Case study research provides useful 
information, but studies of this type on African countries have so far been rare.  The 
purpose of this dissertation is to contribute to case study research in NIE by focussing on 
two African countries.  Among others it proposes to answer the following questions: where 
do institutions that are detrimental to growth come from, and why do countries find it 
difficult to change them? 
 
Botswana and Zambia are the two countries chosen for this comparison because they 
are similar in various respects that can be related to growth differences.  Both countries are 
situated in sub-Saharan Africa, are mineral dependent in their exports, landlocked, and 
were under British rule until the 1960s.  There are marked growth differences between 
these two countries, which new classical growth theories do not fully explain.  But when 
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empirical institutional data is analysed, new explanations for growth differences come to the 
fore.   
 
If sovereign leaders were responsible for postcolonial policies, why did leaders in 
Zambia make decisions that increased transaction costs and infringed property rights?  
Differences in colonial experiences are explored, as well as the situation that prevailed in 
pre-colonial days.  It is found that due to the informal institutions that were created by 
these two experiences and the lack of legitimacy of the post-colonial leadership, the 
Zambian government was able to turn away from two formal institutions that provide 
checks on government decisions: i.e. democracy and the rule of law.  Without these 
oversight agencies, the post-colonial Zambian government was able to make decisions that 
had short-term benefits (especially in terms of ridding the country of any colonial 
influences), but were to the long-term detriment of the country.   
 
Institutions in Botswana tell the opposite story.  Informal institutions created before 
and during British rule supported the formal institutions left by the departing Britons.  This 
created an atmosphere of stability and certainty in which the economy prospered. 
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Opsomming 
 
‘n Aantal teorieë is oor tyd ontwikkel om groeiverskille tussen lande te verklaar.  
Soos data meer beskikbaar geraak het, was dit moontlik om met behulp van 'n kruissnit van 
lande veranderlikes te identifiseer wat ‘n bydrae tot ekonomiese groei lewer, insluitende 
veranderlikes soos investering in menslike en fisiese kapitaal.  Alhoewel die meeste van 
hierdie geïdentifiseerde veranderlikes ‘n bydrae lewer tot die verklaring van ekonomiese 
groei, verklaar dit steeds nie alle groeiverskille nie.  Die ontleding van hierdie veranderlikes 
verklaar byvoorbeeld nie waarom twee lande wat dieselfde hoeveelheid finansiële hulp 
verkry, dit verskillend spandeer nie.  Die Nuwe Institusionele Ekonomie (NIE) aanvaar die 
belangrikheid van die veranderlikes soos deur empiriese studies geïdentifiseer, maar brei 
die analise van groeiverskille uit na die verwantskap tussen beleidskeuses en ekonomiese 
groei.   
 
In die NIE literatuur word dit algemeen aanvaar dat beleid die vermindering van 
transaksiekoste en die beskerming van eiendomsreg moet ondersteun.  Dit ondersoek ook 
die oorsprong van verskillende beleidskeuses en waarom verskillende lande verskillende 
weë volg na ekonomiese groei en ontwikkeling (of alternatiewelik na stagnasie). 
 
Beleid is ‘n formele institusie, die sogenaamde “reëls van die spel”.  Formele 
institusies ontstaan weens verskillende redes- en meestal ter ondersteuning van die groepe 
in die gemeenskap wat die mag het om besluite te beïnvloed.  Informele institusies, 
insluitend kultuur, norme en algemene gedrag wat reeds vir ‘n geruime tyd in ‘n land 
teenwoordig is, is ook belangrik.  Aangesien informele institusies tussen lande verskil, is dit 
onmoontlik om formele institusies tussen lande te dupliseer en dieselfde uitkoms te verwag. 
 
Hoe verkry lande institusies wat die vermindering van transaksiekoste en die 
beskerming van eiendomsreg ondersteun?  Vergelykende gevallestudies kan hieroor 
inligting verskaf, maar hierdie studies was tot dusver skaars vir Afrikalande.  Die doel van 
hierdie proefskrif is om ‘n bydrae te lewer tot gevallestudie navorsing in NIE wat op 
Afrikalande fokus.  Van die vrae wat ondersoek word is: waar kom institusies wat nadelig vir 
groei is vandaan, en waarom vind lande dit moeilik om hulle te verander? 
 
Botswana en Zambia is vir die studie gekies weens die feit dat hulle ooreenstem op 
‘n aantal gebiede wat aan groeiverskille verwant is.  Beide is geleë in sub-Sahara Afrika, 
mineraal-afhanklik in hul uitvoere, deur land ingesluit, en onder Britse bewind tot die 1960s.  
Daar is duidelike groeiverskille tussen die twee lande wat die nuwe klassieke groeiteorieë 
nie ten volle kan verklaar nie.  Wanneer empiriese institusionele data op hierdie lande 
toegepas word, kom nuwe verduidelikings vir groeiverskille na vore. 
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Indien verkose regerings verantwoordelik was vir na-koloniale  beleid, waarom het 
die leiers in Zambië besluite geneem wat transaksiekoste verhoog en eiendomsreg 
benadeel?  Verskille in koloniale ervarings word ondersoek, sowel as die omstandighede in 
voor-koloniale tye.  Dit blyk dat die informele institusies wat deur hierdie twee gebeure 
ontstaan het, en die gebrek aan legitimiteit van die na-koloniale leierskap, dit vir die 
Zambiese regering moontlik gemaak het om die twee formele institusies wat beperkings op 
besluitneming plaas, naamlik demokrasie en die gesag van die reg, te verontagsaam.  
Weens die afwesigheid van hierdie beperkings kon die na-koloniale Zambiese regering 
besluite neem wat korttermyn voordele inhou (veral om die land van enige koloniale 
invloede te bevry), maar tot die langtermyn nadeel van die land was. 
 
Institusies in Botswana vertel die teenoorgestelde storie.  Informele institusies wat 
voor en gedurende Britse bewind geskep is, het die formele institusies wat deur die Britte 
agtergelaat is, ondersteun.  Dit het 'n atmosfeer van stabiliteit en sekerheid geskep 
waarbinne die ekonomie kon groei. 
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1 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
The new economic growth theory implies convergence, with developing countries 
catching up with developed countries because knowledge is available to everybody and 
capital moves freely among countries (Meier 2001).  But the twentieth century proved this 
theory to be wrong.  High levels of economic growth do not come easily, or naturally, and 
divergence seems to be more prevalent than convergence.  After a thousand years of 
Western civilization, despite the immense decline in information costs and despite the 
advantages of international free trade, there are still enormous disparities between 
economies.   
 
On closer investigation, growth differences become even more puzzling.  Some east-
Asian countries succeeded in catching up with industrialised countries, while Africa has 
fallen behind even more.  There are developing countries, like Argentina, that at one stage 
seemed to be catching up, but then collapsed again.  Some developing countries 
experienced unprecedented rates of economic growth during the post-World War 2 period, 
but were unable to sustain it after the oil shock of 1973.  And, of all the regions in the 
world, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has experienced the slowest economic growth, with 
poverty looming large and deepening.   
 
The reason why SSA performs so badly remains an important area of study for many 
economists.  Numerous reasons have been proposed to explain the slow growth and several 
cross-country studies of growth (for example, Easterly and Levine 1997) have found that 
the conventional factors of growth (labour, physical and human capital accumulation, and so 
on) do not fully explain the African experience. 
 
In recent years attempts to clarify growth differences internationally, and also for 
Africa, have favoured an explanation based on institutional differences.  Currently, most 
development economists agree that differences in institutions are amongst the crucial 
determinants of growth differences.     
 
Institutions, both formal and informal, create incentives for role-players in the 
economy.  The net effect of these institutions taken together can either be growth 
enhancing or growth retarding.  Each country has its own matrix of institutions, and for a 
country to reap the benefits of mineral riches or technological innovations, the growth-
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enhancing institutions have to be in the majority.  And for institutions to be growth 
enhancing, they have to lower transaction costs and secure property rights.   
 
Governments play an important role in securing a structure of incentives that would 
support growth-enhancing institutions.  Not only do they influence the rules of the game 
through policy choices, but they are also third-party enforcers of formal institutions.  
Mancur Olson (1996: 32) claims that “those countries with the best policies and institutions 
achieve most of their potential, while other countries achieve only a tiny fraction of their 
potential income…”. 
 
An interesting question that is discussed in the literature is why countries find it so 
hard to adhere to growth enhancing institutions.  Why do some countries succeed in their 
creation and maintenance, while others fail?  Why do some governments fail to lower 
transaction costs and secure property rights?  And why is it difficult for a government to 
change growth-retarding policies to those that would secure a higher growth path?   
 
In her address to the International Society for New Institutional Economics (2003), 
Mary Shirley suggests more cross-country work, combined with more comparative case 
studies to provide answers to questions relating to institutions and institutional choices.  
Much research has been done cross-sectionally on this topic, but very few country studies 
have been done, especially of sub-Saharan countries, to establish exactly why some 
countries fail to achieve their potential.   
 
A recent book, edited by Dani Rodrik (2003), contains a number of country studies 
from an institutional perspective.  Only two countries from Africa were included in this 
study, i.e. Botswana and Mauritius, as the “African success stories”.  In the chapter on 
Botswana, Acemoglu and his co-authors (2003a: 113) suggest that more research needs to 
be done on African countries: “The puzzle is why Botswana ended up with such good 
institutions… there is relatively little research done on this topic, and a satisfactory answer 
requires a detailed analysis of Botswana’s history and comparison with other African 
experiences”.  And this is the main purpose of the study: to determine why some 
governments succeed in creating growth enhancing institutions and others not.   
 
The two countries chosen for this study are Botswana and Zambia.  These countries 
offer fertile ground for an institutional comparative study given their many similarities, 
including the fact that both countries were under British rule up to independence in the 
middle of the 1960s, both are mineral dependent, landlocked, and at the time of 
independence had hostile neighbours.       
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At the time of independence, on a general level, their “initial conditions” were very 
similar, with Zambia slightly better endowed than Botswana.  The Zambian economy was 
better placed for development, but the subsequent experience has been the opposite.  
Botswana has since become one of the best-managed economies in Africa and is often 
referred to as the “African miracle”, while the Zambian economy has stagnated.  Why did 
they develop differently, and can it be explained by differences in institutions?   
 
One of the explanations for low growth that fits Botswana and Zambia well, is the 
influence of their respective colonial experiences.  Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) 
suggest that countries subjected to extractive colonisation1 experience lower post-colonial 
growth than countries in which participatory institutions were established.  This seems to be 
a plausible argument for growth differences in Zambia and Botswana, because Botswana 
was merely a protectorate of Britain and underdeveloped at independence, whereas Zambia 
was subject to extractive colonisation. 
 
However, it cannot be ignored that although path dependency has a bearing on 
decision-making over time, it does not state that the path cannot be reversed.  Colonial 
experience does not predestine post-colonial policies.  This study links the colonial 
experience of the countries with post-colonial policies, but goes one step further in 
explaining the reasons why the post-colonial Zambian government was unable to reverse 
the low growth path created by the extractive nature of their colonial rule.  The good 
practice in Botswana is found to be a very useful comparison. 
 
Linked to their colonial experience is another difference that may explain their 
divergent growth experiences: the fact that rich diamond deposits in Botswana were only 
discovered after independence, whereas European companies had been mining copper in 
Zambia since the 1920s.  With no foreign companies operating within Botswana at 
independence, the government was, for instance, not under the same pressure as the 
Zambian government to nationalise the mining industry. 
 
The minerals as such also have explanatory power: with diamond prices being 
regulated by the Central Selling Organisation, they hardly fluctuate, while the price of 
copper has been unstable.  The study, however, shows that although differences in the 
minerals have a lot of explanatory power, there is still room for explaining the different 
spending patterns of the two governments. 
 
                                          
1 Under extractive colonisation property rights of the indigenous population were not protected. 
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A comparison between Botswana and Zambia has not been done as yet.  Individual 
studies on the two countries are numerous, of which a number is relevant to (and made use 
of) the present study.  In the theoretical discussion the work of Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson is followed very closely.  In their study on Botswana (Acemoglu, et al. 2003a) 
they attribute the country's success to the adoption of good policies, which promoted rapid 
accumulation, investment and the socially efficient exploitation of resource rents.  They link 
this with the pre-colonial tribal institutions and benign neglect during colonial rule.  They 
also stress the importance of political leaders with rural interests, and particularly the 
sensible decisions made by Khama and Masire. 
 
Kenneth Good (1992) considers the advantages of an open "elite" democracy.  
According to him competitive politics was to the advantage of the country, with no 
"debilitating cult-of-personality" being allowed to mar developments.  Charles Harvey and 
Stephen Lewis (1990) conclude their book on Botswana by summarising the reasons for 
Botswana's success as: luck due to colonial neglect and the discovery of diamonds after 
independence; good management by the post-colonial government; and good skills in 
negotiating with South Africa and the mining companies. 
 
These reasons are supported in the present study and yield a sound contrast with 
the experience of Zambia.  Most of the work done on the Zambian economic stagnation 
focuses either on the declining income from the copper industry or on colonial rule.  Arne 
Bigsten (2001), for instance, links the resource curse to policymaking.  For good 
policymaking he suggests a democratic process and judicial control.  He also suggests that 
an elite that builds up its economic interests outside government will come to a point where 
the benefits of having an efficient economy outweigh those of having one with extensive 
scope for rent-seeking.  These findings of Bigsten are supported by the current study.   
 
Unravelling the causes for their different performances is not only of theoretical 
interest but also of practical importance.  A plausible account of growth enhancing 
institutions might guide institutional and policy decisions, not only in Zambia and Botswana, 
but also in other similar countries and may guide growth paths in the decades ahead. 
 
 
1.2 METHODOLOGY 
 
To explain growth differences between countries an analytical framework is necessary 
to trace the historical evolution of their economies, and to provide a guide to policies that 
can improve their economic performance.  Cross-country empirical research accounts for 
growth differences at a general level, but provides little information regarding specific 
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countries and their particular experience.  Case study research that draws on the theory of 
the New Institutional Economics (NIE), presents a requisite framework.  The framework of 
the NIE bases the analysis of the causes and consequences of institutions and institutional 
change on theory, and less on culture as was the case previously2.   
 
The NIE defines institutions as encompassing rules that constrain and influence human 
behaviour.  A key aspect of these humanly devised rules is that they structure human 
interaction by providing incentives that shape economic and political organisations.  Among 
the institutions that are most important for economic performance are those involving the 
lowering of transaction costs and the definition and enforcement of property rights.  If 
transaction costs are minimised and property rights protected, the cost of production and 
distribution is lower.  This allows private agents more scope to benefit from specialisation, 
investment and trade, thus leading to economic growth. 
 
Case study research has an important role in the broadening of our understanding of 
institutions and institutional change.  Comparison, as such, is an important research tool.  
Swanson (quoted in Ragin 1987: 1) described it as follows: “Thinking without comparison is 
unthinkable.  And, in the absence of comparison, so is all scientific thought and scientific 
research".  Referring to the comparison of countries, Giovanni Sartori (1994: 16) feels that 
"knowing one country means knowing none". 
  
The experience of Botswana and Zambia provides a suitable and appropriate basis 
for an analysis of the impact of institutions on economic development.  Both these 
landlocked countries were colonies of the same colonial power, Great Britain.  Both are 
mineral-rich, but have had distinctly different growth experiences and have relied on 
dissimilar institutional structures to support economic and political governance.  Linking the 
differences in economic performance to institutions is the principal objective of this study 
and to do this, the experience during the period after independence (but including colonial 
experience to the extent that the impact of path dependency on decision making demands 
this) until about 1990 provides a suitable setting for a comparative analysis.  In 1991 the 
Third Republic was launched in Zambia.  The institutional and policy changes this brought 
about represented a structural break for Zambia, which makes 1990 a convenient cut-off for 
the study period which even so remains sufficiently long for meaningful analysis.  
 
After 1990 economic growth slowed down in both countries, but with Botswana still 
averaging almost 5 percent for the 1990s and Zambia barely able to realise 1 percent.  
                                          
2 In his account of growth differences in The Wealth and Poverty of Nations – why are some so rich 
and some so poor, David Landes (1998) relied much on cultural differences. 
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Since 2000 the two countries have moved closer to each other in terms of GDP per capita 
growth, with Botswana realising 4.0 percent in 2003, and Zambia 3.5 percent.  Botswana's 
average annual inflation for the period 2000-2003 reached 7.7 percent while Zambia's 
average annual inflation decreased to 14.4 percent for the same period.   
 
For the period 1990-2003 the countries had almost the same average annual 
population growth: 2.3 percent for Botswana and 2.2 percent for Zambia.  Both societies 
have become more urbanised.   
 
An alarming trend in both countries is the increase in infant mortality rates.  This can 
be ascribed to an increase in the incidence of HIV Aids.  For Botswana life expectancy at 
birth peaked at 60 years in 1985 and then declined to 38 years in 2002.  For Zambia it also 
peaked in 1985 at an expected 50 years but declined to a low 37 years in 2002.   
 
Exports as a percentage of GDP have remained more or less constant for Botswana 
during the 1990s, whereas Zambia has witnessed a decline.  Botswana has become less 
dependant on imports, while the Zambian situation has changed very little.  In 2002 Zambia 
received more foreign direct investment than Botswana – 197 million dollars relative to 
Botswana’s 37 million dollars.  However, external debt remains a problem for Zambia.  In 
2002 external debt was 127 percent of GNI, compared to 8 percent for Botswana. 
 
Relevant literature on the political and economic history of the two countries was 
studied and published empirical data on economic activity collated to illustrate the 
differences in economic structures and performance.  In Zambia copper is the dominant 
commodity and in Botswana it is diamonds.  An intensive analysis of the copper industry 
and the impact of variations in the copper price were undertaken. But we were unable to 
undertake a similar exercise for diamonds (with present resources) and a comparison of the 
two dominant products was made impossible by the difficulty of finding wholesale diamond 
prices. 
 
Extensive research benefits were derived from a two-week visit to Botswana, which 
allowed access to a wider range of sources and the opportunity to interview scholars and 
observers of Botswana’s economic development.  During this visit a number of Zambian 
scholars were also consulted.  The theoretical sections of the study on the New Institutional 
Economics were strengthened by discussions at the Summer School of the European School 
for New Institutional Economics in Cargése, Corsica, in May 2004, where a summary paper 
on the study was presented.  Similarly, the study also benefited from a presentation at the 
STIAS interdisciplinary summer school in Stellenbosch in September 2004. 
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1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
 
Chapter 2 presents an economic comparison of Zambia and Botswana.  The purpose 
of the chapter is to show how these economies developed, and especially how their paths of 
development differ.  It provides an overview with the aid of tables and figures.   
 
Chapter 3 discusses theoretical reasons for growth differences between Zambia and 
Botswana.  The purpose of the chapter is to broadly outline the progress made in 
development thinking since the classical economists, and to establish whether the neo-
classical Solow growth model, endogenous growth models, and other models that feature in 
growth literature, sufficiently explain the growth differences illustrated in Chapter 2.  
Special focus falls on growth differences that result from the ownership of the natural 
resources of the two mineral-rich countries.  A clear explanation of growth differences 
between the two countries does not emerge from this discussion; hence, the focus shifts to 
the theory of the New Institutional Economics in chapter 4.   
 
Chapter 4 introduces the NIE as the approach that can explain growth differences 
between Botswana and Zambia.  The NIE is currently perceived as one of the most 
important explanations for growth differences in the development literature.  Chapter 4 
defines and discusses institutions and pays special attention to the importance of the 
lowering of transaction costs and the protection of property rights.   
 
Another important section in this chapter is the discussion of the reasons why 
institutions that are detrimental to growth persist over time.  One explanation is the colonial 
experience.  But, although path dependency links decision-making over time, it does not 
make stagnation or prosperity inevitable.  Post-colonial decision-making determined post-
colonial growth experiences, although some of these decisions can be justified by the 
colonial experience.  If colonisation is not deterministic, other reasons for bad post-colonial 
policies need to be identified.  Theory shows these to be, amongst others, an inability of the 
polity to commit and the prevalence of social conflict.   
 
Chapter 5 uses empirical measures to determine whether institutions provide evidence 
for growth differences between Zambia and Botswana.  These measures act as empirical 
indications of institutional development in Zambia and Botswana and the role it played in 
their divergent economic performances.  
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The next stage of the investigation is to explain the causal differences in the 
experience of Botswana and Zambia that can explain institutional differences.  Chapter 6 
summarises their respective histories up to independence.  Although the study focuses on 
the time after independence, history is important in understanding decision-making; 
therefore, important instances in their pre-colonial and colonial pasts are highlighted.  The 
discussion of the pre-colonial and colonial situation in the two countries enables a deeper 
understanding of the post-colonial state and is consistent with the theory of path 
dependency.   
 
The lowering of transaction costs and the protection of property rights in Zambia and 
Botswana are explained in Chapter 7.  Examples from the two countries show how Zambia 
has increased transaction costs through decisions made to prevail over European influences.  
In a similar manner it infringed on property rights in various ways – directly through 
nationalisation, but also indirectly through taxation and regulation.  Although the Botswana 
government was also active in the economy, it proceeded through consultation and 
cooperation.  It created an atmosphere of confidence–which lowers transaction costs.   
 
Chapter 8 discusses the political institutions in the respective countries.  Because 
governments are important role players in economic development, there is a growing 
interest in the development literature in the determinants of policies and in the institutional 
choices that governments make.  Although the two countries inherited the same 
constitution from Britain, they have followed different paths since then.  Specific attention is 
given to the democratic process and the separation of powers between the legislature and 
the judicial authority.   
 
Chapter 9 concludes the study. 
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2 CHAPTER 2 
ECONOMIC COMPARISON OF BOTSWANA AND ZAMBIA: 
HIGHLIGHTING SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Although similar in many respects, Zambia and Botswana developed very differently 
since independence.  This chapter sets the stage for a discussion of the reasons for these 
divergent growth paths, which are illustrated with tables and figures. 
 
The data used are mostly from the World Bank, the IMF, and other international 
organisations.  As far as possible the time period will range from independence to 1990.  
Botswana remained a member of the Rand Monetary Area (RMA) during the first number of 
years after independence, and is also a member of the Southern Africa Customs Union 
(SACU), as a result of which comparative data for Botswana is often impossible to find. 
 
 
2.2 GENERAL BACKGROUND 
 
As stated earlier Botswana and Zambia are two landlocked countries, situated in sub-
Saharan Africa.  Botswana shares boundaries with Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe, 
and Zambia with no less than seven other countries, i.e. Angola, The Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.  These borders were 
drawn by the European colonial powers at the Berlin Conference, which was held from 
November 1884 to February 1885. 
 
Although Botswana was never a colony, it was administered as a British protectorate 
from the Cape Colony since 1885.  At that stage Britain had no intention to increase its 
costs in Africa, and with the rich diamond deposits still undiscovered, had no incentive to 
colonise Botswana.     
 
With the copper resources already known in Zambia at the end of the nineteenth 
century, Zambia was of much greater economic importance to Britain.  The British takeover 
of the country was formalised in 1889 when the British government granted permission to 
Rhodes's British South African Company to bring about a series of land-ceding treaties with 
African leaders north of the Zambezi.  The country gained independence in 1964. 
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Although roughly similar in size - Botswana at 566730 sq km and Zambia at 743390 
sq km - their population sizes differ considerably (see Table 1).  In Botswana water 
shortages place a constraint on the size of the population.  
 
Table 1: Total population (in millions) 
 Botswana Zambia 
1964  3,7 
1966 0.5  
1990 1.3 7.8 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2002a) 
 
Zambia is classified as a tropical country, situated 15º south, while Botswana is semi-
arid and 22º south.  Botswana faces desert and near desert conditions in the bulk of the 
country, while Zambia is more fertile.  Although the soils are poor in Zambia, the climate 
makes possible the cultivation of a wide range of crops.  In Botswana the shortage of water, 
sometimes severe, is a major impediment to the development of almost all areas of 
economic activity.  Apart from some of the rivers that border on the country, the Okavango 
is the only source of permanent surface water for Botswana. 
 
Both countries suffer from tropical diseases, although to a different extent.  Malaria 
risk in Botswana occurs from November to May/June in the northern parts of the country, 
while for Zambia malaria risk is present throughout the year in the entire country.   
 
Being neighbouring countries that are landlocked, ex-British colonies, and mineral 
dependent, one would expect to see more or less similar economic structures.  The 
following section, however, shows how they have developed differently. 
 
 
2.3 ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND CHANGES OVER TIME 
 
Experience from a wide range of countries shows that structural transformation (the 
transition from a low income, agrarian economy to an industrial urban economy with 
substantially higher per capita income) is important for economic growth.  According to 
Syrquin (1988) the reallocation of resources from sectors with low productivity, such as 
agriculture, to sectors of higher productivity, such as, for instance, manufacturing, 
contributes to growth if it leads to fuller or better utilization of resources.  This differs from 
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the experience, not only in most African countries3, but particularly so in Botswana and 
Zambia (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Change in economic structure 
 Botswana Zambia 
 1960 1970 1980 1990 1960 1970 1980 1990 
Agriculture (% of GDP) 40.6 28.5 11.0 4.6 15.6◊ 11.6 15.1 20.6 
Industry (% of GDP) 13.6 30.7 45.1 56.4 58.8◊ 59.8 42.1 51.3 
   Manufacturing (% of GDP) 10.9◊ 6.7 5.3 4.9 6.9◊ 11.0 18.3 36.1 
Services (% of GDP) 45.8 40.9 43.9 39.0 25.6◊ 28.6 42.8 28.1 
Imports of goods and services 
(% of GDP) 
31.2 47.7 52.1 50.1 40.1 36.8 45.4 36.6 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2002a) 
◊ 1965 data 
 
At independence the Botswana economy was dominated by agriculture, especially 
beef.  The change in the structure of economic activity started with two major events that 
took place during the last few years of the 1960s.  Firstly, De Beers announced its rich 
diamond discovery at Orapa, and secondly, Bamangwato Concessions Ltd (an Anglo-
American and Amax subsidiary) decided to develop the Selebi and Phikwe copper-nickel 
deposits.  By the beginning of the 1970s industry (which includes mining) overtook the 
agricultural sector as the sector contributing most to GDP (see Table 2).  Attempts to 
diversify the economy into manufacturing have not been that successful.     
 
The high growth in value added manufacturing for Botswana over the first half of the 
1970s (see Figure 1) was only enough to initiate industrial development, but manufacturing 
was unable to deliver sustained growth afterwards.  This is shown in Figure 2 where the 
absolute values have increased only slightly over the relevant period.   
 
                                          
3 According to Collier & Gunning (1999a) the reallocation of resources from agriculture to the 
industrial sector did not contribute to growth in Africa.  The reallocation took place with the help 
of an urban-based government, who taxed agricultural exports heavily in order to finance the 
industrial sector.  This bias against agricultural exports in favour of import-substituting industry 
was common both to socialist regimes (like Zambia) and more market-oriented ones. 
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Figure 1: Manufacturing - value added (percentage growth) 
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Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2002a) 
 
Figure 2: Changes in Botswana’s economic structure: in Pula value 
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Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2002a) 
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From Table 2 it seems that during 1960-90 Botswana had not achieved much in its 
attempt to diversify.  The contribution of the manufacturing sector, apart from the meat 
processing industry, remained negligible.  Possible reasons why this structural change did 
not happen are: 
• The focus of the government in the first two decades after independence was not on 
the diversification of the economy.  Due to neglect during British governance 
government identified more pressing matters at that stage, such as the lack of basic 
infrastructure.  The first priority stipulated in the National Development Plans, 
therefore, was to invest the income from the mining operations in physical and 
social services.  It was only by 1976 that most of these were taken care of.  The 
next pressing issue addressed in the National Development Plans was employment 
creation.  In was only in the 1980s that the focus shifted towards diversification 
away from the country’s dependence on mining and cattle (Harvey and Lewis 1990).   
• A more practical reason was the proximity of the mines to suppliers of mining 
materials, equipment and consumables in South Africa.  With these suppliers 
already established, there was no clear necessity for firms to start producing these 
goods in Botswana (Solomon 2000). 
• As a member of SACU Botswana could not impose any import protection measures 
to encourage the development of local supplies of consumable materials and 
equipment for the mining industry (Solomon 2000).   
• Most of the income generated from the mining sector did not flow directly through 
into the economy.  Apart from salaries, and dividends received by the Botswana 
government, the vast majority of shareholders lived outside Botswana (Solomon 
2000). 
 
The increase in mining activities contributed to the increase in exports as a 
percentage of GDP.  Exports increased almost 700 percent between 1969-70 and 1975 
(Dahl 1981).  Table 3 confirms the increasing importance of exports to the GDP of Botswana 
and Figure 3 shows how the value of diamond exports, in particular, has increased over 
time.   
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Table 3: Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 
   Botswana   Zambia 
  1965   28.53   49.25 
  1970   23.11   53.64 
  1975   41.10   36.60 
  1980   49.74   41.39 
  1985   61.97   36.44 
  1990   55.42   35.88 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2002a) 
 
Figure 3: Botswana diamond exports ('000 UA) 
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Source: Africa South of the Sahara (various years) 
 
The increase in exports was also due to an increase in beef exports after successful 
negotiations with Britain gave Botswana easier access to the European market.  Although 
the agricultural sector declined in relative terms because of the great expansion in the 
mining sector, beef exports grew in absolute terms.  It was only at the beginning of the 
1980s that diamonds had overtaken beef as the country’s leading foreign exchange earner 
(see Table 4).  In 1980 diamond exports accounted for almost 60 percent of total exports 
and rose rapidly thereafter to reach approximately 80 percent of total foreign exchange 
earnings by 1990.   
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Table 4: Botswana Meat and Diamonds as percentage of total exports 
 1966 1976 1980 1985 1990 
Meat and meat products 6.7 28.1 7.2 7.0 3.9 
Diamonds  24.5 60.7 75.8 80.2 
Source: Africa South of the Sahara (various years) 
 
Figure 4 shows how Botswana's inability to diversify has influenced its trade balance.  
As the country developed, its dependence on imports grew rapidly.  Like many developing 
countries, Botswana would have suffered from a chronic trade deficit, had it not been for 
income from the country’s strong mining sector (Picard 1985).  Except for a negative 
balance between 1975-1978 and again at the beginning of the 1980s Botswana experienced 
positive balances throughout the indicated period. 
 
Figure 4: Botswana: Goods exports and imports (millions US$) 
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Source: International Financial Statistics (IMF various years-a 61678AADZF... and 61678ABDZF...) 
 
One area where diversification in the Botswana economy has taken place is at the 
labour front.  At independence economic activity involved predominantly unskilled labour 
and land-intensive activities, with little capital employed (Leith 1997).  Since then the 
economy has become a much more intensive user of skilled labour and capital.   
 
The distribution of employment between the different sectors of the economy has 
also changed over time.  From 1964-1980 a tremendous shift occurred, with labour moving 
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from agriculture to industry.  Data from the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
(Various years) shows that in 1964, 90.8 percent of workers was employed in agriculture 
and only 1.8 percent in industry.  Unfortunately the ILO did not publish comparable 
statistics for later years, but according to the World Development Indicators (World Bank 
2002a) 5.1 percent of the workforce was employed in agriculture in 1980 and 33.1 percent 
in industry4.  Comparable data for 1990 changed only marginally. 
 
The structure and change of the Zambian economy differs slightly from that sketched 
for the Botswana economy.  Table 2 shows that the percentage contribution of agriculture 
firstly declines and then increases again.  And, according to these relative figures, the 
economy was more able to diversify into manufacturing than the Botswana economy.  The 
manufacturing sector benefited from the import substitution strategy, but was unable to 
decrease the reliance on copper in the export market. 
 
Zambian exports are concentrated in a single product, i.e. copper (see Table 5).  
Copper contributed 91 percent of total exports in 1964, and since then the ratio has 
changed very little.   
 
Table 5: Copper exports as % of total export value: Zambia 
   1964    91 
   1970    96 
   1974    93 
   1980    85 
   1984    86 
   1993●    86 
Source: International Trade Statistics Yearbook (United Nations various years) 
●Data could not be found for 1990; therefore the end date is shown as 1993. 
 
Copper has dominated the economy since big-scale mining operations started in 
1924.  It was discovered at a time when the world demand for copper increased with the 
expansion of electrical and automobile industries.  This increased demand immediately 
stimulated Zambian copper exports.  At independence in 1964, the industrial sector (which 
includes mining) was already the biggest contributor to GDP, as can be seen in Table 2.   
                                          
4 These figures indicate formal employment, which probably under-measures informal employment 
in, especially, the agricultural sector.  With agriculture producing 11 percent of GDP in 1980, it 
can hardly be the case that only 5.1 percent of the population was economically active in the 
agricultural sector at that time.  A figure that includes formal and informal employment will 
therefore be higher than the 5.1 percent indicated by the World Bank figures. 
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Table 3 shows how exports up to the mid-1970s contributed much more to the 
Zambian economy than to the Botswana economy.  This changed towards the 1990s when 
the situation was almost the opposite to that in 1965. 
 
Figure 5 shows Zambia's high dependence on imports during the first number of 
years in the 1980s.  Zambia was, however, able to realise positive trade balances for the 
period indicated, except 1981-1982 and 1990. 
 
Figure 5: Zambia: Goods exports and imports (millions US$) 
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The decline in the value of exports of copper from Zambia over time can be seen in 
Figure 6, but from Figure 7 it seems as if Zambian copper exports were also influenced by 
the change in the world demand for copper (over time the latter seems to have moved 
sideways)5.    
 
                                          
5 A positive correlation of 0.52 is realised between growth in Zambian exports of copper and 
growth in world imports of copper. 
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Figure 6: Zambian copper exports (nominal) 
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Source: International Trade Statistics Yearbook (United Nations various years) 
Data could not be found for whole period 
 
Figure 7: Growth in world copper imports and Zambian exports of copper 
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Zambia’s First National Development Plan (FNDP, 1966-70) called for the 
diversification of the economy and consequently for a reduction in the export of 
unprocessed copper.  Most of the set targets were met (Mwanza, Mwamba and Kakuwa 
1992).  The Second National Development Plan (SNDP, 1972-76) was not that successful.  
The launching thereof coincided with the emergence of a worldwide economic recession — a 
recession due to rising inflation that in turn was mainly caused by the 1973 oil crisis.  The 
major objectives of the SNDP included the expansion of agricultural production, 
transformation of subsistence into commercial agriculture, reduction of regional inequalities, 
and development of tourism (Mwanza, et al. 1992). Most of these objectives were not 
achieved, and the country’s agricultural potential was left undeveloped.   
 
One reason for the neglect of the agricultural sector (see Table 6 for growth figures) 
was the overwhelming presence of the mining sector.  The copper industry undermined 
agricultural production, not only with policies that forced males to find paid employment on 
the mines, but also due to the fact that employment on the mines promised a more 
consistent income than agriculture.  The absence of so many men, working for wages away 
from home, was detrimental to the development of agriculture.   
 
 
Table 6: Average annual percentage change in agricultural value added per 
hectare 
 Botswana Zambia 
1965-70 8.7 1.6 
1970-75 16.7 2.9 
1975-80 -1.1 0.1 
1980-85 -5.5 2.5 
1985-90 11.0 2.3 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2002a) 
 
Another reason for the lack of agricultural development according to Gulhati (1989) 
and Gann (1986), was the result of the specific policy framework.  Although government 
declared its intention to support agriculture, the country’s economic policy after 
independence gave primacy to import substituting industrialisation.  Zambia’s development 
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strategy was to use its copper earnings to create a manufacturing sector that would produce 
import substitutes in a highly protected environment.  This resulted in agriculture receiving 
only 6.6 percent of total fixed investment during the FNDP and 5.2 percent in the SNDP.  
During 1975-80 only 3 percent of total government expenditure went to agriculture.   
 
According to Gann (1986: 187) the funds spent on agriculture were largely wasted 
because of “excessive reliance on complex machinery, inadequate technical training, 
inefficient marketing and the gross mismanagement of credit facilities”.  Furthermore, the 
government fixed the producer prices of most major crops, and their level remained well 
below prices in neighbouring countries.  According to Gulhati (1989) a reason for the fixed 
prices was to assure a regular supply of goods at low prices to the Copperbelt and urban 
areas.  The farmers also had to pay high prices for locally manufactured consumer goods 
that were protected against imports.  Farming was, therefore, not profitable and farmers 
had little incentive to increase their operations.  The result was that food imports doubled in 
value in the first ten years after independence.  In 1964-66 Zambia produced 97 percent of 
the staple grains it consumed, but by the end of the 1970s the proportion dropped to 79 
percent (Gann 1986) and dependence on imports had increased (see Figure 5).     
 
As previously mentioned, Zambia was more able to diversify its economy into 
manufacturing than Botswana.  Its industrial policy started off with the Zambian White 
Paper of 1964, which placed considerable emphasis on foreign private investment in support 
of import-substituting production.  This intention changed a number of years later when 
President Kaunda abandoned the reliance on overseas investors.  This he had done through 
a series of nationalisations at the beginning of the 1970s that left the public sector 
producing more than 50 percent of the output (Gulhati 1989).  Government also regulated 
private firms via an elaborate battery of licenses, controls, taxes and subsidies6. 
 
The industrial sector absorbed a large share of investment and imports, while most 
of its output was sold in the home market, which was, therefore, a large net consumer of 
foreign exchange.  The inability of Zambian manufacturers to penetrate foreign markets is 
the result partly of structural impediments, like being landlocked, but also by several 
organisational features and management practices peculiar to these firms.  Gulhati (1989: 
22) describes it as follows: 
• new projects were selected without proper technical or economic screening 
• the insistence on rapid Zambianisation led to the appointment of people to key 
positions who did not have the proper qualifications and experience 
                                          
6 This point will be elaborated on in Chapter 7. 
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• managers were not allowed to remain in their posts for a reasonable time; instead, 
they were shifted around from position to position 
• overstaffing became obvious during 1975-80 when jobs increased twice as fast as 
the volume of production in the public sector while private firms shed workers more 
rapidly than their output fell 
 
The ILO did not publish labour statistics for Zambia similar to that quoted for 
Botswana, but according to the World Development Indicators, 76.1% of all labour 
employed in 1980 was employed in agriculture and 8.1 % in industry.  Although industry 
(including mining) was the biggest contributor to GDP, it clearly was not labour intensive. 
 
It can be concluded that in 1990 both these economies were still dependent on their 
mining activities for generating income.  Zambia had tried to diversify its economy much 
earlier than Botswana, and according to the relative contributions, it was more successful.  
However, this does not negate the fact that both these economies significantly depend on 
the export earnings of the mining products. 
 
The following section reviews the fluctuations in the economic growth between these 
countries. 
 
 
2.4 ECONOMIC GROWTH  
 
The divergent economic growth paths the two economies have experienced since 
independence are revealed in Figure 8.  At independence in 1964, Zambia’s per capita 
income was almost double that of Botswana’s, namely US$664 compared to US$396.  But 
for the 30 year period indicated, Botswana experienced an average GDP per capita growth 
of 7.6 percent, in contrast to Zambia’s -1.0 percent.  Botswana has even outperformed the 
rest of the developing world.  According to Sachs and Warner (1997b), African growth 
(measured as the annual average change in GDP per capita) averaged 0.8 percent per year 
over the 25-year period 1965-907, whilst the seven fastest growing developing countries 
outside Africa experienced an average of 5.8 percent and the rest of the developing world 
an average of 1.8 percent over the same period. 
 
                                          
7 Sachs and Warner (1997) highlights the bad performance of SSA by calculating 1965 GDP per 
capita in SSA as 60 percent of the average of the rest of the developing world.  By 1990 this 
figure had fallen to 35 percent. 
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Figure 8: GDP per capita (constant 1995 US$) 
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Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2002a)  
 
The divergent growth of the two countries is also evident from the following two 
graphs.  The surge in Botswana’s per capita GDP growth in the years following the discovery 
of diamond deposits, and the remaining high positive per capita growth for the rest of the 
period are shown in Figure 9.  Also evident from the figure is the downward trend in the 
Zambian per capita growth, with negative growth occurring for most parts of the period. 
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Figure 9: GDP per capita growth 
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Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2002a) 
 
What makes Botswana’s performance even more outstanding is the fact that the 
country was classified as one of the poorest countries in the world at independence in 
September 1966.  But with persistent increases in GNP (see Figure 10) Botswana 
maintained an extremely good performance.  If taken into account that Zambia’s population 
is almost 10 times larger, the GNP clearly provides a picture of divergent growth.  From 
1965 to 1985, Botswana experienced the most rapid rate of growth of GNP per capita of any 
country in the world (Harvey and Lewis 1990).   
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Figure 10: GNP at market prices (‘000 000)  
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Source: African Development Indicators (World Bank 2000) 
 
The growth in the Botswana economy was facilitated by the inflow of capital from 
abroad.  Foreign investors developed the mines and the government paid for the 
infrastructural development largely out of foreign borrowings (Harvey and Lewis 1990).  
Figure 11 shows the high contribution of gross foreign direct investment to GDP that 
Botswana experienced from the mid-1970s (unfortunately comparable data for earlier 
periods is not available).  The downward trend that can be observed in Figure 11 is still a 
source of concern in the Botswana economy.  The trend coincides with the inability to 
diversify the economy's industrial base and the fact that investment in the infrastructure 
necessary for the operation of the mining industry, was complete. 
 
With the nationalisations that took place in Zambia from the early 1970s, Zambia 
was not seen as a safe haven for foreign investors.  The persistently low levels of the 
contribution of foreign investment to GDP are shown in Figure 11.   
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Figure 11: Gross Foreign Direct Investment 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
%
 o
f G
D
P
Botswana Zambia
 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2002a) 
 
Foreign direct investments (FDI) were used to different extents in the two countries.  
With the movement of the central government from Mafeking (in South Africa) to Botswana, 
a new capital was built at Gaborone.  Capital investments were made in infrastructure, 
which includes modern housing, tarred roads to virtually all parts of the country, electricity 
generation and distribution, dams, a telephone system, as well as schools and health clinics 
(World Bank 1999).  The growth in the contribution of gross fixed capital formation to GDP 
is evident from Figure 12 and was made possible first by FDI and later by the high diamond 
revenues8 (Gaolathe 1997).   
 
The picture sketched for Zambia is not that positive.  From the mid-1970s Zambia 
experienced a sharp decline in the contribution of gross fixed capital formation to GDP.  This 
was probably due to a lack of income from copper exports, and as mentioned earlier, 
international investors were cautious to invest in a country known to have nationalised its 
mining industry.  The growth in FDI in the last number of years of the 1980s coincided with 
the growth in fixed capital formation. 
 
                                          
8 The trend coincides with growth in per capita GDP. 
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Figure 12: Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
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Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2002a) 
 
 
The figures presented for economic growth and capital formation in the two countries 
culminate in the following two graphs that show the employment situation in the two 
countries.  For Botswana employment grew more rapidly than the population, whereas the 
opposite happened in Zambia, where a stagnating economy was unable to supply job 
opportunities to a growing population.   
 27 
Figure 13: Botswana: Population and Employment  
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Source: Africa South of the Sahara (various years) 
 
Figure 14: Zambia: Population and Employment  
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Source: Africa South of the Sahara (various years) 
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With positive per capita growth and increasing employment opportunities, Botswana 
displays the characteristics of a growing economy that invested its income in employment 
creating opportunities.  Figure 15 displays high levels of labour force growth in the 
Botswana economy.  The sharp increase in the beginning of the 1970s probably displays 
labour leaving subsistence agriculture to enter the formal labour market in order to share in 
the growth of the formal economy. 
 
Figure 15: Botswana: production and labour force 
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Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2002a) 
 
Figure 16 shows the situation in Zambia.  The decline in the growth of the labour 
force in the first half of the 1970s, and again in the beginning of the 1980s, is probably due 
to a redefinition of the labour market. 
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Figure 16: Zambia: production and labour force 
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Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2002a) 
 
The following section will cast light on stabilisation indicators for the two economies. 
 
 
2.5 STABILITY INDICATORS 
 
The instability in the Zambian economy, compared to the stability in Botswana, is 
illustrated in Figure 17, which presents a comparison between the standard deviations in 
growth and inflation for the two countries.  With Botswana’s data points grouped closer to 
the origin, Botswana has experienced less instability as measured by inflation and economic 
growth rates. 
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Figure 17: A comparison of the standard deviation in growth and inflation for 
Zambia and Botswana (1975-20009 @ 5 year intervals) 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Stdev inflation
S
td
e
v 
g
ro
w
th
Botswana Zambia
 
 
The instability in the Zambian economy has often been thought to be related to the 
price of copper (see for instance Mwanza, et al. 1992).  Figure 18 shows, however, a 
negative relationship exists between economic growth in Zambia and the nominal price of 
copper.  Intuitively one would have expected it to be different and this leaves room for 
interpretation.  This is done in section 3.5.1 where the possible transmission mechanisms 
between the price of copper and economic growth are discussed. 
  
                                          
9 Due to the unavailability of data before 1975, the period is extended to 2000 in order to provide 
a more substantial comparison.   
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Figure 18: Zambian economic growth and International price of copper 
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Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2002a) and International Financial Statistics (IMF 
various years-a 11276C.ZZF...) 
 
Figure 19 shows the movement in the terms of trade for the two countries.  Both 
countries experienced unstable terms of trade, although in different respects.  Zambia had 
to deal with a falling terms of trade, while Botswana had to deal with the opposite. 
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Figure 19: Terms of Trade (1995 = 100) 
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Source: Global Coalition for Africa (2002/2003) 
 
With copper playing such a substantial role in exports in Zambia, the movement in 
the real copper price can probably explain the declining terms of trade (see Figure 20).  
Again, this issue is explored in section 3.5.1. 
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Figure 20: Real Copper Price 
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Source: (IMF various years-a: IFS series 11276C.DZF…)  
 
Figure 21 indicates that Zambia experienced high levels of budget deficits throughout 
its post-colonial period, whereas Botswana was able to realise surpluses since the beginning 
of the 1980s (Figure 22).  To finance their budget deficit, the Zambian government resorted 
to a number of methods: e.g. printing money, borrowing domestically, and borrowing 
externally.  Each of these methods had serious consequences for the economy: 
• Normally one would expect that the printing of money results in growth of the 
money supply and thereby pushes up real interest and inflation rates in the 
money market.  High interest rates would be to the disadvantage of the 
economy because business people find it expensive to borrow money to 
extend their operations.  This was, however, not the case in Zambia where 
interest rates were kept artificially low.     
• But the crowding out of private sector investment happened through another 
route.  Government borrowings averaged 10 percent of GDP in 1975-79, 
compared to 3 percent in 1970-74 (Gulhati 1989).  An unfavourable 
consequence of such lending is that in order to accommodate government 
needs, the Bank of Zambia had to restrict credit to the private sector.  In the 
words of Gulhati (1989: 10): "Monetary policy became hostage to the budget 
deficit". 
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• The last option leads to external debt (and money creation), which is shown 
in the debt figures in Table 7.  Zambia borrowed from foreign commercial 
banks, supplier’s credit agencies and the IMF.  Total external debt in 1995 
was estimated at US$ 6,366 million, that is, three times the GDP and five 
times total export earnings.   
 
Figure 21: Zambia overall budget balance 
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Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2002a) 
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Figure 22: Botswana overall budget balance 
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Table 7: Central government debt (% of GDP) – various years 
   Botswana   Zambia 
  1977   28.8   85.7 
  1981   14.1   94.6 
  1985   18.2   192.6 
  1987   15.8   127.6 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2002a) 
 
The large deficit is probably the reason for the high levels of inflation experienced by 
the Zambian economy (Figure 23).  This assumption is not out of the ordinary, because 
such a relationship has been established empirically for countries in general.  The 
relationship between fiscal deficits and inflation has been studied widely, with econometric 
studies supporting the view that the relationship between the two variables is positive.  
Fischer and Easterly (in Agénor and Montiel 1999: 161) put it as follows: “Milton Friedman’s 
famous statement that inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon is 
correct.  However, governments do not print money at a rapid rate out of a clear sky.  They 
generally print money to cover their budget deficit.  Rapid money growth is conceivable 
without an underlying fiscal imbalance, but it is unlikely.  Thus rapid inflation is almost 
always a fiscal phenomenon”.  It is therefore reasonable to assume that the same is true for 
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Zambia. 
 
Figure 23: Inflation 
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Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook (IMF various years-b) 
 
Towards the end of the 1970s Zambia faced stagflation and a rising burden of public 
debt.  The IMF, as part of a Structural Adjustment Programme, required a devaluation of 
the Kwacha in the early 1980s of no less than 40 percent, but the government decided to 
devalue the currency by only 20 percent in 1983.  During that same year the Kwacha, which 
had been linked to the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) was floated and pegged to a basket of 
currencies of Zambia’s major trading partners (Mwanza, et al. 1992).  The exponential path 
of the devaluation of the currency is evident in Figure 24. 
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Figure 24: Zambian Kwacha/US$ 
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Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook (IMF various years-b) 
 
The Botswana Pula, which was linked to the Rand for most of the period, has 
experienced a depreciation against the dollar, especially in the first half of the 1980s (see 
Figure 25). 
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Figure 25: Botswana pula / US$ 
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Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook (IMF various years-b) 
 
 
2.6 SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
 
The age distribution of the populations of the two countries has not changed much 
over time.  In 1960, 47 percent of the population in Botswana was younger than 14 years.  
In 1990 the comparable figure was 46 percent.  In Zambia 45 percent of the population was 
younger than 14 years in 1960 and 46 percent in 1990.  Both countries, therefore, have 
young populations. 
 
Although Zambia has a much larger population than Botswana, both countries have 
low levels of population density.  However, due to the fact that Zambia was a more 
developed country at independence, the population was more urbanised at that stage than 
was the case for Botswana (see Table 8).  Urbanisation in both countries continued until the 
1990s.  In 1990 both had the same percentage of rural populations. 
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Table 8: Rural population (% of total population) 
 Botswana Zambia 
1960 98.2 82.8 
1970 91.6 69.8 
1980 84.9 60.2 
1990 58.5 58.0 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2002a) 
 
At independence Zambia was the third most urbanised country in mainland sub-
Saharan Africa, with 78 percent of the urban population located in the 10 largest urban 
areas, all situated along the railway line extending south from the Copperbelt, through 
Lusaka, to the Victoria Falls.  In Botswana the population distribution is skewed towards an 
eastern strip.  This area is the best-endowed and most developed region of the country, 
where 80 percent of the total population live.  The Botswana population is concentrated 
along the railway line (Picard 1985: 4).     
 
Another important difference between the two countries is the ethnic composition of 
their populations.  There are 73 different ethnic groups among Zambia’s indigenous 
population, and over 80 languages have been identified (Williams 2001).  In contrast, the 
Batswana consists of only eight ethnic groups.   
 
According to the World Bank (1996) living standards have declined in Zambia since 
the mid-1970s, with nearly 70 percent of Zambians living in households where basic needs 
are not being met and where chronic malnutrition affects 45 percent of all children.  
Malnutrition is pervasive in both rural and urban areas.  Furthermore, Zambia is one of the 
few countries to have experienced an increase in infant mortality (World Bank 1996).  Table 
9 shows the relatively high figures of infant mortality for Zambia. 
 
 
Table 9: Infant mortality rate - deaths per 1000 live births 
 Botswana Zambia 
1960 170 213 
1970 139 181 
1980 94 149 
1990 62 191 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2002a) 
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The emphasis placed on primary health care facilities in Botswana resulted in a 
dramatic decline in infant mortality in the 1970s and 1980s.  The strategy since the mid-
1970s emphasised the widespread provision of primary health care, rather than providing 
hospitals and doctors for a few.  The effectiveness of this strategy is illustrated in a much 
lower infant mortality rate for Botswana than for Zambia.     
 
For both countries life expectancy has declined from the mid-1980s to 1990, (see 
Table 10) due to a high incidence of AIDS.  But both countries were in 1990 still in a better 
position than they were in 1960. 
 
 
Table 10: Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 
 Botswana Zambia 
1960 47 42 
1965 49 44 
1970 52 46 
1975 55 49 
1980 58 50 
1985 60 50 
1990 57 49 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2002a) 
 
Both countries have done well in lowering illiteracy rates (see Table 11).   
 
Table 11: Illiteracy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above) 
 Botswana Zambia 
1970 53.9 52.3 
1980 42.5 41.4 
1990 31.9 31.9 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2002a) 
 
Table 12 points out that school enrolment has been a problem in both Botswana and 
Zambia.  At primary school level Zambia started out much better than Botswana, but in 
1990 the figure dropped to below 100 percent again.  At secondary level, Botswana has also 
outperformed Zambia.   
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Table 12: School enrolment (% of gross◊) 
 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 
primary school 
Botswana 63 71 91 105 113 
Zambia 90 97 90 105 99 
      
secondary school 
Botswana 7 15 19 29 43 
Zambia 13 15 16 19 24 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2002a) 
◊: total enrolment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to 
the level of education shown 
 
 
One of the problems in the Botswana economy is a skew distribution of income.  The 
success of attempts to reduce income inequality has been modest.  Income inequality in 
Botswana is high by international standards.  Botswana comes second only to Namibia as 
the country with the highest Gini coefficient in the world, with the poorest 20 percent 
earning 2.2 percent of national income and the highest 20 percent 70.3 percent (see Table 
13 for a comparison with South Africa and Zambia).  According to Picard (1985), little of the 
economic revenue generated from the mining industry has gone to the average citizen, with 
the effect that rural income has risen very little.   
 
Table 13: Gini coefficients 
Botswana (1993) 63.0 
Namibia (1993) 70.7 
Zambia (1998) 52.6 
South Africa (1995) 59.3 
Source: World Bank (2005) 
 
The same trend can be identified in Zambia.  While two-thirds of the population live 
on the land in Zambia, the agricultural sector was neglected in favour of the mining 
industry.  This has had a skewing effect on income distribution, where those with formal 
employment in the mining industry and government agencies received a much higher 
income than those people living off the land. 
 
 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter the two countries were compared on different grounds.  From the 
overview an interesting picture unfolds.  At the time of independence in the mid-1960s, the 
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Zambian economy was performing much better than the Botswana economy in terms of 
economic growth and investment in infrastructure.  Since independence the picture has 
changed markedly, with Botswana achieving economic growth levels that are high not just 
for Africa, but also the world.  The Zambian economy, on the other hand, has stagnated. 
 
At independence, Botswana largely depended on agriculture to provide the country 
with income.  This changed with the discovery of rich mineral deposits.  In Zambia the 
mineral wealth was already known and being exploited at independence, and due to a 
number of reasons the agricultural sector was neglected.  Both countries failed to diversify 
their exports and depended on mining for the generation of GDP and export income.   
 
Copper and diamonds performed very differently in the international markets and 
this difference may be the reason for the divergence in economic growth between these 
countries.  Rich diamond deposits were discovered in Botswana shortly after independence 
and their exports contributed to improved trade.  The growth and stabilisation figures show 
that Zambia was unable to capitalise on earlier gains from copper and had to deal with a 
decline in the terms of trade.  The Botswana government managed the income from the 
newly discovered diamond industry to the advantage of the country.  Stable inflation, and a 
stable exchange rate contributed to the highest per capita growth rate in the world for the 
30-year period shown. 
 
It leaves an interesting question.  Why did two neighbouring, landlocked, mineral 
rich countries, which both gained independence from Britain in the mid-1960s, produce such 
different economic and socio-economic results?  Can their growth performance be explained 
by the difference in the minerals they export?  Why did Zambia succumb to the resource 
curse and Botswana not?  And, furthermore, do the neoclassical and new growth theories 
sufficiently explain the divergent growth paths? 
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3 CHAPTER 3 
AN EXPLANATION OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BOTSWANA AND ZAMBIA 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Differences in economic growth between countries have been the focus of economic 
research for a long time.  Much work, even as far back as the classical economists of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century (Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, David Ricardo and Karl 
Marx), has been done to explain why some countries prosper while others stagnate.  This 
chapter outlines broadly the progress made in development thinking since the time of 
classical economists and establishes whether the augmented Solow growth model, and 
other models from the growth literature, sufficiently explain growth differences between 
Botswana and Zambia. 
 
One of these “other factors”, and one which applies to Botswana and Zambia in 
particular, is the difference in economic growth that results from the endowment of natural 
resources.  Because of the importance of resource dependence in the two countries, this 
factor, namely the resource curse hypothesis, will be discussed in a separate section.  In 
studies done on the hypothesis (for example Neumayer 2004, Sachs and Warner 1995a, 
Stevens 2003), Zambia regularly features as an example of a country that has fallen prey to 
it, whereas Botswana turns out to be the opposite.   
 
Both countries have an abundance of natural resources and are resource dependent 
in their exports, but achieved different outcomes in terms of economic growth.  Questions 
such as why Zambia has fallen prey to the resource curse and Botswana not, will feature in 
section 3.5.  In chapter 2 it is shown that an increasing nominal copper price cannot explain 
the stagnation in the Zambian economy.  The declining real copper price probably explains 
the declining terms of trade due to the importance of copper in the export market.  With 
copper being such an important factor in the economy, it is important to establish the 
nature of the transmission mechanism between the copper price and economic growth.  
Section 5 explores two possibilities: Dutch disease or government’s reaction to an unstable 
copper price. 
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3.2 CLASSICAL, NEOCLASSICAL AND THE ‘NEW’ GROWTH 
THEORIES 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, preoccupation with the problem of economic 
growth and development is not exclusively the domain of modern economic thought.  Great 
economic thinkers of earlier times were also concerned with the nature and causes of the 
growth of the “wealth of nations”.  For Adam Smith, the father of classical economics, 
economic growth would take care of itself if the rules of the free market were obeyed.  
Smith supported a laissez-faire government because, according to him, political institutions 
would only limit people from making full use of their talents and the available natural 
resources.  Smith supported the idea that governments should provide little else than 
incentives necessary to make sure that market participants engage in productive 
activities10.  The rest should be left to the “invisible hand” of the market that would secure 
the optimal outcome for a particular economy by rewarding those that contribute to 
economic growth and punishing those that do not act in the best interest of the market 
(Landes 1990).   
 
Differences in economic development between nations were ascribed to differences 
in the endowment of labour, capital and especially land.  It was accepted that those nations 
more richly endowed with natural resources were bound to be richer.  Today we know this is 
not necessarily true.  One only has to look at Africa where most countries are richly 
endowed with natural resources, but where these resources are more often associated with 
stagnation rather than prosperity. 
 
Smith’s theories were developed and refined in the decades after the appearance of 
An Inquiry into the Wealth and Poverty of Nations in 1776, by people like Thomas Robert 
Malthus, David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill.  Malthus’ work on the relationship between 
population and economic growth, together with Ricardo’s explanation of diminishing returns 
in the use of land, focused attention on the conflict between population growth and 
resources.  However, their fear that food production would not keep up with population 
growth was shown to be misguided towards the end of the 19th century when the use of 
machinery in agricultural production increased productivity in the use of land.  Better ways 
of transportation opened new possibilities for trade and made food and raw materials 
available to the more populous countries.   
 
                                          
10 It is interesting to note that Smith already had some of the ideas that were later formalised 
within the New Institutional theory. 
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Economic growth was no longer seen as a problem and the importance of economic 
growth as a field of research diminished.  Economics came to be dominated by static 
neoclassical value theory under the influence of Alfred Marshall’s Principles of Economics 
(1890).  Marshall treated growth and development as natural phenomena, with issues that 
are now recognised as central elements in the growth process, i.e. a nation’s institutions, its 
technology, and its history, as autonomous (Abramovitz 1991).  It was only after the two 
world wars and the Great Depression that the need to study something else than general 
equilibrium became apparent.   
 
 
Under-investment 
After World War II economists focused their attention on theories that could show 
how newly independent poor countries could grow and catch up with developed countries.  
Thinking was influenced by the Great Depression and the apparent successful 
industrialisation of the Soviet Union through forced savings and investment.  With an 
abundance of labour due to the Depression and the Soviet Union's economic performance in 
mind, Sir Arthur Lewis (1955) suggested a model where machinery was the only constraint.   
If more factories could be built, it would not only absorb the labour, but also contribute to 
production and hence to economic growth.  In his view growth was proportional to 
investment in these factories, and to secure investments, a country had to increase its 
domestic savings (Easterly 2001).   
 
Lewis described development as the process of transforming a country from a net 5 
percent saver and investor to a net 12 percent saver and investor.  For Lewis and other 
development economists, poor countries were unable to make the required investments 
because they could not save enough.  This lack of savings to invest was called a “finance 
gap”, and could be filled with either donor money, investments from abroad, or export 
income from mineral resources (Easterly 2001).  W.W. Rostow (1960) contributed to this 
line of thinking with his theory on the stages of economic growth.  In Rostow’s take-off 
stage, leading sectors, such as a rapidly growing export market, or an accelerating flow of 
technology, drives the take-off.  Once these leading sectors begin to grow rapidly, the take-
off occurs.  For this take-off to occur, however, Lewis’s finance gap had to be filled.  
According to Easterly (2001), Rostow tried to demonstrate to the Third World that 
communism was not the only effective state organisation that could launch a take-off11.   
 
                                          
11 The subtitle of Rostow’s Stages book was “A non-communist manifesto”. 
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Following from this, one cure for underdevelopment would be for Western nations to 
provide Third World nations with aid to fill the financing gap between their national savings 
and the investment necessary for the take-off.   
 
Unfortunately the incentives to use aid in a manner that would benefit the country in 
the long run, do not necessarily come easily.  Too often the reality is that aid does not 
finance investment, but rather increased consumption.  Easterly and Levine (1998) found on 
average no relationship between aid and investment. They suggest that if no incentive 
existed in a country to invest in the future, aid is not going to change that.  If citizens were 
used to consumption at the cost of investment, they will do likewise with aid.  Aid can even 
have the additional drawback that it can provide the incentive to lower domestic savings, 
and, the larger the finance gap, the more eligible the country becomes for aid (Easterly and 
Levine 1998).   
 
Easterly (2001: 42) describes the “most spectacular failure” of the financing gap 
model by comparing Zambia’s actual average income to what it would have been if filling 
the financing gap had worked as predicted.  He predicts that Zambia would have been an 
industrialised country with a per capita income of $20 000.  With a per capita income of 
$380 in 2003, this is hardly the case.  Easterly shows that Zambia's investment rate went 
down after it received aid and that those investments did not yield growth in any case.   
 
Zambia is not alone in this lack of growth due to investment funds.  Figure 26 shows 
no correlation between investment per GDP and GDP growth.  Both Nigeria and Hong Kong 
increased their physical capital stock per worker by over 250 percent from 1960 to 1985.  
The results of this massive investment were different: Nigeria’s output per worker rose by 
12 percent during that period, while Hong Kong’s rose by 328 percent.  Again, this is an 
extreme example, but serves as a reminder that investment is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient, condition for high growth rates. 
 
Capital growth does not necessarily translate into output growth unless the 
investment was made in productive activities (Easterly 2001).  In the case of Hong Kong the 
investment was made in industrial diversification and in Nigeria in the production of oil.  
Hong Kong’s investment generated income and growth, while the investment in Nigeria was 
wasted. 
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Figure 26: GDP Growth and lagged investment/GDP, 4-year averages 
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Source: Shirley (2004: 7) 
   
 
Lack of technological innovation 
Nobel laureate Robert Solow’s contribution to the debate regarding investment in 
capital goods was to argue that diminishing returns would decrease output as more 
machines per person are introduced.  Poor countries with a small amount of capital per 
head should then grow faster than rich countries with a lot of capital per head, leading to 
the convergence of per capita incomes and living standards across the world (Thirlwall 
1999).   
 
Although a logical argument, many industrial economies have been able to realise 
sustained economic growth per worker for more than two centuries.  This led a number of 
scholars to investigate the factors that attributed to economic growth over many decades in 
the United States.  Although they used different data sets, they all reached the same 
conclusion: only a small fraction of US per capita growth could be attributed to total input 
growth per capita and only a small fraction of labour productivity growth could be attributed 
to growth of capital per worker.  An overwhelmingly large fraction (approximately 90 
percent) was due to the advancement of what they called “total factor productivity”, the 
contents of which were at that stage unidentified and unmeasured (Abramovitz 1991).   
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Solow’s explanation for this paradox was technological change.  He explained this in 
two famous papers (1957, 1962), in which he emphasised the importance of technological 
progress as the ultimate driving force of sustained economic growth.  According to his 
explanation, growth in the long run was a function of technical change, and not of savings 
or investment.  Higher saving would yield higher growth, but only temporarily before it ran 
into diminishing returns.   
 
Following Solow’s papers, theoretical work on technological change was resumed in 
the early 1980s.  At that stage cross-sectional studies were inspired by increasing concerns 
about the economic performance of the poorer regions of the world, increased availability of 
standardised data, enabling reliable econometric work, and studies that have shown no sign 
of convergence of per capita incomes across the world economy.   
 
Work done by Robert Lucas (1988) and Paul Romer (1986, 1990) relaxed the 
assumption of diminishing returns to capital.  With constant or increasing returns to capital 
there can be no presumption of convergence of per capita incomes across the world.  Lucas 
and Romer created renewed interest in the link between investment and economic growth 
by particularly emphasising the importance of investment in ideas and human capital.  
According to them, research and development prevents the marginal product of capital to 
fall and the capital-output ratio to increase.  Technological progress and human capital 
formation were endogenised within the general equilibrium models of growth, in what came 
to be known as the ‘new’ (endogenous) growth theory (Abramovitz 1991).   
 
 
Lack of education 
The new growth theory had interesting consequences for developing countries.  It 
emphasised the importance for a country to develop its stock of human capital and the 
importance of obtaining the benefits from the international exchange of ideas that 
accompanies an open economy.  It was especially Paul Romer (1993: 71) who highlighted 
the importance of ideas in the development process: “ideas are therefore the critical input in 
the production of more valuable human and nonhuman capital. But human capital is also 
the most important input in the production of new ideas.  Physical capital (a computer for 
example) is often used in an ancillary way, but a trained person is still the central input in 
the process …”.  Romer reminds us, however, that investment in formal education takes a 
long time to produce benefits.  He suggests that integration in the world markets should be 
considered because it offers large potential gains when using someone else’s ideas.  “And 
someone else's ideas are basically costless to use”.  
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In development thinking, education was for long seen as the cure to all ills.  The 
secretary general to UNESCO, Federic Mayor, put it as follows: “the level of education of the 
overall population of a particular country… determines that country’s ability to share in 
world development, …to benefit from the advancement of knowledge and to make progress 
itself while contributing to the education of others.  This is self-evident truth that is no 
longer in dispute” (quoted in Easterly 2001: 72).  The 1997 World Development Report 
(World Bank 1997: 52) notes that “many attribute a good part of the East Asian countries’ 
economic success to their unwavering commitment to public funding for basic education as 
the cornerstone of economic development”. 
 
Unfortunately the growth response to the educational expansions of the last four 
decades has been disappointing.  What was not taken into account when emphasising 
education, is the fact that education per se does not cause economic growth.  If educated 
people do not have the opportunity to use their skills in a productive fashion, the 
investment in education will render little profitable output.  If people can earn a good living 
simply by, for example, lobbying government for favours, investment in education will show 
no long-term benefit (Easterly 2001).   
 
Furthermore, what should not be lost sight of is the importance of the type and 
quality of education.  In South Korea, for example, the emphasis was on technical and 
scientific education and it has paid them high dividends.  In Africa, however, large 
expenditure (relative to GDP) on education did not result in growth.  African countries with 
rapid growth in human capital over the 1960 to 1987 period – countries like Angola, 
Mozambique, Ghana, Zambia, Madagascar, Sudan and Senegal, were growth disasters.   
 
 
Geography 
In the late 1990s geography became a popular explanation for growth disasters.  
Geography refers to the climate, disease burden, transport barriers, which include distance 
from developed markets and the landlockedness of countries, and natural resource 
endowment.  Scholars who advocate geography as the main determinant for economic 
growth and development, are, for instance, Bloom and Sachs (1998), Gallup, Sachs and 
Mellinger (1999), McArthur and Sachs (2001).  Two books, one by economic historian David 
Landes (The Wealth and Poverty of Nations (1998)) and the other by ecologist Jarred 
Diamond (Guns, Germs and Steel (1997)), also explore the origins of economic 
development from a geographical perspective. For Bloom and Sachs (1998: 211) an 
"extraordinarily disadvantageous geography" lies at the root of Africa's poverty.  They do 
not argue that Africa is fated to be poor because of its geography, but that “economists 
 50 
neglect the role of the forces of nature in shaping economic performance in general, and for 
Africa in particular”.   
 
Although the Hecksher-Ohlin theory suggested that trade patterns will follow the 
path of relative factor availability, Bloom and Sachs (1998: 113), for instance, suggest a 
much more interventionistic approach: “good policies should be tailored to geographical 
realities”.  If agricultural productivity is low due to climatological reasons, growth should be 
led by outward-oriented industry and services.  They base their evidence on the fact that 
only a few countries in the tropics have made significant breakthroughs in economic growth 
in the past twenty-five years and in almost all cases this happened through the promotion 
of manufacturing or service sector exports.  The reason why they suggest that economic 
growth should be promoted through manufacturing and services is because technologies in 
manufacturing and services can transfer across climatic zones much more readily than 
technologies in agriculture.  The greatest tropical success stories12 are small island 
economies with almost no agricultural sectors13 and rapid growth in manufacturing and 
service sector exports.   
 
Most of the supporters of geography highlight the fact that good policies could 
overcome the fate of bad geography.  Hausmann and Rigobon (2002: 46), for instance, 
state, “there is still much we do not understand about the links between geography and 
economic growth.  But what we do know suggest that the challenges of economic 
development must be examined from a very new perspective.  Denying the impact of 
geography will only lead to misguided policies and wasted effort.  Geography may pose 
severe constraints on economic growth, but it need not be destiny”.  In other words, 
geography does not predestine the level of economic development as long as the policies 
take the constraints it impose into account.  Brazil, for instance, benefits from its tropical 
location by being able to harvest some field crops twice a year.   
 
To conclude this section, it can be said that thinking about a panacea for economic 
growth has changed much over time.  Although it was found that most of the factors 
discussed above are not sufficient explanations for economic growth, they still play 
important roles in the process of economic growth and development.  They cannot be 
discarded when thinking about economic growth, but not one of them is presently seen as 
the sole explanation for growth differences. 
                                          
12 In a world ranking of countries by GNP per capita, only three of the top thirty lie in the tropics: 
Brunei, Hong Kong and Singapore and their geographical locations leave them ideally suited for 
growth through trade.   
13 The sugar industry in Mauritius provides an exception to this phenomenon. 
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The following section applies the augmented Solow model to Zambia and Botswana 
to determine to what extent it explains the growth differences between these economies. 
  
 
3.3 EMPIRICAL REASONS FOR GROWTH DIFFERENCES 
ACCORDING TO NEOCLASSICAL THEORY 
 
The augmented Solow model is used instead of the textbook Solow model is because 
the former was found to explain a greater percentage of the variation in cross-country per 
capita income.  In the textbook Solow model economic growth is studied by assuming a 
standard neoclassical production function with decreasing returns to capital.  It shows that 
saving and population growth rates determine a country's steady-state level of per capita 
income - the higher the rate of savings, the richer the country, the higher the population 
growth, the poorer the country.  These variables were found to explain more than half of 
the cross-country variation in income per capita (Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992).   
 
Due to the importance of human capital14, Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), and 
others such as Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), added a proxy for investment in human 
capital in an augmented model.  In the augmented model savings, population growth and 
human capital are considered to be responsible for economic growth over time, given that 
the initial level of GDP must also be taken into consideration.  The latter is referred to as the 
convergence term.   
 
The cross-country economic data is taken from the Penn World Tables (mark 6.1) 
(Heston, Summers and Aten 2002), unless stated otherwise.  The data set contains 76 
countries of which 22 are from Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
 
Convergence term 
The convergence hypothesis states broadly that countries will converge towards 
similar output per capita ratios as factors of production seek the optimum rate of return in a 
competitive system.  Initially, backward economies will grow faster as all the countries 
converge towards a shared steady state.  According to Knack (2003: 8) evidence over a 
broad range of countries suggest that relative backwardness presents an opportunity for 
                                          
14 Human capital was found to be over half of the total US capital stock in 1969 (Mankiw, et al. 
1992).   
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nations: “the lower a nation’s per capital income, the greater is this opportunity to grow 
rapidly through borrowed technology and new investment”.   
 
A weaker form of the hypothesis – conditional convergence – predicts convergence 
of countries to their own steady state level of income as determined by their savings rate, 
population growth rate, levels of human capital and so on, rather than converging towards 
the levels of technological leaders.  This leaves room for negative growth rates due to 
unfavourable rates of savings, fertility, or human capital.  It is the weaker form of the 
convergence hypothesis which seems consistent with the cross country experience (Mankiw, 
et al. 1992).   
 
In 1960 Zambia was 58th in a ranking of countries from rich to poor in the sample 
and if the convergence hypothesis holds it would be expected, ceteris paribus, that Zambia 
would be amongst the faster growers.  As shown in Chapter 2, was not the case.  Even 
within SSA, Zambia performed worse than expected from its relative poverty in 1960.  At 
64th on the list in 1960 Botswana was therefore poorer than Zambia at the time, but has 
since turned out to be a fast-growing economy.   
 
From these, and other, differential performances, it can be concluded that although 
relative backwardness in some cases appear relevant, the explanation for the difference in 
the performance of Botswana and Zambia must be sought elsewhere.   
 
 
Savings rate 
An economy’s savings rate indicates the rate at which the formation of physical 
capital can be financed in a closed economy.  But because of openness, the savings rate 
does not capture the rate of capital formation, and hence the growth literature uses the 
investment rate as the appropriate indicator of capital formation.  Table 14 compares the 
investment share of GDP in Zambia and Botswana with that of the SSA and the total 
samples during the early years of independence.  
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Table 14: The investment rate (average 1960-75 15) 
Ranking of growth Country/group Investment rate 
World SSA 
Zambia 0.17 33 4 
Botswana 0.15 41 7 
SSA 0.11   
World 0.17   
 
According to this indicator Zambia was performing better than Botswana for the 
1960-75 period.  The investment rate in Zambia was average compared to the total sample 
but high for a SSA country.  If it is taken into account that Botswana had already started to 
outperform Zambia in the first half of the 1970s (see Figure 8), the investment rate does 
not account for Zambia’s poor economic performance.  This result shows how misleading it 
can be to explain the economic performance of a country with reference to the determinants 
identified in cross-country regressions.  A more in-depth study is necessary to find reasons 
for unproductive investments. 
 
 
Population growth 
Both the steady state and the growth rate of the economy are inversely related to 
the population growth rate in the augmented Solow model.  There is no causal claim in this 
statement, indeed the reverse applies: there is a feedback effect from the growth effect to 
the population growth, as is well established in the growth literature (see for instance Jones 
1998).  Table 15 shows population growth rates for Zambia and Botswana as well as the 
SSA and world samples.  
 
 
                                          
15 The average of a limited period (the first number of years after independence) is used to take 
care of a possible problem of endogeneity.  Investment is necessary for capital investments, but 
after a number of years the capital investments (if they were in productive investments) will 
deliver an income that can then be used to finance capital investments. 
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Table 15: Population growth rate (1960-65) 
Ranking of growth Country/group Population 
growth World SSA 
Zambia 2.8 23 6 
Botswana 2.6 29 8 
SSA 2.5   
World 2.2   
 
In both countries population growth was higher than the world average, and also 
slightly higher than the average for SSA. 
 
 
Human capital 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) demonstrated the explanatory power of including a 
proxy for human capital investment in the Solow model.  Primary school enrolment in 1960 
is used in Table 16 as a proxy for human capital investment in a cross sample comparison 
to control for the feedback effect. 
 
Table 16: Primary school enrolment 
Ranking of growth Country/group Primary 
school 
enrolment 
World SSA 
Zambia 0.42 64 11 
Botswana 0.42 64 11 
SSA 0.44   
World 0.74   
 
From Table 16 one would predict a low steady state and low transitional growth rate 
for Zambia and Botswana on account of the low level of the initial human capital 
endowment.  Again it seems there is more to a country’s growth than is revealed by cross-
country studies. 
 
In summary, the augmented Solow model would have predicted uninspiring 
economic growth for both Zambia and Botswana due to low investment in human capital 
and high population growth, which would have lowered their expected growth rates.  
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In the following section other factors from the empirical literature are used in an 
effort to explain growth differences between Botswana and Zambia. 
 
 
3.4 OTHER FACTORS FROM THE EMPIRICAL GROWTH 
LITERATURE 
 
Work done by Doppelhofer, Miller and Sala-i-Martin (2000) and extended by Burger 
and du Plessis (2004) identified seven variables that have been robustly related to growth 
for the same sample of countries used in the previous section: initial GDP (discussed 
above), a tropical dummy, primary school enrolment (discussed above), a demographic 
shift variable, Sachs and Warner’s trade openness proxy, the black market premium, and a 
neighbourhood dummy. This sub-section discusses those variables in this list that had not 
been discussed so far.   
 
 
Tropical dummy 
The tropical dummy indicates the extent to which a country’s climate could be 
described as tropical.  Sachs and Warner (1997b), amongst others, have argued that this 
characteristic is one of the most powerful explanatory factors of cross country growth 
performance, based on theories such as the adverse impact on growth due to the poorer 
soil quality and also the prevalence of tropical diseases like malaria.  
 
With the exception of Botswana (with tropical index value of 0.5), Madagascar (with 
index value of 0.9) and South Africa (with tropical index value of 0) all of the SSA countries 
in the sample are classified as fully tropical.  If the geographical theories of economic 
growth were correct this would partly explain the underperformance of SSA as a group, but 
it would offer no explanation of Zambia’s relative underperformance within the SSA group.  
 
 
Demographic shift variable 
The demographic transition that countries made in the last century has been 
identified as one of the driving forces behind the movement from stagnation to growth (see 
for instance Galor and Weil 1999, 2000).  It is argued that a reduction in fertility rates and 
population growth enable economies to apply a larger share of factor accumulation and 
technological progress to growth in income per capita.  This happens because there is a 
more intensive use of the stock of capital and land, an enhancement of investment in 
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human capital, change in the age distribution of the population, and a temporary increase in 
the size of the labour force relative to the population as a whole (Galor 2004).   
 
The demographic shift variable relates the growth rate of the working age population 
to the growth rate of the total population.  Burger and du Plessis (2004) find a robust and 
significant effect, in other words, the demographic transition is robustly related to growth.  
Table 17 shows a sample comparison of the demographic shift variable from Zambia and 
Botswana.  The variable shows the growth rate of the economically active population 
(between ages 15 and 65) minus the growth rate of the overall population (Sachs and 
Warner 1997b). 
 
Table 17: Demographic transition (1965-1990) 
Ranking of growth Country/group Demographic 
transition World SSA 
Zambia -0.18 70 16 
Botswana 0.43 20 1 
SSA -0.09   
World 0.2   
 
Both on an international and on a regional comparison, Zambia’s demographic 
transition was debilitating, whereas, according to the indicator, Botswana has accomplished 
the demographic transition. 
 
 
Sachs and Warner’s trade openness proxy  
Sachs and Warner (1997b: 18) argued that closed trade policies have been “…cutting 
Africa off from the growth dynamism of world markets”.  In the growth literature trade 
openness is credited with enhancing both static (allocative) and dynamic efficiency.  But 
there is also a discipline effect, whereby governments of open economies are more directly 
limited in the pursuit of potentially unorthodox policies by the market discipline of the 
international financial markets.  Table 18 provides a sample comparison of the Sachs and 
Warner (1997b) openness variable for Zambia and Botswana.  
 
 57 
Table 18: Openness16 
Ranking of growth Country/group Openness 
World SSA 
Zambia 0 51 8 
Botswana 0.42 27 1 
SSA 0.06   
World 0.38   
 
On the Sachs and Warner measure of openness Zambia had a highly closed regime 
from the 1960s until the 1990s.  This is consistent with the Artadi and Sala-i-Martin’s 
(2003) observation that African economies have been considerably more closed than 
economies in other regions. Alternatively, Botswana was markedly more open and not only 
outperformed the other SSA countries, but was even better than the average for the world 
sample.  One can assume that its membership of SACU and the accompanied inability to set 
its own external tariffs contributed to this performance. 
 
 
Black market premium 
Underdeveloped financial markets are, evidently, an important contributing factor to 
poor economic growth, notably in Africa.  While there are no comprehensive indicators of 
the financial sector development, the black market premium is a frequently used proxy 
(see, for example, the survey in Ndikumana 2001).  The variable is an indication of how well 
the financial sector is developed, in other words, if a financial system is not adequately 
developed to provide the services that are demanded, people will turn to the black market 
for financial transactions.   
 
                                          
16 The OPEN6590 variable is the fraction of years during the period 1965-1990 in which the country 
is rated as an open economy according to the criteria in Sachs and Warner (1995b). An economy 
is deemed to be open to trade if it satisfies four tests: (1) average tariff rates below 40 percent; 
(2) average quota and licensing coverage of imports of less than 40 percent; (3) a black market 
exchange rate premium that averaged less than 20 percent during the decade of the 1970s and 
1980s; and (4) no extreme controls (taxes, quotas, state monopolies) on exports.   
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Table 19: Black market premium 
Ranking of growth Country/group Black market 
Premium World SSA 
Zambia 0.56 7 5 
Botswana 0.12 36 12 
SSA 0.26   
World 0.18   
 
Table 19 indicates that Zambia’s black market premium for foreign exchange was not 
only high internationally (7th highest) but also high within SSA.  This result intimates that 
the financial markets in Zambia might have been a significant constraint on growth over the 
sample period.  Again, Botswana performs better than the world average.  
 
 
Neighbourhood effect 
This variable from Sachs and Warner (1997a) records the average annual growth of 
neighbouring economies between 1970 and 1989.  The intuitive explanation is that there 
are positive spillovers from having fast growing neighbours.  It would also have been 
indicative if an index was available for indicating the political stability between neighbouring 
countries (if neighbouring countries did not get along politically, it would possibly be 
detrimental for their growth).  Unfortunately no such index is available.  Table 20 provides 
an international comparison on neighbourhoods.  
 
Table 20: Neighbourhood17 
Ranking of growth Country/group Neighbourhood 
World SSA 
Zambia -1.2 72 20 
Botswana -0.05 61 12 
SSA 0.07   
World 1.4   
 
On this measure both Botswana and Zambia were not only in one of the least 
conducive neighbourhoods in SSA for economic growth, but in one of the least conducive 
                                          
17 This variable measures growth of neighbouring countries. It was derived by first calculating 
aggregate GDP per-capita, measured in purchasing-power-adjusted dollars, of all countries that 
border a given country.  Standard growth rates were then calculated from the aggregate GDP 
per-capita of this group of countries between 1970 and 1989 (Sachs and Warner 1997a). 
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neighbourhoods anywhere in the world, with Zambia in a weaker position than Botswana18.  
With both economies relatively close to South Africa (especially Botswana), one would have 
expected a higher ranking in SSA.  This variable is therefore read with caution. 
 
In summary, the neighbourhood and demographic shift effects contributed to modest 
expectations of growth in Zambia for the period under consideration, though neither of 
these variables was open to direct influence by the Zambian government.  Although not 
directly related to government policy, the demographic shift variable is endogenously 
determined by government policy—for instance access to schooling for women.  Botswana’s 
demographic shift variable would have predicted high economic growth for Botswana.  
 
The black market premium and openness measure are both due to government 
policies and in both these instances decisions made by the Zambian government could have 
had a negative impact on subsequent growth.  On the other hand it seems that the 
Botswana government has made policy choices regarding these variables that are more 
supportive of long-term economic growth.  Furthermore, both the black market premium 
(on the financial development side) and the openness proxy (on the trade regime side) 
capture important institutional features that are dealt with in more detail in the following 
chapters.   
 
 
3.5 THE RESOURCE CURSE HYPOTHESIS 
 
The way resource abundance turns out not to be a blessing for economic growth, 
was discussed more than two centuries ago by Adam Smith (1981 [1776]: 562): 
 
  Projects of mining, instead of replacing the capital employed in them, together with 
the ordinary profits of stock, commonly absorb both capital and stock.  They are the 
projects, therefore, to which of all others a prudent law-giver, who desired to 
increase the capital of his nation, would least choose to give an extraordinary 
encouragement…. 
 
During the last number of decades empirical evidence has been added to expand the 
discussion.  It was shown that natural resource-abundant economies have tended to grow 
slower in the post-world-war II period than economies without substantial resources.  It was 
especially Sachs and Warner (1995a, 1997a, 2001) who have done important work in this 
regard.  They show that none of the countries with extremely abundant natural resources in 
1970 (their base year) have grown rapidly during the next 20 years.  Their empirical 
                                          
18 Chapter 7 discusses the effect of neighbours on transaction costs. 
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evidence indicates the negative relationship between economic growth and exports of 
natural resources presented in Figure 27.   
 
Figure 27: Growth and natural resource abundance 1970-1989 
 
Source: Sachs and Warner (2001: 829) 
 
The Asian tigers, such as South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore are all resource-
poor, while growth losers, such as Nigeria, Angola, Venezuela, Mexico and Zambia are all 
resource-rich.  Table 21 shows how resource poor countries have on average outperformed 
resource rich countries since 1960.  Amongst the resource rich countries, the ones with hard 
minerals have done the worst.  The phenomenon that resource poor countries outperform 
resource rich countries has been termed the "resource curse".   
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Table 21: Relative performance of resource rich countries 
Resource 
endowment 
Number of 
countries 
GDP per capita 
1970 ($) 
GDP per capita 
growth 1960-
90 (%/year) 
GDP per capita 
growth 1970-
93 (%/year) 
Resource poor     
 Large 7 196 3.5 3.7 
 Small 13 343 2.5 2.1 
Resource rich     
 Large 10 574 1.6 1.3 
 Small     
   Non-mineral 31 250 1.1 0.7 
   Hard minerala 16 304 0.8 -0.2 
   Oil exporter 8 831 1.7 0.8 
All countries 85 362 1.6 1.1 
Source (Auty 2001: 4) 
a Auty includes both Zambia and Botswana in this category 
 
The work of Sachs and Warner has spurred an extensive and growing literature on 
the subject, for instance Auty (2001), Ross (1999), Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003), 
Robinson, Torvik and Verdier (2002), Gelb (1988), Tornell and Lane (1999), Sarraf and 
Jiwanji (2001) and Stijns (2001).  Most of the literature states that an abundance of natural 
resources is not necessarily to the advantage of the country, and they mention a variety of 
reasons why this is so.  Stijns (2001: 2), for instance, is critical on the robustness of Sachs 
and Warner’s results.  For him it is unsatisfactory that they “practically leave us with the 
impression that developing countries should leave their natural resources undiscovered 
and/or unexploited”.   
 
The literature that is critical about the direct link between resource abundance and 
low economic growth, draws on examples of countries with an abundance of resources that 
have not fallen prey to the resource curse.  Examples of growth winners that are richly 
endowed in resources are Canada, Norway, Chile, Thailand, Malaysia and Botswana.  As 
Robinson, Torvik and Verdier (2002: 7) argue: “For every Venezuela and Nigeria, there is a 
Norway or a Botswana”.  Indonesia provides an interesting example of a country that 
seemed to have overcome the resource curse, but not being able to avoid the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997-1998.  It can, therefore, not be concluded that resource abundance 
itself is the sole problem.   
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If resource abundance is not the problem, the concentration of the country's exports 
in one commodity may explain the curse.  It is suggested in the literature (Prebish 1950, 
Singer 1950) that countries with a high resource dependency are more likely to fall prey to 
the resource curse because the price of manufactured goods move inversely with those of 
primary products in the long run.  Auty (2001) suggests that the reason small resource 
abundant countries on average performs worse than large resource abundant countries 
(Table 21), is because large countries are likely to be less dependent than small ones on 
one or two primary exports.  Large countries also find it easier to diversify into 
manufacturing due to a large home market. 
 
Botswana and Zambia are both classified as small mineral rich countries and both 
are highly mineral dependent.  It is therefore not possible that any of the abovementioned 
reasons can completely explain their different growth paths.  This requires a closer look at 
their mineral dependency.  In this regard use is made of the distinction by Auty (2001) 
between exogenous and endogenous explanations of performance divergence.  Exogenous 
explanations tend to be deterministic and neglect the role of domestic policies, whereas 
endogenous explanations take the latter into account.  It is difficult to make a clear 
distinction between these two explanations because the effects are often interrelated.  For 
the purposes of this chapter the changes in the terms of trade, volatility in the price of the 
commodity, and Dutch Disease are viewed as exogenous explanations.  Internal 
explanations focus on the government's spending decisions and the macroeconomic policy 
implications of the exogenous events. 
 
 
3.5.1 Exogenous explanations of performance divergence  
 
Terms of trade and volatility 
In 1950 Prebisch and Singer were the first to write about the deteriorating terms of 
trade exporters of primary products experience.  They emphasised that the fundamental 
nature of primary products and manufactures would, in the long run, cause primary product 
prices to fall relative to those of manufactures.  They argued that this is inevitable due to an 
increasing use of synthetics, shrinking raw material content of finished products and the low 
elasticity of demand for raw materials.  Primary product specialising countries would 
therefore see a deterioration in their terms of trade because they are the producers of 
increasingly cheaper primary products and the consumers of increasingly expensive 
manufactures (Blattman, Hwang and Williamson 2003).   
 
Botswana is in the advantageous position of exporting a commodity of which prices 
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are kept artificially high by the monopoly power of the Central Selling Organisation19; 
hence, the improving terms of trade (Figure 19) is not surprising.   
 
Figure 19 also shows the declining terms of trade for Zambia.  Since Zambia is very 
reliant on copper as export product (see Table 5), it seems logical that the changing price of 
copper would explain the movement in the terms of trade.  And indeed Zambia’s declining 
terms of trade because of the falling real copper price often features in explanations of 
Zambia’s economic decline (for example Neumayer 2004, Sachs and Warner 1995a, 
Stevens 2003).   
 
On the import side, Zambia is typical of many oil-importing, low-income countries.  
The unit value of imports rose very sharply after 1973 and then again in 1979 as a result of 
the hike in energy prices.  This index was also affected by the unprecedented inflation in 
OECD countries in the 1970s and the fact that exporters to Zambia charged increasing 
mark-ups on prices in anticipation of delays in obtaining payments (Gulhati 1989).  Figure 
20 shows an overall decline in the real copper price, but especially a collapse after 1973.  
This means that the slight rise in the nominal price of copper did not match the rise in the 
cost of other products.  Inflation had increased more than the price of Zambia’s main export 
product.  This provides an explanation for the deterioration in Zambia’s terms of trade. 
 
But what is the transmission mechanism between the movement in the price of 
copper and the resulting economic growth?  A group of theories built around the terms of 
trade suggest that it is not the trend, but the volatility of commodity prices that translates 
into detrimentally volatile terms of trade.  Work by Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003), 
Aron (1999), and Bleaney and Greenaway (1993) suggest that it is especially true for 
countries that have a high level of concentration in exports.  Volatility affects economic 
growth through the uncertainty it creates.  If the tradable resource is important for export 
revenue and especially for government revenue, the developing country might be subjected 
to extreme external shocks, affecting the balance of payments, the exchange rate, and 
fiscal policy.  These effects can be detrimental to the performance of the economy. 
 
Since copper plays an overwhelming role in its exports, Zambia is extremely 
vulnerable to instability in world copper prices.  Also, most of the Zambian government’s 
revenue came from the copper industry, which made it highly susceptible to large trade 
shocks from fluctuating world copper prices.  The dollar price of copper has been volatile 
(Figure 28), especially since the middle sixties, averaging 71$ during the first half of the 
                                          
19 The Central Selling Organisation is the diamond marketing arm of De Beers, responsible 
for the marketing of a high percentage of the world's diamonds. 
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1960s, $133 during the second half of the 1960s, $147 during the 1970s and $184 during 
the 1980s.     
 
Figure 28: Nominal price of copper (monthly) 
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Source: International Financial Statistics (IMF various years-a 11276C.ZZF...) 
 
If there were a direct correlation between volatility and economic performance, one 
would have presumed a correlation between the price of copper and economic growth in 
Zambia.  But there seems to be no clear evidence of a correlation between the world copper 
price and the economic growth in Zambia.  Figure 18 graphically shows the correlation 
between the nominal price of copper and economic growth in Zambia to be negative.  If the 
same exercise is done with the real price of copper (Figure 29), a positive, but no 
statistically significant relationship is found.   
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Figure 29: The real dollar price of copper and economic growth in Zambia 
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Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2002a) and International Financial Statistics (IMF 
various years-a 11276C.ZZF...) 
 
Furthermore, if the price of copper is related to other metal prices (see Figure 30) 
copper has done worse than the other metals in the late 1960s and early 1970s, but since 
then it’s performance is similar to that of other metals.   
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Figure 30: Index of copper prices relative to the all metals index  
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Source: International Financial Statistics (IMF various years-a: IFS 00176AYDZF..., IFS 
11276C.DZF...) 
 
This is not suggesting that the price of copper is unrelated to economic growth.  With 
a country that dependent on copper, there must be some relationship between the price of 
copper and economic growth.  It just shows that for almost half the period, the nominal 
price of copper was neither deteriorating in absolute (Figure 28) nor relative terms (Figure 
30).  It can, therefore, be concluded that statistically the copper price cannot be correlated 
with the poor economic growth in Zambia.  If there is a relationship between resource 
dependence and economic performance, other factors than the movement in the price of 
the resource need to be discovered.  
 
 
Dutch Disease 
Many studies seeking to explain the resource curse emphasize the failure of 
resource-abundant economies to promote a competitive manufacturing sector.  This 
phenomenon is often termed the "Dutch Disease", referring to the discovery of gas in the 
North Sea off the coast of the Netherlands in the 1960s and the subsequent decline in the 
Dutch manufacturing sector.  Dutch Disease is a resource boom that has two effects: the 
exchange rate appreciates because of a growing resource exporting sector and this leads, 
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secondly, to a relative price effect and the movement of resources from non-booming to 
booming sectors.  
 
The resource movement is detrimental to the prosperity of a country if it is from a 
dynamic sector like manufacturing to a less dynamic sector like services.  The movement 
occurs when an increased income from mineral exports leads to an increase in the demand 
for both tradables and non-tradables (Auty 2001).  If the domestic economy is unable to 
provide in this increased demand, imports of tradables will raise.  Furthermore, if the 
currency appreciates, there will be an increase in the price of the non-tradables relative to 
the tradables.  Resources will shift from the tradable sectors to the non-tradable sectors, 
causing an increase in imports and a decrease in exports.  The non-booming tradable sector 
may find it hard to expand and therefore the country will find it hard to diversify its exports 
even if government favours such a move.   
 
Furthermore, if one assumes increasing returns to scale in manufacturing, but not in 
the resource sector, the country will stagnate.  This is due to shifts of factors of production 
away from sectors generating learning by doing towards the booming resource sector.  The 
curse may therefore be explained as an abundance of natural resources that makes the 
economy specialise in the less dynamic sector (Matsen and Torvik 2003).  It is no small 
wonder that Abramovitz (1995: 25-26) describes a country’s natural resources as a 
“constraint on potential”.  This, however, need not be the case. 
 
Recent work done by Wright (2001) and Wright and Czelusta (2002) shows that the 
United States was the world’s leading mineral economy in the same period the country 
became the world leader in manufacturing (roughly between 1890 and 1910).  According to 
them other resource-based economies have performed poorly, because they failed to 
develop their mineral potential through appropriate policies.  By ‘appropriate policies’ Wright 
(2001: 5) means: “large-scale investments in exploration, transportation, geological 
knowledge, and the technologies of mineral extraction, refining and utilisation”.  The 
mineral rent should therefore be spent on productive investments, which affirms the 
argument that much depends on internal matters, like government spending20.  Wright and 
Czelusta (2002: 31) conclude that “minerals are not a curse at all in the sense of 
                                          
20 Wright and Czelusta (2002) shows, for example, that Australia lagged behind other developed 
countries in engineers per capita in the 1880s, and that this coincided with a decrease in the 
relative pace of learning in the Australian minerals sector.  Pessimism about the minerals 
industry led to an embargo on the export of iron ore to ensure its availability to the domestic 
sector.  When the policy regime changed in the 1960s the embargo was lifted and the state 
encouraged exploration and the construction of new ore terminals.  This not only led to the 
discovery of previously unknown iron ore deposits, but also numerous other metals.   
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inevitability; the curse, where it exists, is self-fulfilling”.  This will be discussed in the 
following section.   
 
In both Botswana and Zambia the non-booming tradable sector was agriculture at 
the time of independence.  In relative terms agriculture contributed much more to GDP in 
Botswana at independence than in Zambia, but this contribution declined over time.  The 
agricultural potential in Zambia is much higher than in Botswana, where low rainfall is a 
constraint.  Because of climatic differences, these two countries’ agricultural value added 
per hectare cannot be compared directly, but work done on agriculture highlights important 
differences.   
 
In absolute terms value added per hectare of agriculture in Botswana and Zambia 
has not changed much over time (see Table 6).  Aron (1999) regards the stagnation of 
agriculture in Zambia (observed by her in declining export revenue, but also observable in 
stagnating value added per hectare from the middle seventies to the middle eighties) as 
possible evidence of Dutch disease.  But one reason for the decline in agricultural 
production in Zambia, which is elaborated on in Chapter 6, was the shortage of productive 
men in the rural areas.  Furthermore, Aron observes that the political climate (with the 
government supported by a food-subsidised urban constituency) and agriculture dominated 
by gloomy expatriate-dominated producers, combined with transport and pricing problems, 
add to this stagnation.  Although government repeatedly declared its intention to promote 
agriculture, the sector received only 3 percent of total government expenditure during 
1975-80.  Maize prices were fixed to assure a regular supply of food at low prices for the 
Copperbelt and urban areas, while the farmers had to pay prices for manufactured goods 
that reflected the high protection against imports the government had given the industrial 
sector (Gulhati 1989).   
 
With such a confluence of debilitating factors it is difficult to blame Dutch Disease for 
having a primary impact on the agricultural sector in Zambia.   
  
Both Botswana and Zambia increased their manufacturing value added in absolute 
terms over time (see Figure 31).  Zambia was, however, more able to diversify its economy 
into manufacturing than Botswana.  As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Botswana economy was 
not substantially more diversified in 1990 than it was at independence, with the 
manufacturing sector persisting at around 5% of GDP.  But no Dutch Disease effect can with 
certainty be linked to either Zambia or Botswana.     
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Figure 31: Manufacturing value added  
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Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2002a) 
 
There exist other reasons than the Dutch Disease in both countries why the sectoral 
shift did not take place (some of these reasons are discussed in Chapter 2).  The movement 
in their respective exchange rates, for example, are discussed in the following section.  In 
Zambia an overvalued exchange rate (see Figure 24) and cheap capital policies (for instance 
negative real interest rates, and low tariffs and taxes on capital imports) created a capital 
and import-intensive manufacturing sector, which was vulnerable to falls in foreign 
exchange earnings during negative shocks (Aron 1999).   
 
In the following section more will be said about the spending of the mineral rent by 
the respective governments— whether it was spent on productive investment or not.   
 
    
3.5.2 Endogenous explanations of performance divergence 
 
Macroeconomic policy responses 
One way to reduce the effects of Dutch Disease is to prevent the currency to 
appreciate.  In Botswana the Pula was first pegged to the US Dollar when it was created in 
1976.  After the South African Rand was floated in 1979, it was pegged against a basket of 
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the Rand and IMF Special Drawing Rights.  This move was beneficial for the Botswana 
economy, because it kept the currency from appreciating due to high export incomes from 
diamond mining.  With the South African Rand depreciating due to political and economic 
instability, the Pula has depreciated since its inception (as in shown in Figure 25).  With the 
currency valued less than would have been the case if it was allowed to find its own value, 
substantial amounts of foreign exchange reserves were accumulated (Leith 2002).   
 
Twice, in 1979 and 1980, the Pula was revalued to counter the effects of imported 
inflation, before the trend was reversed with the slump in the diamond sales in 1981 and 
1982.  The Botswana government did not refrain from a devaluation of 10 percent in 1982 
as part of a package of adjustment measures.  This was the first time the value of the Pula 
was below that of the US dollar.  Further devaluations were undertaken in 1984 and 1985 to 
compensate for the continuing appreciation of the Pula against the Rand during a period 
when the Rand was depreciating rapidly against the US Dollar (Hermans 1997). 
 
Exchange rate policy in Zambia was largely passive between 1964 and 1976, but 
under various fixed regimes.  The Kwacha was first fixed to the UK pound, then to the US 
dollar, and later to IMF Special Drawing Rights.  The Kwacha appreciated against the 
currencies of most of its trading partners from 1971-76 due to the appreciation of the 
currency it was pegged to at that stage, namely the US dollar.  The Kwacha depreciated 
very rapidly after it was allowed to move freely after 1980.  Therefore, as will be discussed 
below, the problem in the Zambian economy was not an appreciating currency like one 
would expect under Dutch Disease, but rather a currency that was not allowed to depreciate 
after real income from the copper industry started to falter in the beginning of the 1970s. 
 
Adding to an overvalued exchange rate, the Zambian government was unable to 
manage aggregate demand.  Political independence witnessed a massive increase in both 
public and private consumption and investment.  At first it was possible to finance these 
levels of consumption and investment because export income exceeded expenditure on 
imports.  The unsustainability of these expenditures, however, became apparent when the 
income from copper mining started to fall in 1973.  The surplus on the current account of 
the balance of payments was exhausted and foreign exchange reserves came under 
pressure (Gulhati 1989).  At that stage government had the choice to devalue the currency, 
but probably because it saw the lower price as temporary and/or a depreciating currency as 
bad for its reputation, it was decided to take the alternative route of restoring financial 
balance by imposing import restrictions and also by financing the deficit through external 
borrowing.  The positive trade balances that are mentioned in Chapter 2 were therefore the 
result of trade restrictions and not due to a movement in the currency. 
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Strict capital and trade restrictions were imposed to protect the reserves.  In 1972 a 
restrictive import licensing system was introduced: certain categories of imports were 
banned, but capital and intermediate goods imports continued under license.  The licensing 
was further tightened in early 1975 and reinforced by the tariff structure (Aron 1999).   This 
did, however, not restore the financial balance and financing had to come from external 
borrowing. 
 
One of the conditions the IMF had stipulated for lending money to Zambia was that it 
had to devalue its currency.  The Kwacha was devalued by 20 percent in 1976 and again by 
10 percent in 1978.  These depreciations, however, were not enough and government relied 
even more on import bans, quantitative import restrictions administered by the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry and administrative allocation of foreign exchange by the Bank of 
Zambia.  These arrangements proved ineffective and only contributed to the misallocation 
of resources.   
 
According to Gulhati (1989), if the Kwacha had been allowed to depreciate freely, it 
would have sent a clear signal throughout the economy to cut back on imports and to 
produce new export items.  Unfortunately this was not allowed.  Imports contracted 
moderately and there was little incentive to diversify the structure of exports.  This resulted 
in a collapse of the Kwacha when it was allowed to be market-determined in the first half of 
the 1980s. 
 
The government misjudged the income from the copper industry and because of the 
pattern of adjustment and financing it had chosen, the Zambian economy has stagnated 
since the 1980s.  As with many other countries in the region, the debt problem arose mainly 
because the government regarded the external shocks of the 1970s as temporary.  The 
adjustment required was postponed and external borrowing closed resource gaps.  
Subsequently, the country accrued payment arrears and has had to request debt 
rescheduling from creditors at regular intervals (Ndulo 1999).  This left the country in a trap 
of over-indebtedness and rapid inflation.  Furthermore, the strong preference to reduce 
investment rather than consumption postponed much needed new projects and 
replacements (Gulhati 1989).  This left the economy increasingly unproductive and 
inefficient.   
 
In other attempts by the Zambian government to make adjustments in the economy 
to cope with the declining copper income, it was severely restrained by the trade union 
movement.  For example, due to the declining income from the copper mines in the 1970s, 
government proposed closing down unprofitable mines.  The Mineworker’s Union of Zambia 
(MUZ) opposed such a move through a series of strikes.  Government accommodated their 
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opposition through an attempt to maximise gross foreign exchange revenues.  It 
emphasised quantity of exports rather than cost minimisation and efficient production 
(Gulhati 1989).  Moreover, when government tried to restrain wages and reduce consumer 
subsidies, it led to demonstrations on the Copperbelt and in Lusaka by the Zambian 
Congress of Trade Unions who opposed increases in the prices of bread, cooking oil, and 
other items.  The government reacted by revoking its decision to restrain wages and reduce 
consumer subsidies. 
 
A clearer picture is starting to unfold regarding the link between the copper price and 
economic growth.  The policy responses of the Zambian government to a lower income from 
the copper industry increased instability in the economy, rather than making the necessary 
adjustments to deal with the lower income.  The currency was not allowed to provide the 
necessary signals to reduce imports, and in the following section it is shown that 
government’s spending plans were not adjusted to the new levels of income, either. 
 
 
Government’s spending decisions 
It often happens that in "boom times" it is almost impossible for governments to 
retain control of public expenditures when public revenues greatly exceed normal 
commitments.  Projects are begun and expenditure commitments made, none of which are 
easy to reverse when the boom ends.  Additionally, if government decides to spend even 
more than the windfall income, it adds to possible debt repayments that might occur after 
the boom (Deaton 1999).  It seems that the safest route to take is to regard this income as 
temporary.  This is what the Botswana government did, and for which it is sometimes 
criticised (see for instance Good 1992, Good 2004).  The Zambian government was not 
similarly restrained in their spending patterns and spent too much too quickly.   
 
Zambia is, of course, not alone in having done this.  Tornell and Lane (1999) show 
that in each resource boom they studied, government spending rose sharply in response to 
an improvement in the terms of trade.  This happens because not only is there an additional 
source of revenue but, at the same time, international credit restrictions are eased.  This is 
particularly important in developing countries where the additional revenue mostly accrues 
directly to government.  What government decides to do with this higher income is crucial 
for what will happen to the economy once this income is no longer available.  Whether 
government sees the higher income as temporary or permanent is important for the 
decision they make on whether to save the additional income, to invest it in productive 
activities, or to increase consumption.   
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Hausmann and Rigobon (2002: 8) provide a good reason for the phenomenon of 
spending too much too quickly: “an individual would choose to smooth consumption, 
however, when there is a common-pool problem each constituency will ask for a larger 
share of the pie in good times, fearing that if they don’t, other constituencies might take it 
away”.  In other words, there is political pressure to spend quickly.   
 
Gelb and associates (1988) studied the question of whether the type of political 
system has a consistent influence on spending patterns.  They found that the time frame of 
governments and the degree to which political power is centralised are important 
determinants of the exploitation of a windfall cycle.  Their example of Trinidad and Tobago 
shows how hard it is to handle oil rents cautiously for a sustained period in the face of 
powerful interest groups.  Although the political system in Botswana was democratic and 
there was always the possibility (although extremely small) of losing the next election, 
there were no powerful interest groups outside government.  This is unlike the situation 
facing the Kaunda government who operated in a one-party state, but could not withstand 
the pressure from, for example, the trade union movement in the country21.   
 
There was considerable political pressure in Botswana to spend everything available 
to the treasury, but this was avoided successfully due to government’s commitment to its 
National Development Plans.  All proposed government spending are made known through 
the publication of these plans.  Once a plan is voted into force by parliament, it is illegal to 
implement any additional public projects without going back to parliament (Sarraf and 
Jiwanji 2001).  This system has proven to be effective in restraining government spending 
when revenue increased and prevented the inception of projects for which no provision was 
made to cover the total costs over time.  An important assumption in these plans, and one 
which differs from the Zambian plans discussed below, is the assumption that the boom will 
be temporary.   
 
Hill (1991) found that both public and total consumption relative to GDP were 
negatively associated with booms in the diamond sector, showing that the Botswana 
government’s attitude was to save a large proportion of revenue from booms, thus treating 
it as a temporary windfall.  Any excess revenue during boom periods was used to build up 
foreign exchange reserves at the Bank of Botswana and budget surpluses were available to 
be drawn on in years when revenues were low.  International reserve accumulation thus 
closely mirrors booms and busts in the diamond sector (Hill 1991).  This policy avoided 
government having to drastically cut expenditures during bad years, and it reduced 
inflationary pressures.  The government justified the reserve accumulation because 
                                          
21 These points are elaborated on in Chapter 8. 
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projections of future export earnings suggested that this level of surplus would not 
continue. 
 
A related question is whether the rate of return on international reserves has in fact 
exceeded that on domestic investment.  Government was convinced that the rate of return 
on domestic investment would be pushed below the rate on international reserves in the 
short run if greater amounts of boom income were allocated to domestic investment.  Hill 
(1991) explains that the Botswana government was cautious of the ability of the economy 
to absorb the additional income.  For example, increased investment expenditure in the face 
of a shortage of trained personnel could lead to increasing costs, either through increasing 
domestic wages or by hiring expatriates.  Since the availability of skilled manpower was a 
large constraint in Botswana, government expenditure beyond the capacity of the country 
would result in a rate of return lower than what could have been earned on alternative 
investments.  Investments could have been in education, but that also requires skilled 
labour as an input, and for education there is a time constraint as well.  Investment in 
international reserves is highly liquid and the funds can be reallocated to domestic 
investment in the future as these constraints are relaxed. 
 
The Botswana government's prudent spending saved it from being unable to service 
recurrent spending during periods of lower income.  The building of reserves created the 
ability to react to declines and cushion declines in the price of diamonds.  According to Hill 
and Mokgethi (1989: 174) Botswana “avoided many of the economic problems that have 
plagued other primary commodity exporters by adopting appropriate, stabilising, 
macroeconomic policies”.  The question can be raised whether the government was too 
prudent in its spending patterns and should have been more expansionary.  It is hard to 
make a sound judgement on such an issue, but Lewis and Mokgethi (1983) assume that 
higher spending would only have resulted in more expatriates flowing into the country and a 
worsening of the bottlenecks that were already a problem in various parts of the economy.   
 
Furthermore, during 1981-1986 when the industry went through a depression that 
caused Botswana’s foreign income to drop22, the government could respond by using some 
of the accumulated savings to avoid any drastic declines in expenditures (Coetzee 1986).  
Faced with uncertainty concerning the duration of the diamond crisis, the government took 
the precautionary view that it might be a long-term crisis rather than a temporary one.  
This resulted in the creation of a package of adjustment policies, which included limiting 
                                          
22 The diamond sales that went through the Central Selling Organisation (CSO) at that stage 
dropped from a peak of $2.7 billion in 1980 to a low of $1.3 billion in 1982 (Harvey and Lewis 
1990).   
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increases in lending, increasing the prime lending rate, and freezing wages and salaries 
(Sarraf and Jiwanji 2001).  Lewis and Mokgethi (1983) find it difficult to criticise the 
conservative spending of the government, especially if compared to the high growth figures 
realised.   
 
In Zambia public expenditure is also driven by National Development Plans, but 
unlike the Botswana plans, the Zambian NDPs lack detail on specific projects.  Another 
problem which is highlighted by Aron (1999), is that the forecasts in the First and Second 
Plans were unrealistic.  This created expectations about future incomes that were not 
realised.  Because of the absence of a coherent mining policy, ad hoc measures were taken 
and these created an environment of uncertainty in the Zambian economy.  For example 
between 1964 and the early 1970s, six different taxes were imposed to tax windfall revenue 
and different measures were imposed to increase control over the mining sector.  The result 
of these measures was an uncertain environment for investors, which created a disincentive 
for production, development and exploration. 
 
For Lewis (1984) a country that exploits its mineral resources has to decide how to 
divide the income generated from the exploitation between current consumption and 
productive investment.  In times of high incomes the Zambian government did not 
accumulate savings to cushion the impact of any fall.  Instead of saving additional income, 
government increased expenditure on socio-economic services like health, education and 
infrastructure (Hwedi 2001).  The increased spending on social services can be justified, but 
government went one step further and also increased investments in projects that mainly 
increased its status as a powerful sovereign state.  An example is the building of a railroad 
to Dar es Salaam, which is discussed in chapter 7.  Furthermore, the increased spending on 
luxury goods and higher wages cannot be justified.   
 
Government imported luxury goods and compensated workers—especially the 
mineworkers—with high wages.  The index of average real earnings of African workers in 
the formal sector rose sharply by 33 percent in 1967 and by a further 15 percent in the 
period up to 1973.  These trends can be explained by government policy.  In 1966 the 
Brown Commission suggested that the pay scales of African and non-African workers should 
be unified.  This was done, not by decreasing non-African wages, but by raising the wages 
of Africans to the same level.  These developments pitched Zambian wages at very high 
levels (especially those in the mining sector).   
 
Expenditure was also aimed at public sector employment.  According to Gelb, Knight 
and Sabot (Gelb and associates 1988) the average annual growth rate in public employment 
in Zambia in the period 1966-80 was 7.2 percent, while private employment on average 
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contracted by 6.2 percent per year.  This is an example of what a lack of the necessary 
restraints on government can lead to.  Government increased its wage bill by increasing 
wages and creating additional employment in boom times, which are very hard to decrease 
in times of lower income.  Burdette (1988) explains that it was hard for government to 
decrease the number of civil servants, because some were employed for political reasons 
and not because they were needed to increase production.  To minimise the cost of the civil 
service, members of government would have had to reduce their own salaries as well, and 
that would not have been a popular thing to do. 
 
With the declining economic situation in the 1970s capital expenditure was cut back 
sharply, but the recurrent expenditures that were created through high salaries and 
employment persisted during the negative shocks.  Furthermore, Aron (1999) explains that 
government still had to finance the large, import-dependent and inefficient parastatal sector 
it had previously created.  Government did this by drawing on scarce foreign exchange, 
subsidies and cheap loans.  In the absence of well-defined development plans these 
expenditures were not taken into account and were made on the assumption that the 
copper price would remain high. 
 
For any country, a declining terms of trade is difficult to handle.  Adding to this a 
main export product that shows a volatile nominal price, only complicates the situation.  If 
one could choose between managing the Botswana or Zambian economies, the Botswana 
situation seems to be a far easier choice.  But that does not negate the fact that the way 
the Zambian government managed the instabilities and lower income, added to the 
detrimental growth path that is observed for Zambia.  For reasons still to be explored in the 
following chapters, the Zambian government played a substantial role in the economic 
stagnation of the country. 
 
  
3.6 CONCLUSION 
 
At different stages in the development of economic thought growth differences were 
explained by, for instance, a lack of investment, a lack of technological innovation, a lack of 
schooling, and bad geography.  These factors all proved to be important in the growth 
process, but did not supply a sufficient explanation for growth differences.   
 
In the empirical growth literature the neoclassical theory provides the augmented 
Solow model as an explanation for growth differences.  If the model is applied to Botswana 
and Zambia it predicts, however, uninspiring growth for both Botswana and Zambia due to 
low investments in human capital and high population growth rates.  Also the other factors 
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from the empirical growth literature explain only part of the growth differences.  For 
instance the neighbourhood dummy would have predicted a low level of economic growth 
for Botswana.  As is often the case with empirical growth models, the models still leave 
much unexplained about an individual country’s behaviour.  What seems to be an 
interesting point from these applied empirical studies is that it shows Botswana to 
outperform Zambia on those factors over which governments have control. 
 
This observation is strengthened in the section on the resource curse hypothesis.  It 
was firstly established that the copper price per se does not offer an explanation for the 
economic decline in Zambia.  Furthermore, both Botswana and Zambia were unable to 
diversify their economies, but due to reasons other than Dutch Disease.  These “other 
reasons” are found in endogenous explanations for the resource curse.  The endogenous 
reasons include the macroeconomic policy response to a resource boom and, importantly, 
how government spends the income received from the resource boom.   
 
Lewis (1984) notes that a resource boom is fortunate for a country because of the 
high income it receives, but that it does not necessarily solve the other development 
problems a country has to face.  These problems have to be dealt with by government.  
“Good governance” seems to be the key to the ability of societies to take advantage of the 
opportunities presented to them by resource abundance.     
 
The question raised is why the Botswana government made economic decisions that 
in the end benefited the country, whereas the opposite occurred in Zambia.  The Botswana 
government, although under immense pressure to spend, imposed a long-term view on its 
expenditure, whereas the Zambian government had a much more short-term horizon.  For 
instance, increased public employment in Zambia created short-term advantages for the 
government, but the government did not take future costs into account.  Why this 
difference?   
 
The fact that Botswana remained a democracy, while Zambia turned into an 
autocracy does not explain this phenomenon fully.  One would expect a democratic 
government to have a much shorter-term horizon than an autocracy.  Why was the 
Botswana government so secure in its position that it did not refrain from making unpopular 
decisions, like for instance building up reserves rather than spending revenue on social 
projects?  In the same vein, why was the Zambian government insecure and unable to cut 
back on expenditure in times of lower income?   
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To answer these questions, a theoretical base is required.  The search for an 
explanation for growth differences, and specifically one that focuses on the role government 
has to play, leads to the theory of the New Institutional Economics. 
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4 CHAPTER 4 
CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL 
ECONOMICS TO AN UNDERSTANDING OF ECONOMIC 
GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Currently it is widely accepted that institutions —broadly defined as the generally 
accepted rules of the game in a society— are the best explanation for growth differences.  
The question is whether differences in institutions are able to explain the growth differences 
between Zambia and Botswana.  But before this question is addressed, this chapter first 
focuses on the theory of the New Institutional Economics (NIE)23. 
 
High quality institutions are those that induce growth-enhancing behaviour, and can 
be both informal (e.g., cultural, self-enforcing agreements) and formal (e.g. legal rules 
enforced through third parties).  The generally accepted rules create incentives for the 
players of the game, and if these incentives are growth enhancing, the country will grow, 
otherwise not. 
 
Rodrik (2004) identifies 'universal principles of sound economic management’ that 
are necessary for a country to perform well.  These principles include allocative efficiency, 
macroeconomic and financial stability, and are called “universal” because “in a sense it is 
hard to see what any country would gain by systematically defying them” (Rodrik 2004: 
14).  To achieve these principles, a country needs to have, for instance, secure property 
rights, the rule of law, appropriate incentives, prudential regulation and incentive 
compatibility.  Unfortunately there is no clear-cut way of how to achieve these because they 
are the outcome of a combination of formal and informal institutions.  To determine the 
combination of institutional arrangements that eventually leads to the universal principles, 
country studies have become increasingly important in development economics. 
 
Section 2 defines institutions and section 3 outlines institutions that are necessary 
for high quality growth, i.e. those that lower transaction costs and those that protect and 
enforce property rights.  Section 4 focuses on reasons why flawed institutions persist over 
time.  A discussion like that is necessary because, although the importance of growth-
                                          
23 The old institutional economics originated in America with the work of Thorstein Veblen (1857-
1929).  Other scholars within the old institutionalist school include John R. Commons, John K. 
Galbraith and Warren J. Samuels.  The dissertation concentrates on the NIE, which has little in 
common with the OIE. 
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enhancing institutions is widely accepted, poor and underdeveloped countries are still 
present in the world economy.  Significantly, if a country has growth retarding institutions, 
it is possible to change them, but to what degree?  And because natural resources play a 
significant role in Botswana and Zambia, section 6 explores how an abundance of natural 
resources effect government's actions.   
 
 
4.2 INSTITUTIONS DEFINED 
 
The NIE can be traced back to the work of Ronald Coase on transaction costs, 
drawing especially on his The Nature of the Firm that was published in 1937.  The 
recognition that was given in this work to transaction costs for the first time provided a 
reason for the existence of institutions.  Research on the NIE reached a critical mass by 
1975 with work done by scholars like Oliver Williamson, James Buchanan, Douglass North, 
George Stigler and Richard Postner24.  During the 1990s empirical evidence started to 
support the initial theories.   
 
North (1990: 3) defines institutions as “the rules of the game in a society or, more 
formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”.  Sjöstrand (1993: 
9) defines institutions as a “human mental construct for a coherent system of shared norms 
that regulate individual interactions in recurrent situations”.  The purpose of institutions is 
therefore to steer individual behaviour in a particular direction through the incentives it 
creates.  Furubotn and Richter (2000: 6) quote a more elaborate definition of Ostrom which 
describes the actions that are created by institutions: 
 
  Institutions can be defined as the set of working rules that are used to determine 
who is eligible to make decisions in some arena, what actions are allowed or 
constrained, what aggregation rules will be used, what procedures must be followed, 
what information must or must not be provided, and what payoffs will be assigned to 
individuals dependent on their actions… All rules contain prescriptions that forbid, 
permit, or require some action or outcome.  Working rules are those actually used, 
monitored, and enforced when individuals make choices about the actions they will 
take…. 
 
Institutions can both be formal (e.g. rules, regulations, the constitution) and informal 
(e.g. norms, culture, codes of conduct).  It is much easier to describe and be precise about 
                                          
24 The award of the Nobel Prize in 1986 to Buchanan, 1991 to Ronald Coase and in 1993 to 
Douglass North has confirmed the importance of the NIE for Economics.  
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formal than informal institutions.  Formal institutions are often divided into political, judicial 
and economic rules, where (for instance) these refer to the structure of the polity, the role 
of the judiciary when it comes to contract enforcement, and property rights.  Informal 
institutions are created by the transmission of information from one generation to the next 
one and make it possible for people to perform everyday tasks without having to think 
about every task that needs to be performed or the terms of exchange at each point and in 
every instance.  While formal institutions may be clear on what it expects of a person, every 
situation a person encounters involves a certain amount of discretion and it is informal 
institutions that will determine the person’s discretionary reactions.     
 
Although a major role for institutions is to provide stability and certainty to society, it 
does not imply that they do not change.  Formal institutions may change overnight but 
informal constraints embodied in customs, traditions and codes of conduct are much more 
resistant to deliberate policy changes (North 1990).  David Landes (1990), for instance, 
mentions the influence of religious values on people’s willingness to change.  The 
characteristic of informal institutions to survive changes in formal institutions makes it a 
source of path dependency and causes institutional change to happen more gradually than 
instantly.  There can be a total change in formal rules in a society, but many aspects will 
stay the same because of the prevailing informal institutions.  As North (1990: 91) notes:  
 
  although a wholesale change in the formal rules may take place, at the same time 
there will be many informal constraints that have great survival tenacity because 
they still resolve basic exchange problems among the participants, be they social, 
political, or economic.  The result over time tends to be a restructuring of the overall 
constraints – in both directions – to produce a new equilibrium that is far less 
revolutionary.     
 
There is a body of economic literature that focuses primarily on this type of 
incremental change, i.e. the theory of path dependency25.  It provides us with an 
explanation of how small changes can lead to a non-optimal solution.  Once a development 
                                          
25 The first article to call the attention of economic historians to the issue of path dependency was 
Paul David’s “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY” (1985).  In this article David attempts to 
explain how the peculiar organisation of letters on the typewriter keyboard became standardised 
and fixed and why an accidental set of circumstances caused the outcome to persist, even in the 
face of more efficient alternatives.  This illustrates the peculiar fact that incremental changes in 
technology, once begun on a particular track, may lead one technological solution to win out 
over another, even when, ultimately, this technological path may be less efficient than the 
abandoned alternative would have been.  The importance that path dependency gives to the role 
of history is one of its most important contributions.   
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path is set on a particular course, the learning that has taken place by the role players in 
the economy, and the informal institutions that were created, may reinforce the course.  
Path dependency makes it possible to explain why colonialism or the type of agriculture, for 
instance, can have such long-lasting effects on economic growth and development26.  An 
important observation on path dependency (and one which will again be referred to in 
Section 4.2) is made by North (1990: 98) when he describes it as follows:  
 
  Path dependency is not a story of inevitability in which the past neatly predicts the 
future, but links decision-making through time.  We cannot understand today’s 
choices (and define them in the modelling of economic performance) without tracing 
the incremental evolution of institutions.   
 
Informal institutions not only influence the way people will respond to a change in 
formal institutions, but it can also contribute to the change in formal institutions.  If 
informal institutions change over time, it may become necessary to alter the formal 
institutions to accommodate the change in informal institutions.  The end of slavery is an 
example where the custom became unacceptable even before slavery was officially banned.  
Whichever way change happens, in conclusion it can be said that formal institutions can 
change, but only incrementally due to the presence and countervailing influence of informal 
institutions.  This makes the study of the relationship between formal institutions and the 
performance of an economy inadequate without taking into account the influence of 
informal institutions.  Economic activity can only be understood if formal institutions are 
viewed in conjunction with the prevailing informal institutions (Sjöstrand 1993).  
 
Because informal institutions create a memory for all the role-players in the 
economy, formal institutions cannot be duplicated in countries in the expectation that it will 
bear the same results.  For instance, in most cases, colonies were left with formal rules at 
independence that were forced onto them by a departing ruler.  Often the colonies had no 
time to assimilate these rules and the existing informal institutions did not necessarily 
support them.   
 
The role-players in an economy are called organisations in the NIE.  They are bound 
by some common purpose to achieve certain objectives and include political bodies (political 
parties, a city council, a regulatory agency), economic bodies (firms, trade unions, family 
farms, cooperatives), social bodies (churches, clubs, athletic associations), and educational 
bodies (schools, universities).  North (1996, 1997) sees institutions as the rules of the game 
and organisations as the players.  In a capitalist society entrepreneurs are the main players.  
                                          
26 This refers to a discussion that follows under the heading Colonialism on p97. 
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Institutions will determine the choices these entrepreneurs make (for instance what to 
produce), and consequently the direction of change in an economy.  In other words, these 
entrepreneurs respond to incentives. 
 
Unfortunately, there is no reason to believe that incentives themselves are efficient 
or that they respond quickly or efficiently to changes in economic circumstances.  North 
(1990, 1995) explains it with the following two analogies:  
 
  the Mafia will develop different skills than will General Motors executives.  If the 
institutional framework makes the highest pay-off for ‘pirate’ organisations, then 
organisational success and survival will depend on the successful learning of being 
better pirates (North 1995: 21).   
  If the maximizing behaviour of firms consist of sabotaging competitors, or for labour 
organisations in engaging in slowdowns, or for farmers in restricting output in order 
to increase the price of their products, then economic growth will be slowed down 
(North 1990: 78).   
 
For economic growth to occur the institutional structure must make it attractive for 
the role-players to invest in productive activities.  If productivity-raising activities had the 
highest pay-off, then the economy will grow.  Unfortunately, all countries have incentives 
that stimulate productive activity as well as those that slow it down; even the most 
productive economies in the modern world have a mixed institutional framework.  For a 
country to develop, the signals that lead to an increase in productivity must overshadow 
those that hamper development.   
 
 
4.3 INSTITUTIONS FOR HIGH-QUALITY GROWTH 
 
Shirley (2003), among others, focuses attention on two sets of institutions that 
create the appropriate incentives for entrepreneurs to invest in productive activities: those 
that foster exchange by lowering transaction costs and encouraging trust, and those that 
influence the state to protect private property rather than expropriate it.   
 
The first set of institutions describes the protection of property rights and includes 
contract and contract enforcement mechanisms, commercial rules, norms, habits and beliefs 
favouring the accumulation of physical and human capital.  The second set of institutions 
forces a government to support the first set of institutions and include electoral rules, laws 
governing freedom of speech and education, constraints on powerful groups from exploiting 
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their position, and the management of conflict.  Both these sets include what Rodrik (1999) 
describes as “institutions for high quality growth”.   
 
Because of their importance to institutional economics, and therefore also to the 
explanation of growth differences, the theory of transaction costs and property rights will be 
discussed in the following two sections.  The application to Zambia and Botswana will be 
made in Chapter 7, while the constraints that forces governments to support these growth-
enhancing institutions will be discussed in a similar fashion in Chapter 8. 
 
 
4.3.1 Transaction costs 
One of the simplifying assumptions in the neoclassical theory is that information is 
costless.  If this is the case, role-players in an economy can engage in transactions without 
incurring costs.  Parties to an exchange can continue bargaining until all misallocations are 
eliminated and the economy is in equilibrium.  Game theory illustrates this possibility of 
reaching self-enforcing cooperative solutions, but only under the strict assumptions of 
perfect information, that the game lasts indefinitely into the future, and that it continues to 
be played between the same parties.  Under these perfect conditions decisions regarding 
the application of scarce resources in the production process, and the production decision 
itself, will depend on the price mechanism.  For example, if the price of labour decreases 
relative to the cost of capital, labour would be substituted for capital and more labour 
intensive products will be produced until the price of labour once again equals the price of 
capital (North 1990).   
 
If all the game theoretical assumptions apply, as they do in neo-classical theory, 
transaction costs are zero.  Coase, in The Nature of the Firm (1937), has shown these 
assumptions to be weak, and not a true reflection of the real world.  He explained that firms 
would not expand inevitably, because at some stage the costs of organising an extra 
transaction within the firm become higher than the costs of carrying out the same 
transaction in the open market or by organising another firm.  The costs that are referred to 
are transaction costs, but where do they come from?   
 
In this section on transaction costs, a distinction is made between economic 
transaction costs and political transaction costs.  Furubotn and Richter (2000) also 
distinguishes between market and managerial transaction costs.  The latter two are typically 
the costs of using the market, and costs related to personnel management, public relations 
and lobbying.  It also includes all costs related to the management of labour and the costs 
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of intra-firm transportation.  But for the purpose of this study, they are considered part of 
economic transaction costs.   
 
 
Economic transaction costs 
Economic transactions are transactions that are necessary for the formation and 
maintenance of the institutional framework in which economic activity occurs.  Theoretically, 
these transaction costs can be zero where repetitive exchange takes place between parties 
that completely trust one another and where full knowledge of the product traded exists.  In 
all other instances information is incomplete and asymmetrically held by the parties to the 
exchange.   
 
In a world of impersonal exchange, exchange takes place with multiple individuals 
and they do not have much knowledge about each other.  Often the exchange is only a once 
off happening and not repeated at all (North 1990).  Under such circumstances economic 
transaction costs are positive.   
 
North (1990) and Coase (1937) provide a step-wise summary of where they see 
transaction costs to originate:  
• Parties that want to engage in a transaction have to find each other, and determine 
whether the other party is able and willing to fulfil the transaction.  They have to 
communicate and exchange information regarding the transaction and there must 
be certainty about the terms of exchange.  In other words, negotiations have to 
take place between the trading parties. 
• Before the transaction can be completed the goods must be described, inspected, 
weighed and measured.   
• Ways to settle disputes have to be explored.  Often lawyers are consulted to draw 
up contracts, and in some cases compliance needs to be enforced through legal 
action and breach of contract may lead to litigation.   
 
These costs, the cost of acquiring information, the cost of protecting rights and the 
cost of policing and enforcing agreements, have come to be known as economic transaction 
costs and are merged in Kenneth Arrow’s definition of transaction costs as the “cost of 
running the economic system” (as quoted in Furubotn and Richter 2000: 40).   
 
Coase (1937: 390) also points out that the process of “running the economic 
system” is complicated by the limited ability of individuals to process data and formulate 
plans.  North (1995) calls this a limited mental capacity to process information.  Because 
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real-world decisions operate under these restrictions, they will be less efficient than the 
decisions made in neoclassical theory. 
 
Niehans (1987) expands on North and Coase's transaction costs that are determined 
in the market (e.g. legal fees, credit rating search) to costs that are unobservable (e.g. the 
cost of uncertainty in the market).  Unlike the observable costs the unobservable costs are 
difficult to identify and measure.  And it is often these unobservable costs that restrain 
trade, like for instance in SSA where the deficient state of the transport and 
communications infrastructure create difficulties for the trading partners.  Another 
unobservable cost present in SSA is the bad neighbourhood.  It was empirically shown (see 
for example, Collier and Gunning 1999b) that being in a bad neighbourhood reduces 
economic growth.  Uncertainty created by the neighbourhood can, for instance, deter 
international investors from investing in the region because the transaction costs of 
securing the investment becomes too high relative to the profit. 
 
Location of a country is important for determining economic transaction costs, 
primarily for two reasons.  Firstly, neighbouring units provide an easily accessible market 
for goods and secondly, and this is most important for landlocked countries, they provide 
access to other markets.  With access to markets seen as one of the main engines of 
growth, both these reasons are important for growth and development.   
 
Even as far back as Adam Smith, economists realised that productivity gains 
achieved through specialisation are the secret to the wealth of nations.  But for these gains 
to materialise, producers must have access to markets where they can sell their specialised 
output and buy other goods - the larger the market, the greater the scope for specialisation.  
Through specialisation each country can make the most of its comparative advantage.  This 
notion is supported by a large number of international cross-sectional analyses that show a 
strong correlation between trade and economic growth.  The fact that Botswana and Zambia 
are located in sub-Saharan Africa, the poorest region in the world, creates a problem.  With 
the exception of South Africa, most other economies are too small to be able to import a 
significant amount of goods. 
 
For landlocked countries (of which Botswana and Zambia are both examples) 
neighbours are important even if they do not provide a market for products, because of the 
access they have to provide to other markets.  For Chowdhury (2003) access to a harbour is 
important because water-transport provides access to a more extensive market than what 
land-carriage can supply.  The Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) provide an excellent 
example of growth due to trade-orientated policies and their favourable geographical 
location for trade.  According to Chowdhury (2003) four of the five world’s largest handling 
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ports are in the NICs.  Hausmann and Rigobon (2002) confirms this by saying that maritime 
transportation is particularly suited to the bulky, low-value-added goods that developing 
nations tend to produce; therefore countries lacking cheap access to the sea will be shut out 
of many potential markets.   
 
Hausmann and Rigobon (2002) found that nations with populations far from a 
coastline also tend to be poorer and show lower rates of economic growth than coastal 
countries.  A country whose population is farther than 100 kilometres from the sea grows 
0.6 percent slower per year than nations in which the entire population is within 100 
kilometres of the coast.   
 
The relative lack of control over the development of infrastructure, transport 
management and policies by the exporting country, adds to the problem of increased 
transport costs.  These aspects of transportation will be shaped by the transit country 
according to its own ability and needs.  In most cases the transit neighbours are themselves 
developing countries, often of broadly similar economic structure and scarcities of 
resources.   
 
Transportation across borders places an extra burden on governments in landlocked 
countries of having to coordinate infrastructural expenditures with neighbouring countries.  
This coordination is especially complex if a country does not have good relationships with its 
neighbours.  Botswana has had the advantage of being a member of the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU), which gives access to the more developed South African market 
and infrastructure.  Alternatively the Zambian government had to locate alternative routes 
for Zambia's external trade after independence, due to political conflict with South Africa, 
Angola, Mozambique and also Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe).  With no other options at that 
stage, Zambia created another route for its international trade to Dar es Salaam in 
Tanzania.  Zambia could afford it because it was still earning a high profit from its copper 
exports, but the creation of the route placed an unnecessary drain on the country’s income 
resources.   
 
Even if neighbouring countries get along politically, landlockedness may still act as a 
barrier to trade.  Landlocked countries face high transportation costs (i.e. economic 
transaction costs) since they must pay road or rail transport costs across at least one 
international boundary in addition to sea freight costs, and these aggregate costs can make 
products uncompetitive in the international market.  Local companies that need imported 
inputs for their production process will similarly be at a disadvantage when eventually 
exporting the goods.  Although air shipments can help overcome many of these problems, 
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only certain low bulk/high value goods can be transported economically by air27, and most 
countries still import and export the majority of goods by sea (Collier and Gunning 1999b, 
Sachs and Warner 1997b). 
 
Most developing countries are commodity exporters and Sachs and Radelet (1998) 
argue that a 5 percent increase in a country’s cif/fob28 ratio reduces the long-term growth of 
the share of non-primary manufactured exports in GDP by around 5 percent per annum.  On 
average landlocked developing countries require almost twice as much of their export 
earnings for the payment of transport and insurance services in 1995 than the average for 
developing countries, and three times as much as the average of developed economies.  
They also show that landlocked countries pay between 25 percent and 228 percent more for 
similar export shipments to Northern Europe than their coastal neighbours, even though the 
overland distances are a small proportion of the total transport distances.  For the 80 
coastal economies, the average was 11.8 percent, while for the 17 fully landlocked countries 
the average was 17.8 percent.  For Zambia the additional cost to ship to Northern Europe 
by road through Tanzania was 136 percent and by rail 72 percent (Radelet and Sachs 
1998).     
 
 
Political transaction costs 
Economic transactions are assumed to take place against a well-defined political 
background.  In this political sphere, politicians, bureaucrats and interest groups interact, 
and political transaction costs are created during this interaction.  Furubotn and Richter 
(2000) also include the costs associated with the maintenance of the state: like for instance 
expenses for external and internal security, the administration of justice and the provision 
of a basic level of education.   
 
Governments always have to deal with these costs, but from time to time extra costs 
are incurred when the structure of the political system, for instance, changes.  
 
Having established the difference between economic and political transaction costs, 
the next step is to establish ways to minimise these costs.  The minimisation of transaction 
costs is important, because together with technology employed, transaction costs determine 
                                          
27 Like for instance diamonds from Botswana. 
28 Cost, insurance, freight (cif) reflects the value of imports plus the cost of insurance and freight 
to the port of entry.  Free on board (fob) is the cost of production including transport costs to the 
border of the country. 
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production costs.  Transaction costs are not an indication of market inefficiency, but to be 
efficient a market needs to minimise transaction costs.   
 
 
The minimisation of transaction costs 
Without transaction costs there are no constraints on the trading volume.  But, 
realistically, the effect of positive transaction costs is pervasive in an economy.  The reason 
why the minimisation of transaction costs is important is shown in the following words of 
Coase (1994 [1991]: 9):  
  
Businessmen in deciding on their ways of doing business and on what to produce 
have to take into account transaction costs.  If the costs of making an exchange are 
greater than the gains which that exchange would bring, that exchange would not 
take place and the greater production that would flow from specialisation would not 
be realised.  In this way transaction costs affect not only contractual arrangements 
but also what goods and services are produced.   
 
Niehans (1987) agrees with Coase by suggesting that the higher the transaction 
costs, the greater becomes the incentives for individuals to economise on transactions.  In 
such high transaction-cost situations incomplete or even missing markets are to be found.  
In the absence of organized capital markets, for example, people in developing countries 
may devise "social" means of pooling savings through credit rings or savings societies.  In 
the absence of secure contracts, they mobilize family ties, religious groups or ethnic 
associations in support of commerce and trade.  In the absence of effective states, capable 
of providing public goods, people are likely to join religious associations, fundamentalist 
groups or revolutionary parties in an effort to secure them (Bates 1995).  Missing markets, 
and the means people find to overcome their absence, makes it complicated for developed 
countries to invest in or trade with these countries.   
 
It is therefore necessary to reduce transaction costs.  Although it is impossible to 
reduce transaction costs to zero, long-term economic growth depends on the minimisation 
thereof.   
 
Unfortunately, there is no prescribed way of minimising transaction costs.  North 
(1995) explains that each country has to find its own solution.  To use Olson’s analogy29, 
                                          
29 Mancur Olson (1996) used a mental exercise to explain why institutions explain why some 
nations are rich and others poor.  He found that natural resource endowments couldn’t explain 
the difference in economic prosperity between two neighbouring countries, but that institutions 
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borders will indicate differences in transaction costs.  And this is one source of difference 
between countries: the way they solve the problem of transaction costs.   
 
In the Coasian tradition it can be said that one way of lowering transaction costs is 
through the establishment of firms.  With the emergence of firms, the cost of acquiring 
information is greatly reduced because one contract can substitute for a series of contracts, 
and the cost for parties to find one another is greatly reduced.   
 
Transaction costs will also be lower where transactions are repeated between the 
same parties, but that can only apply to a limited number of transactions.  In the real world 
exchange takes place amongst multiple individuals and with very little information known 
about all of them.  This creates a necessity to find ways for individuals to trade without 
being familiar with each other (North 1990).     
 
Contracts between trading parties are a logical solution to this problem.  By 
stipulating the legal requirements of transactions, the legal system not only lowers the cost 
of transacting, but also gives an indication of the costs involved in the transaction (Coase 
1994 [1991]).  An important part of contracts are their enforcement.  If they are not 
enforced properly, they serve no purpose.  The issue of enforcement are elaborated on p93. 
 
Other examples of formal institutions that may reduce transaction costs include the 
management of conflict, maintenance of law and order, a clear view on macroeconomic 
policy and the regulation of the market.  According to Williamson (1985) the economic 
institutions of capitalism have the main purpose and effect of economizing on transaction 
costs.  The absence of these formal institutions will raise transaction costs.   
 
Informal institutions, however, have the effect that countries solve the problem of 
transaction costs differently.  Informal institutions make people interpret formal institutions 
differently.  And as mentioned earlier, these informal institutions are partly culturally 
derived and in part acquired through experience.  They will therefore differ between 
countries, and cause participants to react differently to formal ways of lowering transaction 
costs. 
 
In conclusion it can be said that whatever method is used to lower transaction costs, 
it results in the development of institutions.  When it is costly to transact, institutions 
matter.  Whether these institutions are efficient or not, will determine the eventual cost of 
                                                                                                                                     
are a more likely explanation. 
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transacting in the country.  And whether these institutions are growth enhancing or growth 
retarding will determine whether the country will grow or not.   
 
Williamson (1985: 17) reminds us, however, that institutions serve more functions 
than just to reduce transaction costs: “Main purpose is not, however, to be confused with 
sole purpose.  Complex institutions commonly serve a variety of objectives.”  One other 
objective is the protection of property rights. 
 
 
4.3.2 Property rights 
Douglass North and Robert Thomas (1973), among many others, have argued that 
the establishment of secure and stable property rights have been a key element in the rise 
of the West and the onset of modern economic growth.  The reason for this can be traced 
back to the previous discussion of transaction costs.  Transaction costs increase as 
economies develop and in effect cause trading partners to become personally more 
unfamiliar with each other.   
 
An important way of lowering transaction costs in exchange is through the creation 
of property rights, because they make it possible for people to trade with unfamiliar 
partners while expecting them to honour their agreements.  If this were not possible, the 
cost of finding familiar trading partners will in most instances obstruct the transaction.  
Therefore, property rights can contribute to economic growth through the lowering of 
transaction costs, because everyone in a transaction will have a reasonable expectation of 
the reaction of the other participants.  The existence of property rights will result in an 
increase in the number of transactions and consequently contribute to economic growth. 
 
Because property rights play such an important role in the economic growth and 
development of a country, the protection or negligence thereof provides evidence in the 
explanation of growth differences between countries.  And it is for this reason that the NIE 
pays much attention to the origins and nature of property rights.   
 
Four categories of property rights (which can either be linked to a fixed asset or 
labour) are distinguished.  Firstly, there are user rights, which provide the owner the right 
to use, transform or even destroy an asset.  Secondly, there is the right to transfer 
ownership of an asset, i.e. to alienate or sell an asset.  Thirdly, there is the right to earn an 
income from an asset and negotiate the terms with other individuals (Eggertsson 1990).  
Therefore, the protected property can be sold for a profit, improved through investment, or 
destroyed by the rights holder.   
 92 
 
Rodrik (2001: 92) places emphasis on a fourth category, namely the importance of 
control rights:  
 
  the key word is control, rather than ownership.  Formal property rights do not count 
for much if they do not confer control rights.  By the same token, sufficiently strong 
control rights may work adequately even in the absence of formal property rights30. 
 
Property rights impact on the performance of an economy in a number of ways.  It 
determines who the players in the economic game are because it determines who gets what 
and when.  In other words: which individuals have access to what scarce resources.  Once 
this is established, the players have the opportunity to decide what to do with their 
economic goods, in other words “it establishes the incentives that determine human 
behaviour in the economy” (Furubotn and Richter 2000: 31). 
 
Furthermore, individuals are willing to maximise the value of the property if they can 
control, sell and earn an income from that property.  Kasper and Streit (1998: 205) explain 
that people are better motivated to make use of their assets by “toiling, labouring and 
experimenting with them, precisely because they could have confidence that they would 
appropriate the rewards of their efforts and their risk taking”.  In other words, to be 
persuaded to make an investment, role-players have to be sure that they have control of 
their property and the benefits thereof.  No entrepreneur will have the incentive to 
accumulate or innovate if there is no certainty that they will be able to control the return to 
that asset (Rodrik 1999). 
 
The development of a manufacturing sector, for instance, necessitates fixed capital 
in plant and equipment, uninterrupted production, a disciplined, appropriately trained labour 
force, and a developed transport network.  To make sure these factor and product markets 
function smoothly, property rights need to be secured.  And if they function well, a surplus 
will be produced that will benefit those in society with a deficit (North 1991).  
 
Empirical work on the correlation between property rights protection and economic 
growth uses data from the Political Risk Services, a private company that assesses the risk 
that investments will be expropriated in different countries.  These analyses (Acemoglu, et 
al. 2001, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2003b, Hall and Jones 1999, Knack and Keefer 
1995), show that countries with more secure property rights have higher average incomes.   
 
                                          
30 See for instance the example of China (Qian 2003). 
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Two objections to these results are common.  Firstly, that there may be an omitted 
variable, like for instance geography, that may explain why countries are poor and why 
their property rights are not secure.  And, secondly, that the results merely prove that rich 
countries are able to enforce property rights.   
 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) suggest that one solution to test for these 
objections is to find a source of variation in economic institutions that have no effect on 
economic outcomes.  Their suggestion is to “look at a natural experiment”.  The two 
experiments that they consider are, firstly, the growth differences between the southern 
and northern parts of Korea, and secondly, European colonisation and the reversal of 
fortunes many of their colonies experienced.   
 
In the second experiment, which is more applicable to this dissertation, Acemoglu and 
his co-authors (2003b) take different forms of colonisation that European countries imposed 
on much of the world as a change in institutions, whereas other factors, like geography, 
remained constant.  Their findings suggest that the institutions imposed by the colonisers 
had nothing to do with initial income (e.g. that only rich countries can afford good 
institutions), but rather that the higher the initial population density or the greater the initial 
urbanisation, the worse the subsequent institutions, including both institutions right after 
independence, and today.  They attribute this situation to the fact that in these areas 
Europeans —if they did not settle in the colony— extracted resources without respecting the 
property rights of the inhabiting majority. 
 
 
Enforcement of property rights 
There is little uncertainty in the NIE literature about the importance of protecting 
property rights.  And because property rights have economic value it must be enforced in a 
way that is clear to everybody in the society.  In the absence of the protection of property 
rights, many exchanges would not take place and markets would remain primitive and 
underdeveloped31 (Azfar 2002).   
 
The protection of property rights is therefore crucial in the process of economic 
growth and development.  But as Popper notes (quoted in Furubotn and Richter 2000: 7): 
“You cannot construct foolproof institutions” and “Institutions are like fortresses.  They must 
be well designed and properly manned”.  How to “man” property rights will be different in 
                                          
31 It is shown in Chapter 7 that mining firms in Zambia decreased investment in the copper mines 
when they did not trust the government of President Kaunda.   
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each country.  Firstly, because countries will unlikely have exactly the same formal rules 
and secondly, due to the diversity of their informal institutions.  
 
Enforcement is established by law and/or custom.  Law is a formal institution, and as 
mentioned before, not all people respond the same way to formal institutions because of the 
prevalence of informal institutions (customs).  If the parties to the transaction respect 
property rights and mutual trust predominates in society, enforcement costs will tend to be 
low.  The level of transaction costs will therefore depend on the behaviour of the individuals 
involved in the transaction.  If the parties to exchange have comparatively uniform ideas 
about the seriousness of the transaction, enforcement costs are lower (Furubotn and Richter 
2000).   
 
Furthermore, enforcement implies a certain cost to the individual.  To exclude others 
from using one’s property without authorization implies costs to the owner.  To prevent for 
instance breaking and entering, people incur exclusion costs like locks on doors, fences, 
burglar alarms, and information-protection systems for computers.  Where this is done by 
collective action (legislation, police) a large part of the exclusion costs are borne collectively 
and has considerable cost advantages for property owners over individual protection (Alston 
1996, Furubotn and Richter 1991).  According to the World Bank (2002b) the poor bear the 
greatest burden of unprotected property rights, because they find it hard to protect them 
against crime.    
 
North (1990) identifies enforcement at three levels, i.e. self-enforcement, 
enforcement by a second party, or third party enforcement. When two parties know each 
other through repeated dealings, they will most likely live up to the agreements of the 
arranged contract because they find it beneficial to do so.  But such self-enforcing 
constraints are a long and slow process that requires time to develop32.  If one of the 
parties to exchange decides not to honour the agreement, the other party can decide to 
have no further exchange with the defaulting party.  Punishment in such a case becomes a 
public good where the costs of searching for a new trading partner are born by the 
individual. 
 
In a complex, modern society self-enforcement will most likely be unsuccessful.  In 
most transactions the parties do not know each other that well and do not depend on each 
other for future dealings.  The costs incurred by the parties in order to secure the 
transaction will probably exceed the advantage gained from the transaction.  This is also 
                                          
32 North (1990) laments the rapid transformation of Africa from tribal societies to market 
economies as an example where not enough time was allowed for the process. 
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true in the case of second-party retaliation.  “It is costly to find out that a contract has been 
violated, more costly to be able to measure the violation, and still more costly to be able to 
apprehend and impose penalties on the violator” (North 1990: 58).  Therefore, if it is taken 
into account that there are economies of scale in policing and enforcing agreements by a 
third party, the latter becomes the best option for the enforcement of formal rules.   
 
Third-party enforcement essentially means the development of the state as the 
coercive force that monitors formal institutions and enforces them.  North (1981: 21) sees 
the state as an organisation with a “comparative advantage in violence”.  Although not 
ideal, the advantage of third party enforcement is that economies of scale reduce the unit 
cost of enforcement.  Therefore a large modern society cannot do without the help of the 
state and an important reason for this is the costliness of enforcement. 
 
Through its role as protector, government also has an important role in the process by 
which various property institutions emerge.  Sened (1997: 7) observes, “There is nothing 
natural about property rights”.  Samuels (1994: 181) summarises it as follows: 
“government does not protect property because it is property; it is property because 
government protects it”.  Unfortunately the political process is not necessarily efficient.  
Property rights emerge because they serve the interests of particular individuals, whether 
government officials or entrepreneurs.  Both these groups will challenge the other party to 
change the institutional structure to fit it to their own needs (Sened 1997).   
 
It is unlikely that rights will emerge or persist unless they serve, directly or indirectly, 
the interests of the authority that protects and enforces them.  Government thus has an 
important role to play in the establishment and security of property rights.   
 
Unfortunately, this “monopoly on power” provides government with the ability to 
infringe on property rights itself.  As Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta and Schleifer (2003: 4) put 
it: “a government capable of protecting property against private infringement can itself 
become the violator and thief”.  If a government is strong enough to control conflict, it is 
also strong enough to use its power against the citizens it is supposed to protect.  Djankov 
and co-authors (2003) describe working economies as somewhere between the two 
extremes of a government that controls too little and allows the economy to plunge into 
disorder, and a government that controls too much and ends up as a dictatorship.   
 
By disorder Djankov, et al. (2003: 7) mean the "risk to individuals and their property 
of expropriation in the form of, for example, murder, theft or violation of agreements, or the 
ability of private violators to escape penalties through the subversion of public institutions, 
such as the courts, through bribes and threats".  It also includes the risk to individuals and 
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their property of expropriation by the state and its agents in the form of taxation.  
Alternatively property rights can also be infringed upon through expropriation by the state, 
by the overuse of regulations, this being an example of the modus operandi of a 
dictatorship.   
 
Some phenomena, such as corruption, are reflections of both disorder and 
dictatorship: in so far as individuals pay bribes to avoid penalties for harmful conduct, 
corruption is a reflection of disorder, but in so far as officials create harmful rules to collect 
bribes from individuals attempting to get around them, corruption is a cost of dictatorship33 
(Djankov, et al. 2003).   
 
According to Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) the imposition of legal rules will position 
an economy somewhere between the spectrum extremes of disorder and dictatorship (e.g. 
greater formalism may correspond to less disorder).  Changes in institutions, on the other 
hand, would induce shifts of the frontier, so that with deteriorating institutions, a society will 
suffer higher costs of both disorder and centralised control.   
 
Similarly North (1981) distinguishes between a “contract theory” of the state and a 
“predatory theory” of the state.  According to the contract theory, a legal framework 
created and maintained by government institutions facilitate (by reducing transaction costs) 
the making of private contracts that result in economic transactions.  According to the 
predatory theory on the other hand the state acts as an instrument for transferring 
resources from one group to another.  North (1990: 58) sees this as a fundamental 
dilemma in economic development: “if we cannot do without the state, we cannot do with it 
either”.  On the one hand government needs to protect property rights, but this also 
provides it with enough power to make decisions that are not to the advantage of the 
majority of the country.   
 
One reason why it is possible for the state to expropriate property is because no 
individual can write an enforceable contract with the state, which is discussed in the next 
section. 
 
                                          
33 The World Bank (2002b) also describes corruption as a regressive tax, because the demands for 
bribes and unofficial fees for services hit the poor the hardest. 
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4.4 HOW INSTITUTIONS DETRIMENTAL TO GROWTH PERSIST 
OVER TIME 
 
In order to explain the inability of countries to converge to levels of developed 
countries or to explain examples of ‘reversals of fortune’, which has been the Zambian 
experience, a number or reasons why flawed institutions have the ability to persist over 
time are discussed in this section.  Different, and sometimes interrelated, explanations are 
discussed.   
 
 
Colonialism 
In the last number of years extensive research has been done on the link between 
colonisation and post-colonial economic prosperity.  It is especially the work of Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2003b, 2004) that have linked different types of colonisation 
to geographical realities, and these to post-colonial institutions.  A study of former European 
colonies by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) revealed that the institutions in almost 
all these former colonies were influenced by their colonial past. In particular those 
institutions dealing with private property that constrained local elites and rulers were more 
likely to be created by Europeans in order to protect their own property rights when they 
settled in large numbers (e.g. in The USA and Australia). 
 
Again, when the Europeans were interested mainly in extracting resources, and did 
not settle, no participatory institutions emerged resulting in the creation of extractive 
institutions only.  In places where the disease environment was not favourable to European 
health and settlement, and especially where they were a small minority relative to a large 
indigenous population, they did not have the incentive to develop good economic 
institutions because “such institutions would have made it considerably more difficult for 
them to extract resources from the rest of society” (Acemoglu, et al. 2004: 49).  It was 
therefore to the advantage of the Europeans to create extractive institutions.   
 
In neither Botswana nor Zambia were there large settlements of Europeans during 
colonial rule.  But due to the fact that copper was extracted during the time of colonial rule 
in Zambia, institutions supporting these extractions were created, while in Botswana such 
institutions were not created since no valuable resources were known to exist before 
independence. 
 
In another article Acemoglu et al. (2002) link their previous findings to current 
macroeconomic instability.  They document a robust relationship between the historically 
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determined component of post-war institutions and volatility (as well as the severity of 
economic crises and economic growth): “countries that inherited worse ("extractive") 
institutions from European colonial powers are much more likely to experience high volatility 
and severe economic crises” (Acemoglu, et al. 2002: 51).   
 
They describe the effect of high European settler mortality and economic outcomes 
after independence as follows:  
Former colonies, which experienced higher European mortality more than 100 years 
ago, are today more likely to suffer high volatility (as measured by the standard 
deviation of the growth rate), severe output collapses (as measured by the largest 
output drop in any year) and low growth.   
 
Their interpretation is that in places where the Europeans did not settle, they set up 
more intensely extractive institutions that concentrated power in the hands of a small elite. 
These countries typically ended up with weaker institutions.  Societies with weak institutions 
not only grow less slowly in the long run, but also experience greater growth volatility. 
 
One conclusion is that history matters.  Initial advantages or disadvantages and 
interim shocks can have long-lasting effects on growth, and these effects can be 
compounded.  Thus, with secured property rights and participatory institutions like those in 
Botswana, one would expect a virtuous cycle of investment, falling costs and higher 
economic growth (Aron 1996, North 1990).  The opposite was true for Zambia at the time of 
independence.  Zambia inherited a system of extractive institutions that was transplanted 
into post-colonial Zambia.  Another applicable example is used by Acemoglu et al. (2004: 
62) when comparing Mexico and the United States of America:  
 
  In Mexico there were very different initial conditions during the colonial period with a 
large indigenous population and rich silver mines to exploit.  This led to a much more 
hierarchical and authoritarian balance of political power and very different colonial 
economic institutions.  These conditions fed into the different institutional structures 
at independence—the United States with its constitution, checks and balances and 
federalism, Mexico with its much more centralized, unchecked, unbalanced and 
absolutist state.  These different political institutions then led to very different 
economic institutions and economic outcomes after independence.  Thus, in some 
ultimate sense, the source of different political institutions was different initial 
conditions during the colonial period.   
 
One can thus draw the conclusion that extractive colonisation is a story of inevitable 
stagnation for colonies that were subjected to it.  Fortunately for these colonies, “path 
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dependency is not a story of inevitability”.  The choice of institutions seems too important to 
be denied.  Colonialism destroyed old institutions and created new ones, but what happened 
in the countries after independence was the result of choices made by those with political 
power.  Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2004: 35-36) describe it as follows: “even if 
institutions have a tendency to persist, their persistence is still a choice, in the sense that if 
the agents decided to change institutions, change would be possible”.   
 
In a sense this is easier said than done, because, informal institutions created during 
colonial times influence the post-colonial decisions, and formal and informal institutions 
from the pre-colonial period in turn influenced these.  The important point is that although 
colonialism is not a story of inevitable stagnation, stagnation can be explained in terms of 
post-colonial decisions embedded in experiences gained during colonisation. 
 
But although difficult to change, it still remains possible for post-colonial 
governments to change exploitive formal institutions that were created during the colonial 
period.  Changes in formal institutions can come about through legislative change, such as 
the passage of a new law, or court decisions that alter the common law, or changes in the 
regulatory rules, or ultimately constitutional changes.   
 
Acemoglu, et al. (2004) describe a number of examples where countries radically 
changed their legal systems, such as Japan after the Meiji restoration, Russia after the 
Crimean War, and Turkey under Mustafa Kemal in the 1920s.  Another example might be 
the introduction of central planning of the economy.  Though many countries adopted this 
way or organizing their economies, some abandoned it while others, such as North Korea 
and Cuba, still maintain it.   
 
The idea of institutional change can also be described within the framework of 
colonialism.  The different types of colonialism and the institutions it created were the 
choice of the colonial powers.  When the colonisers did not settle, they chose economic 
institutions simply to extract resources from the native population.  When they settled in 
large numbers, economic institutions and policies emerged in order to protect them in the 
future and encourage investment and prosperity.  These actions of the economic and 
political agents, although not necessarily to the advantage of the indigenous population, 
were taken in a rational fashion.    
 
Although not an exploitive institution created during colonial times, the embedded 
institution of chieftaincy in Botswana serves as an example of an institution that was 
changed with independence to benefit post-colonial democratic structures.  As discussed in 
Chapter 6, the chiefs lost most of their executive power at independence, ending up in a 
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consulting position in the House of Chiefs.  The only way chiefs could participate in 
governing the independent nation was to give up their chieftaincy and be elected in the 
democratic process.   
 
In conclusion it can be said that, "although institutions are the incidental outcome of 
history, at some point people will start to ask why these choices were made" (Acemoglu, et 
al. 2004: 35-36).  These choices are the result of history, informal institutions and, as is 
discussed on p102, the pressure from interest groups that benefit from upholding the old 
formal institutions.  Informal institutions do not change at the same speed as formal 
institutions, but serve as a “memory” of things that happened in the past34.  The formal 
institutions created during colonial times, per se, are therefore not to be blamed as a source 
of stagnation in the independent country.  It is the combination of informal institutions 
created during colonial times and the choices made after independence that are to blame.   
 
 
Ideology 
The question of why post-colonial economic and political players choose policies that 
only benefit a small group, although these policies are detrimental to the country as a 
whole, needs to be answered.  One possibility is that policies are based on some form of 
ideology, for instance, the “Zambian Humanism” that Kaunda supported.  In the mid-1960s, 
when most African colonies gained their independence, socialism was the fashionable 
ideology to adopt.  The capitalist west was seen to be the enemy of most African countries, 
so it was more acceptable to side with the supporters of socialism.  It may be construed 
that this type of socialism was to the disadvantage of Zambia.  In Botswana a capitalist 
system was adopted at independence, and the biggest role-players were wealthy cattle 
owners.  The smooth functioning of a capitalistic system was therefore to their advantage. 
 
Again, as for colonialism, one can consider the inevitability of path dependency.  It is 
not so much the choice of ideology at independence that is important, but whether a 
country continues on that road even if it produces stagnating economic results.  Why do 
countries persist on the road to stagnation?  Acemoglu et al. (2004) uses the example of 
South versus North Korea to argue that much can be explained by the self-interest of the 
leaders.  He argues that the choice of different ideologies can explain the divergence in 
economic institutions straight after independence, but even when the choice of the north 
proved to be a failure in the 1980s, the leaders of that country still clung to it.  The ideology 
they have chosen provides them personally with a higher rate of return than the alternative, 
                                          
34 It is shown in Chapter 6 that the “memory” of colonialism in Zambia was much more negative 
than that of Botswana which was only a colonial protectorate. 
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and therefore they tend to stick to the ideology that is detrimental to the majority of the 
population. 
 
Again the conclusion is similar to the one reached under colonialism as the reason for 
the existence of bad institutions.  Societies may choose economic institutions that are 
detrimental for society as a whole because of a history of extractive institutions.  
Institutions may differ across countries because of ideological differences.  But these 
theories do not satisfactorily explain why societies stay on a road to stagnation.  Different 
beliefs and ideology often play important roles in economic decisions, but it is not enough to 
explain long-term stagnation.   
 
If a country was subjected to colonialism or had chosen an ideology that leads to the 
stagnation of the country, government can alter the influence of both through a change in 
policy.  Government choices are important for the economy.  Why is it so hard for 
government to change bad policies?  One reason might be the inability of the polity to 
commit to their decisions when they have unconstrained power. 
 
 
The inability of the Polity to commit 
From an institutional perspective governments have, broadly defined, two roles to 
play in an economy: they can make or change formal rules, and they can enforce them.  
The success, to which these roles are performed, depends to a large extent on the degree of 
power governments enjoys.  If they have unconstrained power, governments can make 
policy choices, for example, that benefit themselves rather than society at large.  The 
reason for this stems from the fact that governments per se cannot be an impartial enforcer 
of agreements between themselves and the citizens.  To explain the situation, it is 
necessary to review government's general role as enforcer of contracts.   
 
In economic exchange the parties to the exchange are held responsible for their 
decisions through an array of enforceable contracts.  These include contracts between 
workers and employers, borrowers and lenders, etc.  The reason why these contracts are 
effective is because there is an authority, a third party, with the power to enforce them.  
Workers have trust in their contract with their employer, because by default the state, and 
its agents, the courts, would be the impartial enforcers of the contract.  If, however, one of 
the contracting parties has any suspicion that the state might support the other party to a 
greater extent and refuse to punish that party if and when it fails to make a payment 
stipulated by the contract, then a contract will have little value.  For contracts to have 
credibility the presence of an impartial enforcer is important.  In the section on 
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enforcement, government was established as the most cost-efficient agent to play the role 
as impartial third party. 
 
However, when it comes to contracts that government or social groups controlling 
the state would like to write with others (e.g. the citizens), there is no impartial third party 
to enforce that contract (Acemoglu 2002).  When there are no checks on government, on 
politicians, and on elites, private citizens do not have the security of property rights 
necessary for investment.   
 
If government has unconstrained power, private citizens are unable to protect 
themselves against possible exploitation (Acemoglu and Johnson 2003).  And for citizens to 
undertake investments, they have to be certain that they will be able to take delivery of the 
income from that investment.  The problem is that the political elites – those in control of 
political power – cannot commit to respect the property rights of the producers once the 
investment is undertaken.   
 
Bad institutions can therefore persist if government has unconstrained power.  If 
government wants to change from a path of bad institutions, role-players will find it hard to 
trust that promise, because they have no means of enforcing that promise (Acemoglu, et al. 
2004).  This situation can be improved if a constitution or independent judiciary control the 
actions of the state.  This point is elaborated on in Chapter 8. 
 
The situation in this section describes a government with too much power, but what 
if government has too little power?  The following section focuses on a situation where too 
little power withholds the government from making decisions that benefit the majority of 
the population. 
 
 
Social conflict 
Related to the commitment problem is the fact that government may not necessarily 
have enough power to change bad institutions.  If governments have too little power, 
powerful groups in society will be able to influence their decisions.  By also taking the 
previous section into account, the complexity of the situation becomes apparent.  A 
government with too little power will be unable to improve bad institutions, but alternatively 
an overly powerful central government directly conflicts with the objective of restraining the 
sovereign.   
 
The idea of too little power is explained by what Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2004) call “a social conflict view”.  They explain that choices made regarding economic and 
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political institutions are not always by and to the benefit of the entire society, because the 
groups that control political power make them.  Those with political power (not necessarily 
the reigning government) will determine which economic institutions will come into effect 
and eventually have important implications for economic performance.   
 
Where does political power come from and who wields political power?  Political 
power comes from two sources:  
• First, an individual or group can be allocated de jure power by political institutions, like 
the constitution.   
• A second type of political power accrues to those individuals or groups who either have 
economic power, or are able to destabilise society through collective action.  This can 
be called de facto political power (Acemoglu and Robinson 2003).   
 
Actual political power is the joint outcome of de jure and de facto power, and this is 
where social conflict is created.  While a government may be committed to make decisions 
that would create an environment conducive to productive investments through the 
protection of property rights, they are also influenced by the bargaining strengths of those 
affected by the decision.  Because their decisions will determine the payoff to the players in 
the economic game, it is worth the time and money for rent-seeking producers to appeal to 
politicians, who themselves have to compete for re-election, to keep certain regulations in 
place or to add new ones.  For both role-players (i.e. politicians and those affected by the 
decision) self-interest seems to be the important issue.   
 
Different groups will choose the economic institutions that maximize their own rents, 
and the economic institutions that result may not coincide with those that maximize total 
surplus, wealth or income.  For example, although the protection of property rights are to 
the long-term benefit of society, a ruler may find it to his/her own financial benefit to 
infringe upon property rights (Acemoglu, et al. 2004).  Furthermore, producers are always 
searching for ways to reduce competition and hence maximise their profits.  If they can 
influence politicians through lobbying, it will be to their financial advantage to influence the 
political decision-maker to make a decision that is beneficial to the producer, but not 
necessarily to society as a whole.  Such a decision will not increase the size of the economic 
pie, but rather the slice that accrues to the one with the de facto political power (Kasper 
and Streit 1998).  Role-players will devote resources to the changing of institutional 
constraints as long as the payoff from changing the direction exceeds the payoff from 
staying with the existing constraints.   
 
The effect of the interaction between de jure and de facto political power is that the 
rules (i.e. formal institutions) that emerge from this process will be those that serve the 
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group with the actual political power.  This situation per se is not necessarily bad.  It all 
depends on whether these rules are growth-enhancing or not.  In other words: whether the 
group with the actual political power has growth-enhancing intentions or not.   
 
Three examples from the literature illustrate the point.  The first example is provided 
by Acemoglu et al. (2004).  They describe the differences between Ghana and Zambia, and 
Kenya and Colombia.  In all four countries price regulations were induced, with different 
outcomes.  In the first set of countries the regulations were distortionary, but not in the 
latter.  In the latter countries agricultural producers had more political power and so "could 
prevent the distortionary policies that would harm their interests" (Acemoglu, et al. 2004: 
59)35.  A second example from De Long and Shleifer (1992) explains the same 
phenomenon.  They found that a government that consists principally of individuals with 
substantial private wealth and private property would care about more than just state 
revenue.  If the region prospers, it will also be to the benefit of their own financial 
prosperity.  Thirdly, if a society is sharply divided by income lines, the poorer half of the 
population possibly stands to gain more from redistribution of income than from growth-
promoting policies.  If the poor is in the majority, they will vote to tax the rich minority.  
Such an action can be detrimental to future economic growth.   
 
The distribution of political power in society is therefore crucial for explaining good 
and bad economic institutions.  The fear of losing political power due to the actions of those 
with de facto power can lead political groups to oppose institutional change that would have 
been beneficial for the country.  Furthermore, if the initial set of institutions provides 
incentives to unproductive activity, it will create organisations and interest groups that 
abide by those incentives and they will use their bargaining power to preserve those 
institutions.  Governments depend on popular support to remain in power and they may find 
it hard to enact efficient rules if powerful constituents oppose those rules.  Government is 
also constrained by historical decisions.  “History matters” and inefficient rules may survive 
because of the nature of path dependency (North 1990).  It is also possible that inefficient 
rules yield more tax revenue than efficient ones and that government may find it difficult to 
change those rules.     
 
The lack of effective institutional constraints on the politically powerful implies that 
there is more to be gained by acquiring political power (Acemoglu, et al. 2002).  When the 
                                          
35 With Kaunda’s power based in the urban areas, the mining industry and manufacturing were 
favoured relatively to the agricultural sector.  In Botswana the cattle owners were also those 
with political power, and therefore created economic institutions that protected the property 
rights of those cattle owners. 
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political power shifts, the newly empowered groups may then attempt to redistribute wealth 
(assets and income streams) to themselves and their supporters.  This can explain political 
instability that has been present in most of Africa in the post-colonial era.  The groups that 
lose out politically therefore have an incentive to demand power. If the political process 
does not function well, this demand may cause instability or more crass measures such as a 
coup.   
 
Acemoglu et al. (2002: 5) argue that "in institutionally-weak societies, elites and 
politicians will find various ways of expropriating different segments of the society, ranging 
from microeconomic to various macroeconomic policies". The problem faced by these 
institutionally weak (having no institutional barriers) societies is how to constrain those in 
power.  A lack of constraint on politicians and elites increases the incentive of various 
groups to fight in order to gain power, and enables the incumbents when they gain power to 
exploit their position, sometimes with disastrous consequences.  The problem looking for a 
solution is how to get the state to behave like an impartial third party. What institutional 
constraints are needed to achieve this ideal? 
 
A challenge in institutional economics is designing institutions that support private 
contracts and simultaneously provide barriers against expropriation by the politically 
powerful.  It is hard to find a government with wealth-maximising actors unconstrained by 
other considerations; therefore governments need to be restrained by some external force.  
And furthermore, Djankov et al. (2003) explain that good institutions would introduce ways 
to get rid of bad politicians and bureaucrats.  These two issues receive attention in Chapter 
8. 
 
The discussion so far on social conflict can be summarised by saying that economic 
institutions that shape economic outcomes, are determined by a combination of de jure and 
de facto political power.  It is, however, possible to take one step back and ask the question 
how these different types of political power originated in a country.  Acemoglu et al. (2004) 
discuss two examples to illustrate the point:   
 
  Agricultural policies in Kenya supported large farms because large farmers could 
solve the collective action problem and exercise de facto political power.  But the 
main reason for the existence of large farms was that British settlers expropriated 
the land from Africans during the expansion of colonialism.  Thus previous 
combinations of formal political institutions (colonial institutions) and de facto power 
(the military might of the British Empire) determined economic institutions, feeding 
into the future distribution of de facto power even after the nature of de jure power 
changed dramatically with independence (p 62).   
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  The Netherlands and England prospered in this period because they had good 
economic institutions, particularly secure property rights, and well developed 
financial markets.  They had these economic institutions because their governments 
were controlled by groups with a strong vested interest in such economic 
institutions. These groups wielded political power because of the structure of political 
institutions, i.e., they received de jure power in the Netherlands after the Dutch 
Revolt and in England after the Civil War and Glorious Revolution (p 72).   
 
These examples take the discussion back to the influence of colonialism on post-
colonial economic outcomes.  The discussions on colonialism and ideology both concluded 
that they are important, but that choices made by the postcolonial government could 
improve bad institutions created during colonialism.  This is true, but a lot depends on the 
allotment of the power base in the country.  In other words, who has de facto and who has 
de jure political power.  The social conflict view provides an explanation of why 
governments choose economic institutions that cause underdevelopment even when they 
know that it is going to happen.  It is because de jure political power is influenced by de 
facto political power, and the latter may not necessarily have the economic prosperity of the 
majority of the country in mind.  To complete the cycle, this distribution of political power 
can be traced back to colonialism.  Therefore colonialism does not necessarily lead to 
stagnation, but it has a lot to answer for about the distribution of power it left the colony 
with. 
 
In conclusion it can be said that if all the explanations for bad institutions discussed 
in this section, are taken into account, an economy that has prospered for many years 
seems to be a miracle.  But history provides examples of countries that have prospered for 
many years, and also countries that have turned from a low growth path onto a high one.  
The question that needs to be solved at this stage is how bad institutions can be changed in 
such a beneficial fashion that the abovementioned problems are being taken care of.   
   
 
4.5 INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
 
For Engerman and Sokolof (2003: 30) the definition of bad institutions are “those 
with institutional inflexibility, whose institutions did not respond constructively to take 
advantage of the opportunities created by their environment and state of knowledge”.  
Societies with good institutions have institutions well adapted for economic performance in 
their specific settings because they had implemented a series of institutional modifications 
or innovations that cumulatively generated improvements in welfare.   
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It must be kept in mind that efficient institutions, which are responsive to changes in 
the environment, come neither easy nor fast.  The move towards an efficient political 
process, for example, takes time to develop, especially for countries that have had to shake 
off a less efficient system, for instance, the burden of colonial rule.  Landes (1990) points 
out that European countries took centuries to reach a point where growth-enhancing 
institutions outnumbered growth-retarding ones.  Because of the memory created by past 
experience, like colonialism, it will probably take many years to overcome the subordination 
and humiliation experienced. 
 
Furthermore, for countries to find the "right" mixture of formal and informal 
institutions, that would induce growth, is a complex process that cannot be duplicated 
between countries.  Every country needs time to find the right mixture, but it is also a 
process that never ends.  For institutions to support economic growth and development, 
they must change over time as circumstances change.  The experience of developments 
during the past half-century where the best performing countries were those that liberalised 
partially and gradually supports this view.   
 
According to Rodrik (2001: 98-99) an important reason why gradualist strategies 
worked in these cases was that they were better tailored to pre-existing institutions at 
home.  Rodrik uses China and Latin America as examples: “China is an excellent example as 
its astonishing success since 1978 is due to a strategy based on dual tracks, gradualism and 
experimentation.  Compare this with wholesale reforms implemented in Latin America and 
the formerly socialist countries – their success hinged on the Herculean task of creating a 
wide range of new institutions in short order and, for most of them, from scratch”.  The 
comparison supports the view that market-orientated reform strategies must recognise not 
only that institutions matter, but also that altering existing institutions takes time and 
effort.  The reason for this is that the greater the fit between market-oriented reforms and 
pre-existing institutional capabilities, the higher is the probability of success. 
 
A further problem affecting institutional change is that institutions responding to the 
wrong incentives can be hard to change when the turn-around costs are too high, or if 
individual attempts to change them causes even more unpleasant consequences (see Toye 
1995 for a discussion on female circumcision).  Political and economic organisations as well 
as individuals may have spent a lot of money in the past to be able to operate in the weak 
institutional environment, and according to Aron (2000) they are likely to maintain and 
entrench the weak institutional environment.  A situation like this creates organisations that 
become more efficient, but more efficient at making the society even less productive.  It is 
therefore important to have a process through which bad institutions can be replaced by 
good institutions. 
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Such a process can come from democratic pressures, from the influence of growth-
seeking interest groups such as merchants, from negotiation among the members of the 
elite, or just from a long-term evolutionary process (Djankov, et al. 2003).  The important 
thing seems to be that the economy and the society must have the flexibility to respond to 
changes in the economic environment.  And the discussion in this chapter has highlighted 
the important role of the polity in the efficiency of institutions.  It is therefore important to 
have a good government, constrained in its choices, but also strong enough to take the 
appropriate actions even if this is opposed by strong groups in the society.   
 
An issue related to good governance and one especially applicable to Botswana and 
Zambia, is the policy choices governments make in the face of natural resource abundance.  
In chapter 3 the resource curse was raised as a possible reason for growth differences.  It 
was concluded that a lot depends on the policy choices government make.  In section 4.6 
that discussion is taken a step further, by extending it to institutional theory to determine 
the theoretical link between institutions and the resource curse. 
 
 
4.6 INSTITUTIONS AND THE RESOURCE CURSE 
 
Resource dependence creates extra problems for government, for instance an 
appreciating exchange rate, an unstable income, and the urge to spend the high income on 
grandiose projects.  But as Wright and Czelusta (2002: 3) suggest: “the underlying 
problems are not inherent in the resources themselves”.  The way government reacts to 
these occurrences will eventually determine whether the country will have a growth 
enhancing experience or not from its resource abundance. 
 
The way government reacts depends strongly on the quality of the institutions in the 
country.  Intuition suggests that if growth-enhancing institutions, like property rights 
protection or restraints on governments, are absent, governments may engage in policy 
choices that will secure the ruling elite’s personal positions, but these choices will not 
necessarily benefit the majority of the population.  The presence of high quality institutions 
will make such policy choices unfeasible.   
 
The question is whether cross-country analyses support the link between high quality 
institutions and good policy choices regarding the expropriation of resources.  This link has 
already been established empirically.  To find causality is, of course, always difficult.  Do 
institutions impact on the spending of the funds generated by the resource curse, or does 
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the resource curse impact on economic growth through its negative impact on institutions?  
Or does it go both ways?  There is evidence for both. 
 
Sarraf and Jiwanji (2001) found that some natural resources – especially oil and 
minerals – exert a complex negative impact on growth because of erosion of institutional 
quality.   Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) also show that natural resources that are 
“easy to steal” (like oil and mining) turn out to have a highly adverse impact on growth by 
allowing corruption chains to be created that end up undermining the favourable institutions 
such as the rule of law.  Both these studies show that the natural resource curse has a 
negative impact on the quality of domestic institutions and so on long-run growth. 
 
There is, however, also support for the theory that good or bad institutions in the 
onset of resource exploration will determine whether a country will escape the resource 
curse or not.  Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2002) suggest that countries with producer 
friendly institutions will attract entrepreneurs into the extraction of the resources in such a 
manner that it will lead to higher growth.   
 
Leite and Weidmann (1999) show both theoretically and empirically that strong 
institutions in the wake of natural resource discoveries are important as a way to curb the 
associated negative growth effects of, for example, corruption.  This is not surprising if it is 
taken into account that good institutions diminish the perverse political incentives that 
booms create.  Countries with deficient institutions may suffer from a resource curse 
because there are hardly any checks on their governments.   
 
When resource rents flow into the coffers of the government these revenues allow 
the government to employ an excessive number of people (supporters) in the bureaucracy 
and in state-owned enterprises. The increase in Zambia’s bureaucracy at a time of 
contraction in private employment provides an example.  It can be hypothesised that the 
presence of robust institutions in Zambia would not have permitted the use of such political 
strategies.  Just across the border Botswana has not fallen pray to the pressure to spend all 
the income from the diamond production.  Again this reminds of Olson’s analogy that 
borders define different institutions. 
 
An interesting example, in this regard, is discussed by Temple (2003) in his account of 
Indonesia's problems.  The Indonesian government of Suharto inherited poor economic 
institutions, but was able to spend its mineral rent well.  They did this with the help of 
external consultants (the so-called “Berkeley Mafia”).  Unfortunately for Indonesia, these 
consultants were only concerned about the macroeconomic policy and no attention was paid 
to the adjustment of defective institutions (for example corruption) in the country and this 
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became apparent with the collapse of the Indonesian economy during the Asian financial 
crisis in the 1990s36.  It seems as if good macroeconomic policies without wealth creating 
institutions can cure the problems related to resource abundance, but only up to a certain 
point.  What need to be taken care of are the underlying institutions. 
 
Robinson, Torvik and Verdier (2002) take a middle-road strategy when they highlight 
the importance of good institutions rather than trying to explain causality.  They divide 
resource abundant countries into two groups:  those that have escaped the resource curse 
and those that have not.  They linked these to the institutional quality index used by Knack 
and Keefer (1995) and found that the first group of countries rank ahead of the institutional 
quality of the second, and that they do so in a consistent manner (Robinson, et al. 2002).   
 
It can therefore be concluded that for resource dependence to contribute to long-term 
economic prosperity, growth-enhancing institutions are necessary.  One of the reasons why 
Botswana and Zambia realised different growth rates, while both being resource rich, can 
therefore be attributed to differences in their respective institutional matrixes. 
 
 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
 
The challenge accepted by the New Institutional Economics (NIE) was to determine 
how societies could be organised to encourage economic growth.  What can countries do to 
secure prosperity?   
 
The institutions needed for economic growth and development are those that lower 
transaction costs (for example property rights) and those that protect property rights (a 
constrained polity).  This may sound trivial, but there are various reasons why countries find 
it impossible to adhere to these principles, for instance the unpleasant memory of 
colonialism, the inability of the polity to commit to previous decisions, and so on.   
 
Countries subjected to colonialism are not destined to become poor because of 
colonialism per se, because post-colonial governments can change the extractive ones 
imposed by the colonial authorities.  Colonialism causes these problems: firstly that it 
creates a memory of extraction (for example to such an extent that the post-colonial 
government would go to extreme lengths to rid itself of any colonial influence), and 
secondly, that colonialism creates powerful groups in society that distorts the de facto and 
                                          
36 See Temple (2003) for a thorough account of the role of defective institutions in the fall of the 
Indonesian economy. 
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de jure power base at independence. 
 
If government has too little power, it may be too weak to change bad institutions 
(especially if those bad institutions are to the benefit of those with de facto power).  And 
then one can ask: who has the greater part of the power and what are their intentions?  
Alternatively, if government has too much power, it may infringe on the protection of 
property rights due to a lack of restraints.   
 
Before an in-depth study of institutions and institutional restraints on governments in 
Zambia and Botswana can be done, the relevance of institutions as explanation for growth 
differences between these countries needs to be established.  This is done in the following 
chapter by applying empirical institutional evidence to Botswana and Zambia.   
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5 CHAPTER 5 
EVIDENCE FROM THE EMPIRICAL INSTITUTIONAL 
LITERATURE 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
North (1990: 107) has suggested that “we cannot see, feel, touch or even measure 
institutions”, but he nevertheless encourages quantification of the effect of institutions on 
transaction costs.  Over time different proxies have been suggested to quantify institutional 
quality.  Such measures are, for example, the time required to obtain a telephone or spare 
parts.  A high score on these measures is indicative of high transaction costs.  Other 
measures include civil and political liberties, the size of government, sound money and 
political measures.  One of the earliest cross-country growth studies that attempted to test 
the importance of property rights and contract enforcement used the Freedom House 
indices of political freedom and civil liberty and a series measuring various forms of political 
violence such as coups, revolutions and assassinations.  A number of different indices have 
since been constructed to quantify some of the institutional dimensions emphasised in the 
new institutional literature.   
 
The purpose of this chapter is to apply relevant measures to Zambia and Botswana 
to determine whether institutions do indeed provide evidence for growth differences 
between the two countries; in other words, whether the available institutional measures 
offer a plausible explanation for growth differences.  Many institutional measures - for 
example, the property rights index of the Heritage foundation – only offer index values 
since the mid-nineties, rendering them of little value in explaining growth differences 
between Zambia and Botswana since independence.  There are however a few data bases 
quantifying aspects of both economies’ institutions since the seventies.   
 
The Freedom House index of political and civil liberties (conceived by Raymond Gastil 
(see for example, Freedom House 2004)) are used in section 2 of this chapter.  It is 
available from 1972 onwards and is a widely used (for example, Barro 2000) source of 
information on political institutions.     
 
In section 3 indices from the Frasier Institute are used.  The Frasier Institute 
publishes an annual international economic freedom report, in which 21 distinct indicators of 
economic freedom in five groups are scored and then aggregated to give a comparable 
index value for economic freedom across countries.  This data is available at five-year 
intervals from 1970, but many of the indicators only score Zambia and Botswana from 1975 
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onwards.  Nevertheless, the economic freedom index, especially at the component level, is 
a rich source of data on trends in the institutional matrix in Zambia and Botswana.  The 
Frasier Institute’s economic freedom index was compiled by Gwartney and Lawson (for 
example, 2003). 
 
In section 4 the Polity IV data base shows data on the de jure and de facto features 
of the political systems of a very large panel of countries on an annual basis (from 1964 for 
Zambia) until 2002.  It was compiled by Marshall and Jaggers (2002) who built on the 
earlier Polity III dataset of Jaggers and Gurr (1995). 
  
These three indices will act as empirical guides to the institutional development in 
Zambia and Botswana and the role this played in their divergent economic performances.   
 
 
5.2 THE FREEDOM HOUSE INDEX 
 
Gastil’s Freedom House index (Freedom House 2004)  scores a large set of countries 
(142 in 1972 rising to 190 in 1993) on two dimensions: civil liberties and political liberties.  
The former refers to property rights, the right to organise and to express one freely, the 
freedom to travel, and freedom of religion and of education.  Political liberties refer to the 
ability of the population to participate in elections and to influence policy, and it also refers 
to the influence of opposition parties.  These two dimensions of liberty are then combined to 
give a total score for each country ranging from Free, to Partially Free, to Not Free.  
 
On the total Freedom House index Zambia has been graded as Partially Free since 
the inception of the index.  But the evolution of the two dimensions of liberty used in that 
index shows interesting variation over the relevant period.   
 
Civil liberties in Zambia was scored at 5 (on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being “free”) in 
1972, and remained at 5 until worsening to a 6 from 1981 to 1983, before returning to a 5.  
The deterioration in civil liberties during the early eighties caused Zambia to drop from the 
middle of the international table to the bottom third of the countries on civil liberties.  This 
ranking improved during the later eighties, with more freedom granted in the run-up to the 
elections of the early 1990s.  
 
Political liberties in Zambia also scored 5 in 1972, where it remained until deteriorating 
to a 6 during the late eighties.  The inception of the third Zambia republic in 1992 brought a 
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rapid improvement in political liberties (to score 2).  Unfortunately the sample starts too 
late to capture the decline in political liberties in Zambia during the late sixties and early 
seventies.  Like many other sub-Saharan African countries (see Barro 2000) Zambia lost the 
semblance of democracy which it enjoyed at independence as it evolved into a one-party 
state with the Second Republic in 1972.  
 
For Botswana the picture looks somewhat different.  For the overall index Botswana 
was rated Partially Free only for 1973 and since then Free.  For Civil Liberties the worst 
score Botswana realised was in 1973, and only for that year, when it was rated a 4.  From 
1974 through to the end of the 1980s it attained a 3.  Political liberties in Botswana scored 
a 2 for most of the period, with the exception of 1973 (3) and in the first number of years of 
the 1990s (1).  Unlike Zambia Botswana has remained a democracy.   
 
Unfortunately, it is hard to relate this index directly to the security of property rights 
or to the institutions that protect property rights.  It does not capture many of the relevant 
threats of property and contractual rights. 
 
 
5.3 THE FRASIER INSTITUTE INDEX 
 
The Frasier Institute has steadily extended the cross-country coverage of its 
economic freedom index from 54 countries in 1970 to 123 by the mid-1990s.  Zambia was 
first ranked in the 1975-survey when it ranked 56th out of 72 countries on the aggregate 
index.  Therefore, relative to other countries in the survey it was not free.  Botswana was 
first ranked in 1980 and was then ranked 48th out of 105 countries.  Figure 32 shows the 
evolution of this ranking (as a proportion of the total number of countries ranked) at five-
year intervals since 1975.  On aggregate, the economic freedom in Zambia has been 
severely constrained - and even suffered periodic decline on an international comparison – 
since 1975.  Indeed the index value for economic freedom in Zambia in 1990 (3.24)37 was 
lower than the index value for 1975 (4.66).  For the period shown, Botswana has remained 
more or less constant in relative terms.   
 
 
                                          
37 An index value of 10 indicates absolute freedom. 
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Figure 32: Relative summary index of the Frasier Institute  
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
120.0
1975 1980 1985 1990
Zambia Botswana
 
 
The aggregate index is the weighted average of 21 scores in five major categories, 
and therefore needs to be unpacked to discover the variations in the sub-indices of the 
aggregate.  Since institutional changes impact differently in the sub-categories of the 
Frasier index they will be considered separately below.   
 
 
Size of the government 
In the first sub-category the Frasier Institute scores the extent of the government’s 
participation in the economy, using measures such as its share of consumption, and 
investment, transfers, subsidies, and the top marginal tax rate. This sub-category is graded 
on the assumption that a larger government impedes economic freedom.  Figure 33 shows 
the relative ranking of Zambia and Botswana in the size of government category relative to 
the number of countries scored in this category.  
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Figure 33: Relative index of the size of government  
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The size of government score for Zambia improves marginally from 1975 through 
1990.  Throughout the sample period the relative size of government consumption declined, 
contributing to the modest decline in the government participation observed above.  This 
trend accelerated during the early nineties and was sustained by lower marginal tax rates 
that contributed to the substantial decline in the relative size of Zambia’s government 
observed during that period. 
 
For Botswana the ranking deteriorated in the first half of the 1980s, but then it 
improved again.  Throughout the sample period the relative size of government 
consumption declined, but a higher marginal tax rate resulted in an increased score.  The 
Botswana government also increased its investment share in gross investment from 1980 to 
1990. 
 
 
Protection of property rights index 
The property rights index combines a number of dimensions, including the 
independence of the judiciary, impartiality of courts, protection of intellectual property 
rights, a law and order measure and a judgement on the involvement of the military in 
politics.  Zambia and Botswana’s relative ranking on the protection of property rights is 
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traced in the figure below, starting with the first score for Zambia on this sub-index in 1980 
and Botswana in 1985.   
 
Figure 34: Relative index of property rights protection 
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Both in relative terms internationally, but also in absolute terms, property rights 
weakened throughout the eighties in Zambia.  In light of the nationalisation of the seventies 
it is reasonable to expect that the eighties was a continuation of a longer trend in the 
erosion of property rights in Zambia38.  Botswana shows a consistently high level of 
property rights protection, internationally and in absolute terms.  The fact that no 
nationalisation has taken place in Botswana supports these values. 
 
 
Sound money 
A third component of economic freedom as defined by the Frasier Institute is sound 
money.  It takes into account the growth of money supply minus growth of real GDP, annual 
inflation, and the freedom of citizens to own foreign currency bank accounts. 
 
In a decentralised system money plays a crucial role in lowering transaction costs 
but also as an integral part of a functioning property rights system.  Not only is money one 
                                          
38 The loss of property right protection is discussed in Chapter 7. 
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of the assets to which property rights can be assigned, but it is also an infinitely divisible 
asset and as a means of exchange facilitates the divisibility of other assets too.  Therefore, 
when the value of money is eroded (by high and/or highly variable inflation) property rights 
are undermined in two ways:  
Firstly, money is itself an asset and the erosion of its value represents an 
infringement on an important part of the portfolio of assets (Buchanan 1993).  
Secondly, when the value of money becomes unstable the alienation of all property 
is more difficult.  Since the ability to alienate property is a central characteristic of 
property rights (North 1989), inflation undermines all property rights.  
 
With underdeveloped financial markets, it is expected that people in Zambia and 
Botswana depend even more on cash as a liquid asset.  In such an instance they have less 
flexibility to secure themselves against the erosion of the value of cash due to inflation.   
 
When the population has access to alternative currencies it limits the power of 
governments and monetary authorities to mismanage their currencies.  Substituting foreign 
exchange for domestic money balances becomes a rational response for the population 
when the domestic money is subjected to high and variable inflation (Hayek 1979).  
Consequently, the Frasier Institute scores the ability of citizens to hold foreign currency as 
an important composite part of economic freedom, under the rubric of sound money.  This 
part of economic freedom was closed to Zambians for the entire period under consideration; 
the capital account was only liberalised in the late nineties.  
 
Figure 35 tells the woeful story of the soundness of money in Zambia and Botswana 
for the period under consideration.  Both on international comparison, and absolutely, 
Zambia experienced a decline in the Frasier Institute measure of sound money since 1980. 
 
After an uneasy start in 1975 Botswana has improved on its score for sound money.  
At independence Botswana’s financial sector was basic.  The money in circulation was South 
African and Botswana initially chose to continue to use the South African monetary system.  
It was only in August 1976 that the new currency, the Pula, was launched (Leith 2002).  In 
the first half of the 1980s the balance of payments surpluses was realised due to the high 
income from new diamond mines.  This flooded the monetary system with money and 
increased the growth in money supply. 
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Figure 35: Relative index of sound money 
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The major reason for the erosion of economic freedom through monetary 
mismanagement in Zambia was the spiralling inflation of the eighties and early nineties, 
discussed in Chapter 2.  The improvement in the score for Botswana in the late 1980s can 
be attributed to the freedom granted to citizens to own foreign banking accounts.  Although 
inflation in Botswana was not at the low levels of developed countries, it was still lower than 
neighbouring South Africa, and significantly lower than that of Zambia.   
 
 
International trade 
A fourth sub-index of the economic freedom index concerns freedom to trade goods 
and services internationally.  On an international comparison the Zambian trade regime was 
not particularly restrictive by the mid-1970s (Figure 36), especially with tariffs that were 
fairly low by international comparison at that stage (Figure 37).   
 
However, the fiscal imperatives changed in Zambia during the course of the seventies 
and became especially acute during the eighties, with a drop in the income from the mining 
industry.  It is not surprising that trade taxes would present an attractive alternative to 
domestic sources of government revenue under these conditions (Agénor and Montiel 
1999); and that was the Zambian experience during the eighties too, as shown in the Figure 
37. 
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As a member of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), Botswana is not free to 
set its own import tariffs.  Given the way in which SACU was managed during the study 
period, the common external tariff in fact was the South African tariff and any changes in 
this regard reflect changes in South African tariff policy. 
 
Figure 36: Relative index of trade restrictions 
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Figure 37: Relative tariff interference with foreign trade 
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Capital controls on international financial flows remained restrictive in Zambia and 
Botswana throughout the period, but this was not exceptional for developing countries at 
the time.  Even if the countries’ capital controls do not stand out as especially restrictive on 
an international comparison, the same cannot be said of distortions in the foreign exchange 
market.  The figure below shows Zambia’s ranking on an international comparison of black 
market premiums.  
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Figure 38: Relative black market premium 
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Evidently, the black market premium has been relatively higher for Zambia than for 
Botswana, which is consistent with the misallocation of capital as well as raising transaction 
costs domestically.  
 
 
Regulation of business 
Finally, the Frasier Institute also grades the extent to which regulations impede 
economic freedom in various categories, including financial market regulations.  Zambian 
authorities have maintained fairly strict controls on the financial sector throughout the 
period, with the government-owned banks playing a leading role in the provision of finance.  
Additionally, interest rates were increasingly regulated to the extent the government’s fiscal 
problems deepened during the eighties, thus leading to negative real interest rates.  Figure 
39 shows the trend in financial repression through interest rate regulations in Zambia 
relative to the international sample in the Frasier Institute’s database.  This is followed by 
Figure 40, depicting the combined effect of interest rate regulations and bank ownership on 
the freedom of credit allocation.   
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Figure 39: Relative interest rate regulations 
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Figure 40: Relative restrictions on the allocation of credit 
 
When the Botswana government left the Rand Monetary System its strategy was to 
regulate interest rates.  For several years rates were changed in response to changing 
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circumstances.  The substantial balance of payments surpluses in the first half of the 1980s 
caused regulation to be even more of a problem.  Although the regulated commercial bank 
lending rates were very low in real terms, the banks faced a limited demand for credit that 
was not expanding nearly fast enough to match the growing deposits.  Commercial banks 
went so far as to refuse interest-bearing deposits, and frequently required depositors to 
hold some portion of their funds in non-interest bearing current accounts (Leith 2002).   
 
Figure 41 depicts business freedom for Botswana and Zambia.  Financial market and 
other business regulations in Zambia had a restrictive effect, while Botswana exerted 
relatively low interference. 
 
Figure 41: Relative business restrictions39 
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In summary, regulations in the Zambian economy were of average intensity on an 
international comparison during the mid seventies, but increased during the eighties in 
absolute terms (on the Frasier Institute measure) and on international comparison.  
Botswana, on the other hand has done very well throughout the 1980s.  The 
underdevelopment of the Botswana financial sector remains a disturbing factor.   
 
 
                                          
39 Included are Ownership of banks, extension of credit, interest rate regulation, credit market 
regulation, labour force share with wages set by centralized collective bargaining, unemployment 
insurance, labour market regulation. 
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5.4 THE POLITY IV DATASET 
 
Whereas the Frasier Institute quantifies various aspects of formal economic 
institutions, Marshall and Jaggers’s (2002) Polity IV dataset does the same on an annual 
basis for various political institutions in a large cross section of countries.  Zambia has been 
included since 1964 and Botswana since 1966.  The measure shows the degree of 
democracy and autocracy in the country and is built on a range of sub-components that 
quantify various aspects of the political institutions.  
 
 
Democracy and autocracy 
Version IV of the Polity dataset estimates both the degree of democracy and 
autocracy in a society and then combines them in an overall Polity score ranging from +10 
for full democracy to –10 for full autocracy.  
 
The democracy score is a weighted average of the following dimensions of the 
political landscape: formal institutions for electing alternative political leaders, formal 
constraints on the power of the executive, and guarantees of civil liberties to all citizens.  
Marshall and Jaggers (2002: 14) offer the following definition of a mature democracy: “…[a 
country] in which (a) political participation is fully competitive, (b) executive recruitment is 
elective, and (c) constraints on the chief executive are substantial”.  
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Figure 42: Evolution of democracy in Zambia 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1964 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989
 
 
Figure 42 shows the Polity IV measure of democracy in Zambia since 1964.  The 
modest degree of democracy in Zambia at independence was undermined in 1968 and 
fatally compromised by the Second Republic in 1972.  Democracy only returned with the 
Third Republic in 1991.  
 
Polity IV’s autocracy score is also a range variable measuring institutionalised 
autocracy.  The underlying conception of institutionalised autocracy is a regime which 
“sharply restrict or suppress competitive political participation” (Marshall and Jaggers 2002: 
14).  There are also few institutionalised constraints on the exercise of executive power. The 
degree to which the state directs economic and social activity – “directiveness” in the 
terminology of Marshall and Jaggers (2002) - is not directly included in this measure.  
Figure 43 traces the evolution of the autocracy index in Zambia since the sixties.  
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Figure 43: Evolution of autocracy in Zambia 
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The figure shows the stepwise move to an extremely authoritarian political structure 
by the early seventies and which was maintained for almost two decades.  This history of 
autocracy is combined with the democracy score in Figure 44 to give the overall Polity score 
for Zambia. 
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Figure 44: Overall polity index for Zambia 
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For Botswana the dataset tells a very different story (see Figure 45 and Figure 46).  
Botswana has been a democracy since independence and has improved on its score during 
the time considered.  This is interesting since Botswana effectively operates as a one-party 
state.  But without any repression of other political parties, Botswana scores a 0 for 
autocracy throughout the period, thus producing an overall polity index that resembles the 
democracy index.  The issue of democracy and autocracy in Botswana and Zambia will be 
taken further in Chapter 8.   
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Figure 45: Evolution of democracy in Botswana 
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Figure 46: Overall polity index for Botswana 
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The sub-components of the polity score are analysed in the following few 
paragraphs.  
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Competitiveness of executive recruitment 
Marshall and Jaggers (2002) score the process of selecting the executive office 
bearers40 (called XRCOMP) on a scale of 1 to 3, where 1 means “selection”, 2 means “dual 
or transitional” and 3 “election”. Zambia’s record is shown in the following graph.  
 
Figure 47: Competitiveness of executive recruitment in Zambia 
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In 1968 and again in 1972 the recruitment of executive office holders in Zambia 
become less competitive, leaving Zambia with a long period of little competition for 
executive power.  After Botswana’s transitional period, it scored a 3 throughout the period. 
 
 
                                          
40 XRCOMP measures the extent to which executives are chosen through competitive elections. 
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Figure 48: Competitiveness of executive recruitment in Botswana 
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Competitiveness of participation 
A second aspect of competitive politics involves the extent to which policy and 
leadership is open to competitive challenge in the country.  Marshall and Jaggers (2002) use 
a 5-point scale for the degree of competitiveness in policy and leadership (called PARCOMP), 
where the various grades are defined as below (Marshall and Jaggers 2002: 25-26): 
1. Repressed: “No significant oppositional activity is permitted outside the ranks of the 
ruling party” 
2. Suppressed: “Some organised, political competition occurs outside government, 
without serious factionalism; but the regime systematically and sharply limits its 
form, extent, or both in ways that exclude substantial groups … from participation” 
3. Factional: “Politics with parochial or ethnic based political factions that regularly 
compete for political influence in order to promote particularist agendas and favour 
group members to the detriment of common, secular, or cross-cutting agendas” 
4. Transitional step 
5. Competitive: “…relatively stable and enduring, secular political groups which regularly 
compete for political influence at the national level…” 
 
Zambia’s score on the PARCOMP variable is traced in Figure 49: 
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Figure 49: Competition for policy and leadership in Zambia 
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Even at its most liberal, political competition in Zambia was factional on the Marshall 
and Jaggers (2002) score.  During the Second Republic even that level of competition was 
absent, with competition for policy and leadership completely suppressed from 1972 to 
1991.  
 
Botswana throughout has a “transitional” score, as is shown in Figure 50.  A reason 
for this is probably the lack of well-organised opposition parties, although there are no 
formal constraints on their development. 
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Figure 50: Competition for policy and leadership in Botswana   
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Executive constraints 
Marshall and Jaggers (2002) define a measure of executive constraints (called 
XCONST) which quantifies the extent to which executive decisions are constrained by formal 
decision rules. This variable has a range from 1 to 7, with the following interpretation 
(Marshall and Jaggers 2002: 23-24): 
1. Unlimited authority: “there are no limitations on the executive’s actions” 
2. Intermediate category 
3. Slight to moderate limitation on executive authority: “there are some real but 
limited restraints on the executive” 
4. Intermediate category 
5. Substantial limitations on executive authority: “the executive has more 
effective authority than any accountability group but is subject to substantial 
constraints by them” 
6. Intermediate category 
7. Executive parity or subordination: “accountability groups have effective 
authority equal to or greater than the executive in most areas of activity” 
 
Figure 51 below tracks the XCONST variable for Zambia since the sixties. 
 
 134 
Figure 51: Constraints on the executive in Zambia 
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There is a clear correlation between formal constraints on the executive and 
competition for the executive, for policy and for political leadership in Zambia.  The erosion 
of formal constraints on the executive was associated with a decline in competitive politics.  
In Chapter 3 it is suggested that the few constraints on the Zambian government resulted in 
spending on politically popular projects, such as spending on public employment, and not on 
projects that would have benefited the majority of the population. 
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Figure 52: Constraints on the executives in Botswana   
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Botswana, as shown in Figure 52, started out with substantial limitations on the 
executive authority, and this increased over time.  The existence of constraints paved the 
way for more competition for policy formulation and leadership.  One constraint on the 
Botswana government discussed in Chapter 3 is the National Development Plans and how 
they could not be changed without referring them again to Parliament.  With the acceptance 
of and adherence to such constraints, the Botswana government was able to create a stable 
economy and overcome one of the temptations present in a mineral rich economy: that is, 
to spend the mineral rent too easily and creating the situation where future recurrent 
expenditures have to be financed from a different source. 
 
 
5.5 OBJECTIVE MEASURES OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
 
The above mentioned subjective governance indicators have attained wide usage in 
the growth and development literature, and are used by the World Bank and other donors 
and aid agencies to assess the state of governance in developing economies.  One of the 
drawbacks of these measures is that they are subjective (Knack and Keefer 1995).  In 
response to this drawback, Clague, Keefer, Knack and Olson (2003) have introduced an 
objective measure called contract-intensive money (CIM). 
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Contract-intensive Money (CIM) 
Various subjective measures have been proposed to gauge the extent to which 
property rights are protected in an economy.  A major objection to the indices is that the 
respondents may be influenced by outcomes in the economy concerned, scoring successful 
economies high on the protection of property rights, while scoring failing economies poorly.  
If this should occur systematically, the subjective indices would pre-judge one of the most 
important functional relationships in the measurement of property rights protection, i.e. the 
relationships between the protection of property rights and economic growth and 
development.   
 
Clague, Keefer, Knack and Olson (2003) propose an objective measure of the 
security of property rights with the added merit of using widely available data dating back 
many decades for most countries, even for developing countries, where alternative data is 
sparse.  The argument in Clague et al. (2003) is that the assets used as money in an 
economy provide a convenient window on the protection of property rights and on third 
party contract enforcement. 
 
Holdings of liquid assets by firms across countries are still consistent with Keynes’ 
theories of transaction and precautionary demand for money.  The CIM-measure makes use 
of the information provided by the financial sector.  If property rights are not adequately 
protected, people will tend to hold notes and coins instead of contractual money.   
 
Currency (notes and coins outside the banking sector) is the preferred medium of 
exchange in countries where contract enforcement is weak and property rights are insecure.  
At the other extreme, in countries with very secure property rights and efficient and 
unbiased contract enforcement, money balances are most likely to be held in banks and in 
the form of other financial instruments. 
 
There are three reasons for the a priori plausibility of using portfolios of money 
balances to indicate the security of property rights and contract enforcement (Clague, et al. 
1999).  
1. Depositors have to trust both the security of their right to their money balances, held 
in the bank, as well as the contract rights implied in depositing and withdrawing 
money.  This cannot be assumed in an economy where neither contracts nor property 
rights are secure. 
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2. Financial intermediaries also depend on property and contract rights to invest their 
deposits profitably.  The extent of intermediation is, therefore, likely to be influenced 
by the security of property and contract rights. 
3. In regimes where government regulations and prohibitions lead to black markets and 
where contract enforcement may be problematic – for example in foreign currency, 
or credit – currency provides highly valued discretionary liquidity. 
Clague et al. (1996; 1999) therefore introduced the concept of contract intensive money 
(CIM) which is the ratio of non-currency money to the stock of broad money, or formally: 
 
CIM = 
2
2
M
CM −
 
 
where: 
C : currency outside banks (line 14a in the IFS41) 
M2: Broad money, defined as: currency outside banks, plus demand deposits (IFS Line 24), 
plus time deposits (IFS line 15), plus time and savings deposits including foreign 
currency deposits of residents other than the central bank (Ifs line 25). 
 
A higher relative value of the CIM indicates more secure property rights and contract 
enforcement.  Further, a rise or fall in the CIM at all levels indicates a rise or decline in the 
relative security of these rights.   
 
Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2003) supported the findings of Clague et.al. 
Pinkowitz, et. al. found that firms in countries with more risk and poor protection of investor 
rights hold more cash.  Entrepreneurs there do not use the formal banking sector to protect 
the value of their money42. 
 
Furthermore, Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Thaicharoen (2002) show that 
countries with weaker institutions are indeed less stable.  In these less stable countries, 
                                          
41 International Financial Statistics 
42 Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2003) used a sample of 35 countries over a period of 12 years, 
and found that firms in countries with poorer institutions hold more liquid assets than they would 
have if they were located in the U.S.  For instance “in a cross-country regression that controls for 
GDP per capita, financial development, stock return volatility, and inflation, a firm in a country 
with the worst institutions has from 5 percent to 25 percent more liquid asset holdings in 
proportion to total assets than a U.S. firm depending on the index of institution quality used” 
(Pinkowitz, et al. 2003).   
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firms are more likely to face disruptions that call for the use of liquid assets.  A breakdown 
in law and order and political intrusion are examples of disruptions for which firms might 
need extra liquid reserves.  Firms in such countries have to be more liquid than comparable 
firms in more stable countries with better institutions.  This is in accordance with Keynes’ 
theory that firms can hold cash to reduce transaction costs and to provide a buffer to absorb 
adverse shocks.   
 
Since Clague et al. (2003) proposed CIM as a measure of contract and property 
rights – and not as a measure of financial sector development - it is important to investigate 
the extent to which their results were driven by the level of financial sector development, 
inflation, or savings rates.  Clague et al. (2003) addressed this issue themselves and found 
CIM not to be a measure of financial sector development.   
 
One piece of evidence they put forward is the significant correlation they found 
between CIM and subjective measures of institutional quality.  Secondly, support comes 
from their country studies.  Clague et al. (2003) traced the impact of well-known political 
and economic events on the CIM in Iran, Turkey, Chile, Grenada, Indonesia and Brazil to 
verify the plausibility of the measure.  They show how CIM tracks dramatic political 
developments that had little to do with the financial sector.  And finally they followed this 
episodic investigation with more formal econometric tests to show that CIM was correlated 
with other widely used measures of good institutions and good governance and that CIM 
was positively associated with growth and investment.   
 
The CIM for Zambia and Botswana is plotted in Figure 53.  It shows, for example, a 
decline in Zambia's CIM in the beginning of the 1970s.  The fall was probably due to the 
political events of nationalisation and the move to one-party rule, rather than a decline in 
financial sector development. 
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Figure 53: CIM for Botswana and Zambia 
Source: International Financial Statistics (IMF various years-a) 
 
From Figure 53 it can be concluded that the economy in Botswana has operated with 
more secure property and contract rights than Zambia over the sample period.  Further, the 
security of property rights as measured by the CIM was undermined in Zambia during the 
seventies, and again during the late eighties. 
 
 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
 
The chapter ends a process that started in Chapter 3, i.e. the search for a plausible 
explanation for growth differences.  With none of the theories mentioned in Chapter 3 able 
to explain growth differences between Botswana and Zambia, in a consistent manner, 
Chapter 4 introduced New Institutional theory. In chapter 5 empirical institutional measures 
displays consistently how Botswana outperformed Zambia. 
 
The Frasier Institute measure, which depicts economic freedom, shows the Botswana 
economy to be much freer, relative to the Zambian economy.  This is especially obvious in 
the index for property rights protection.  And if it is kept in mind how important this 
measure is within institutional quality, it consequently tells an even more important story.  
Although the Botswana government interferes, relative to other countries in the measure, 
quite extensively in the economy, it somehow creates an environment where businesses 
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and international investors feel their investments to be safe.  The figures also show a 
relatively low score on business restrictions. 
 
Zambia has not done the same, with much more government interference and 
infringement on property rights. 
 
Another important distinction between the countries that is evident from the 
empirical results, is the difference in government structure.  Although Botswana operates 
basically as a one-party state, it still creates an environment that resembles a true 
democracy (e.g. competition for polity and leadership receives a high score).  Zambia 
displays a political environment of autocracy and with very little competition allowed for 
leadership in the country.   
 
It can therefore be deduced that institutional differences have explanatory power for 
growth differences between Zambia and Botswana.  But, the origin and type of institutions 
need further investigation.  And the all-important question is why Zambia was unable to 
change the growth-retarding institutions it inherited at independence. 
 
Chapters 7 and 8 focus on the institutional policy decisions since independence, but 
it would be unfair not to take the different colonial histories into account.  It is necessary to 
establish to what extent colonialism can be held responsible for the divergent institutional 
decisions. 
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6 CHAPTER 6 
BOTSWANA AND ZAMBIA BEFORE INDEPENDENCE 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The economic picture sketched so far of Zambia and Botswana since independence 
shows a prospering Botswana and a stagnating Zambia.  This was however not the case at 
the time of independence.  At independence Zambia was in a much better position than 
Botswana to develop economically.  For example, it was only in 1970 that Botswana passed 
Zambia in terms of per capita growth.  This, of course, leaves an interesting question to 
explore.  Not only is there evidence of divergent economic performances, but this 
divergence also started shortly after independence.  Was it coincidence or not? 
 
Was this divergence solely due to post-independence policy choices?  Or how much 
can be attributed to these countries' different colonial experiences?  The empirical work 
done on the link between colonial experience and post-colonial economic performance was 
mentioned in Chapter 4.  Empirical work done by Acemoglu and co-authors (see for instance 
Acemoglu and Johnson 2003, Acemoglu, et al. 2001) has confirmed the existence of a link 
between a country’s past colonial experience and its current level of economic development.  
The colonial experience of Zambia and Botswana can therefore not be ignored in an 
explanation of their growth differences.   
 
The most obvious difference between Zambia and Botswana in terms of colonisation 
– and one linked to their mineral wealth — is the time of discovery of their mineral wealth.  
At the time of Botswana’s independence, the rich diamond deposits were unknown to 
Britain, which left Britain’s interest in Botswana during colonial times at nothing more than 
the strategic occupation of an area en route to the central parts of Africa.  Since the 
territory had no obvious economic benefit to Britain during occupancy, it was subject to so-
called “benign neglect” (Acemoglu, et al. 2003a, Dale 1995).  Britain had no intention to 
develop the area and rather wanted to hand administration to South Africa.  The first time 
that mining concessions were negotiated it was between big mining companies and an 
elected government representing the Botswana population.   
 
This stands in contrast with Zambia where copper had been extracted on a large 
scale since the 1920s.  Even as early as the end of the 19th century, mining companies had 
been present in the country.  The extraction took place without taking the property rights of 
the local population into consideration, and therefore Zambia experienced so-called 
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"extractive colonisation" (Acemoglu, et al. 2001).  At independence the economic strength 
in Zambia was in the hands of foreigners. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is therefore to provide an overview of the history of the 
two countries prior to and during British rule (in Sections 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4).  Section 6.5 
concludes the chapter. 
 
 
6.2 BACKGROUND TO THE TRIBAL SYSTEMS IN BOTSWANA AND 
ZAMBIA 
 
The known history of Botswana goes back to the first millennium when a Khoisan 
population was present in the region, known as Botswana today.  When the Europeans 
entered the region in the late 18th century, tribes called the "Batswana" were the principal 
inhabitants.  The English called the indigenous population Bechuana, and therefore 
Botswana was formerly known as Bechuanaland.  The Batswana forms one of the three 
major divisions of the Sotho group of Bantu peoples, and it is commonly accepted that they 
migrated to southern Africa at the time of the Bantu migrations from the north several 
centuries ago (Colclough and McCarthy 1980).   
 
There are eight principal tribal groups in Botswana, seven of which are direct 
descendents of the original Sotho migrants.  The Ngwato is by far the largest and makes up 
about 80 percent of the Batswana.  In addition to the eight major tribes, a large number of 
smaller and related or subjected tribes have lived amongst them in the reserves and under 
the authority of the Tswana chiefs (Colclough and McCarthy 1980).   
 
The homogeneity of the Batswana was to their advantage when they had to deal 
with the British.  A handful of chiefs could negotiate with the British while representing the 
whole of Botswana.  From these chiefs the Ngwato chiefs not only represented the biggest 
section of the population, but they were also the most influential throughout the history of 
the territory.     
 
The tribal situation in Botswana contrasts sharply with that in Zambia where a 
multitude of tribes each have their own separate history.  Present day Zambia consists of 
seventy-two separate ethnic groups living in nine provinces.  They speak a multitude of 
languages and dialects, but the major ethno-linguistic groups are:  
• the Bemba (36.2 percent),  
• Nyanja (17.6 percent),  
• Tonga (15.1 percent),  
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• Barotse (8.2 percent) and  
• the north-western group (10 percent), which includes the Kaonde, Lunda and 
Luvale speakers. 
 
Before the Europeans drew a border defining the present-day Zambia, the nation’s 
ethnic groups lived in relative isolation from one another for almost four centuries.  The 
groups had no common language and were organised politically different from one group to 
another.  Some chiefs were major political actors and ruled large kingdoms, while other 
chiefs were minor officials, little more than village headmen.  According to Colson (1959), 
the Tonga, for example, had no chiefs or other forms of authority before colonial rule 
started.     
 
Although these groups lived in close proximity to one another, there was no 
distinctive binding force.  And for Burdette (1988: 11) it was this “lack of a common political 
and social history and shared institutions” that eventually rendered these groups vulnerable 
to the European invasion.  Unlike the case in Botswana the multiple groups in Zambia were 
unable to create a binding force that was strong enough to withstand the British influence.   
 
Even though the groups in Zambia differed from one another, there is a need to 
contrast the political set-up in Zambia before colonisation with the situation in Botswana.  
As a detailed discussion of the politics and authority present in all the different tribes in 
Zambia at the time before colonisation falls outside the scope of this dissertation, the focus 
will fall primarily on the Bemba.  There are two reasons for this choice:  The Bemba 
represents the largest single group of people in Zambia, and it is also the group in which the 
first President of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda, grew up43.   
 
Between 1500 and 1800 the Lunda and Luba peoples of Congolese origin settled in 
the northern, eastern, and western parts of Zambia under the leadership of Kazembe.  By 
the end of the eighteenth century they came in direct contact with the people that is today 
known as the Bemba.  With the two groups specialising in different economic activities, they 
were able to trade their surpluses.  The Lunda and Luba mined and smelted copper and iron 
ore to make ingots for sale to other tribes or traders, while the Bemba not only traded salt 
and ivory, but were even more renowned as slave traders (Burdette 1988).  At first these 
groups were able to live in harmony, but eventually the competition between them brought 
them into conflict.  Wars between them contributed to the devastating effects of the slave 
                                          
43 Kaunda’s parents originally came from Malawi, but they lived amongst the Bemba. 
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trade44, and by 1870 Kazembe’s kingdom was in serious decline, with the Bemba retaining 
much of its power (Burdette 1988). 
 
The manner in which the political structures developed in pre-colonial Zambia and 
Botswana had much to do with their location.  The Bemba’s of Zambia lived in a well-
watered area, where the ample amount of rainfall made it possible for them to survive in 
spite of the generally poor soil.  They were self-sufficient, subsistence farmers who grew 
their own food, but because of the poverty of the soil they had to move their villages to new 
locations every few years (Maday accessed July 2004).  No large villages developed and 
because it was always easy to move to another location, there was no necessity for a 
political culture of cooperation to develop. 
 
In contrast, the Batswana lived in large villages from the time of their earliest 
settlements.  They had to deal with regular droughts and depended on surface water 
(Colclough and McCarthy 1980).  Large villages developed around waterholes and because it 
was not that easy to move to a new location, they had to find ways to solve differences and 
settle disputes in a peaceful manner.  As will be shown below, these tribal capitals were the 
centres of political and social life of the tribe, and the place where all the important 
gatherings were held.  This tradition of having gatherings that included all men above a 
certain age, was not present in the Bemba culture. 
 
Both the Tswana and Bemba political systems can in essence be described as a 
centralised state where a royal family controls the chiefdoms.  In the literature (Simon 
1970, Whiteley 1951) the Bemba Paramount Chief is described as a person who commands 
the army, has supreme control of supernatural powers, possesses the most sacred of the 
tribal relics and who has the right of appointment to lesser chiefdoms.  The bases of his 
political power and authority are both supernatural and secular.   
 
According to Simon (1970:12) "a chief’s power to curse, bless, employ forces, etc. is 
respected (and feared) by his subjects; his authority as an institutionalised leader of both 
territorial and kinship groupings is acknowledged and accepted.  The acquisition of this 
'respect', 'acknowledgement', 'acceptance', etc. constitutes the process of legitimation for a 
particular Bemba chief, and that legitimacy is not attributed automatically through 
matrilineal succession to political office".  An individual’s heredity determined his eligibility 
for a legitimate position of authority, but among other things he also needed the support of 
a sufficient number of commoners, military power and slaves. 
                                          
44 Throughout the 1800s the peoples of the region fell prey to raiders and slavers – the Arabs and 
Swahili from present-day Tanzania and Malawi, and the allies of the Portuguese on the coasts. 
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The Tswana succession was, in a way, more natural with the oldest son of the king 
succeeding him after his death.  These successions happened within very strong family 
lines, where for instance one of the great chiefs, Khama III (1837-1923) attained world-
wide prominence as a “zealous convert to Christianity, a fanatical prohibitionist of alcoholic 
liquor, and a strong supporter of British imperialism in central Southern Africa” (Schapera 
1940: 56)45.  These chiefs were the wealthiest people in the tribes, owning most of the 
cattle46.   
 
This differs from the Bemba chiefs who did not posses inheritable wealth.  
Accumulation of material wealth was not regarded as an indication of prestige or power 
amongst the Bemba.  According to Simon (1970) the chief’s status depended to a large 
extent upon how much control he had over his subjects’ means of survival.  Maday 
(accessed July 2004) describes how this situation can be a possible explanation for the 
absence of prominent families in the Bemba culture.  No family was able to distinguish itself 
from the others through the accumulation of personal wealth.  And the chief had no 
certainty that his son would become the next chief and therefore had little incentive to 
gather belongings beyond his basic needs for survival.  After his death all his belongings 
could become the possession of the new, possibly unrelated, chief. 
 
For the Batswana the identifiable strong chiefs were a great advantage.  When faced 
with a common external threat (for example the possible handing over to South Africa) it 
was possible for these leaders to unite in their opposition.  This gave them a much stronger 
basis to negotiate from.  For the peoples of Zambia this was not possible.  With the Bemba 
chiefs renowned primarily for being efficient slave traders, it did not create a basis for 
cooperation between the many tribes of Zambia.  Furthermore, as will be discussed in 
section 6.3 in more detail, because they lived in small, scattered groups, most people were 
unaware of the arrival of the British colonialists before the process was already in an 
advanced state.  The Bembas and the rest of the Zambian tribes were unable to work 
together to resist the British influence in their country. 
 
The administrative structure of the Batswana society revolved around the chief, his 
councillors, the headmen, and the subjects.  In theory the responsibility for the lives of his 
subjects rested with the chief, but in practice he depended heavily on his councillors and 
                                          
45 It was also Khama III, together with chiefs Bathoen and Sebele, who travelled to Britain in 1895 
to convince the Queen not to hand over Bechuanaland to South Africa. 
46 Although no Batswana had private rights to game or other natural resources, the personal 
accumulation of cattle was unrestricted (Colclough and McCarthy 1980). 
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headmen.  According to Mgadla (1998) the chief could be influenced by his headmen to 
alter his decisions, although it was in his power to make the final decision. 
 
At the centre of the chief’s administration was the traditional assembly or kgotla 
where national issues were discussed and debated and laws and resolutions were passed.  
According to Mgadla (1998: 4-5) "the kgotla was a public forum for the Batswana leaders 
and their subjects to announce laws and discuss matters affecting the village, and more 
importantly, the participants had the opportunity to air their views.  This exercise could 
probably be regarded as some form of participatory democracy, in that an atmosphere 
existed where the people could exchange their views and could influence final decisions".  
Schapera (1940: 72) describes it as follows:  
 
  all matters of tribal policy were dealt with finally before a general assembly of the 
adult men in the chief’s kgotla.  On important occasions the people of the districts 
are also summoned, and the tribe as a whole debates the question at issue.  The 
decisions made are generally the same as those previously reached by the chief and 
his personal advisers, who as leaders of the tribe can sway public opinion; but it is 
not unknown for the tribal assembly to overrule the wishes of the chief.  Since 
anybody may speak at these meetings it enables the chief to ascertain the feelings of 
the people generally, and provides the latter with an opportunity of stating their 
grievances: the chief and his advisers may be taken severely to task, for the people 
are seldom afraid to speak openly and frankly.   
 
This interactive forum made it easier for the Batswana to communicate and keep 
their traditions alive during the time of British rule.  The Bembas did not have a similar, 
representative forum.  The Paramount chief of the Bembas, and some of the other biggest 
territorial chiefs, only had to rely on the direct support of a group of hereditary officials, the 
so-called bakabilo, who combined rituals with political and judicial functions.  Together with 
the chief these officials formed a central tribal advisory council, but without a public 
assembly (Schapera 1940).   
 
Although the bakabilo were advisors, their main function was to perform rituals.  It 
was, for instance, their duty to perform the special rituals when a new chief was installed, 
they were in charge of the ceremonies at the sacred relic shrines and acted as regents at 
the death or absence of the chief.  They were not royal, but nor were they commoners 
either.  They were a body of hereditary councillors drawn from the eldest non-royal lineage 
heads, and attached to the courts of the most prominent chiefs (Simon 1970).   
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The bakabilo derived their effectiveness from the fact that they were neither royals 
nor commoners.  “They are hereditary officials and therefore cannot be removed at will.  
They are immune from the chief’s anger and exert a salutary influence over him by refusing 
to perform the ritual functions that are necessary to the chief’s state” (Schapera 1940: 109-
110).  Whereas the Tswanas had direct discussions between the chiefs and commoners in 
their kgotla meetings, the Bemba chiefs only became aware of the unhappiness of the tribe 
with their rule through the non-performance of rituals by the bakabilo.  It will be argued 
below that the bakabilo lost most of its functions and influence during colonial rule, whereas 
the kgotla meetings survived.   
 
The historical events preceding and during colonial rule are discussed in the following 
section, where after the effect of colonial rule on tribal politics is discussed. 
 
 
6.3 EVENTS LEADING TO COLONISATION 
 
Except for slave traders, the first European interest in Africa came from the London 
Missionary Society (LMS), which arrived at the Cape Colony in 1799.  One of the LMS’s most 
famous missionaries-turned-explorers, David Livingstone, travelled parts of southern Africa 
between 1854 and 1873 in search of the origin of the Nile.  It was especially his shocking 
descriptions of the slave trade that set off a wave of missionaries coming to Africa (Burdette 
1988).   
 
British missionaries generally supported colonisation for two reasons.  The LMS 
missionaries were British citizens and they wanted their own country to rule the area, 
fearing that if the Boers should colonise it, the Dutch Reformed Church would replace the 
LMS.  The missionaries also believed that the colonised people would be powerless to resist 
Christianity under British rule, because “Britain could change those African customs they 
considered heathen” (Tlou and Campbell 1984: 133).   
 
But the real drive towards colonisation came in the 1880s when European powers 
became interested in Africa as a source of natural resources.  European countries such as 
Britain, France and Germany became rich because of the industrial revolution that had 
taken place earlier.  The manufacturers experienced large and growing requirements for raw 
materials, such as cotton, rubber, iron and tea, and this created an incentive for European 
traders and miners to explore non-European countries, including countries in Africa (Tlou 
and Campbell 1984).  The imposition of European rule over most of Africa can therefore be 
seen as the result of two distinct but converging processes: growing rivalry among the 
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major states of Europe as they became fully industrialised powers, and their increasing need 
for cheap raw materials47.   
 
European governments in general took active steps to protect the interest of their 
own traders and manufacturers against those of rival countries.  Governments were not 
only concerned about defending existing interests in Africa; they also wished to reserve for 
themselves areas for possible future exploitation (Roberts 1976).  The anxiety to secure 
both present and future needs was a major reason why so much of Africa and other parts of 
the tropical world were shared out among European governments in the late nineteenth 
century, in what is now commonly known as "the scramble for Africa".  
 
By the time the scramble for Africa was in full force, Portuguese agents hoped to link 
together their colonies of Mozambique and Angola through the lands of the upper Zambezi.  
King Leopold of Belgium, who ruled the Congo, looked southward for more territory, and the 
Germans established a colony in Tanganyika (now Tanzania) and in 1884 annexed South-
West Africa (now Namibia).  These interests of the other European powers in the central 
African plateau threatened British control of the southern portion of the continent.   
 
The British intended to preserve a route for Cape and British trade to central Africa 
along the road that had been opened up by the missionaries Moffat and Livingston.  Cecil 
John Rhodes described this road as the “Suez Canal” to the north and it was extensively 
used by labour recruiters, labourers and traders.  The economic importance of the road was 
increased by the discovery of diamonds at Kimberley in 1867, because the British mine 
owners recruited labour from everywhere in Southern Africa48.  When gold was discovered 
at the Witwatersrand in 1884, the road became even more important for labour recruitment 
(Fawcus and Tilbury 2000, Tlou and Campbell 1984).  However, the British use of the road 
was threatened, not only by Belgium and Germany, but also by the westward expansion of 
white adventurers from the Transvaal.   
 
The Boers from the Transvaal took possession of wide areas of land on which they 
set up the small republics of Stellaland and Goosen.  These republics were in the southern 
                                          
47 According to Roberts (1976: 150): " … African political organisation was unfitted for large-scale 
development of land and labour at the time of colonisation.  If Africa’s mineral and vegetable 
resources were to be exploited in full, capitalists had to be persuaded to invest money in Africa.  
Investors would only do so if they could be reasonably sure to appropriate the returns on their 
investment.  And even the largest states in tropical Africa seemed too small, or too loosely 
governed, to provide adequate security for European lives and property.  The objectives of the 
European powers seemed therefore incompatible with African political independence". 
48 As early as the 1870s, the Batswana had sought work in Kimberley.   
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part of the area occupied by the Batswana.  It seemed likely that the Transvaal would 
absorb these republics and that would have posed a barrier to British trade with central 
Africa.  All these strategic movements brought about competition by the different European 
powers to secure their positions in Africa (Burdette 1988).   
 
In order to prevent a war between the rival countries, the European powers gathered 
at the Berlin Conference in 1884-85 where the African countries were partitioned.  At the 
Conference the Europeans agreed to recognise each other’s territorial claims based on 
effective control of the coast.  The process was completed by 1914 and the resulting 
territorial borders were largely adopted at independence.  The whole African continent was 
conquered, with only Liberia and Ethiopia retaining their independence.  Throughout the 
whole process little or no consideration was shown for the African people’s right to their own 
land. 
 
At the time of the Berlin Conference the Liberal government in Britain could not pay 
for the extension of British power, so the challenge was picked up by the millionaire Cecil 
John Rhodes (Burdette 1988).  Rhodes wanted to see the British flag fly right across Africa 
and he wanted to extend his control over Africa’s mineral resources.  Through the British 
South Africa Company (BSAC) Rhodes staked out claims of exclusive rights over central 
Africa for Britain (Roberts 1976).   
 
By the end of 1891 the BSAC had gained recognition from other European powers of 
its right to occupy a specified area north of the Zambezi.  They secured the agreement of 
other European powers through a series of international treaties that largely determined the 
present borders of Zambia.  The occupation of Zambia was, however, unknown to most of 
the people living in the region.  The Company’s first officials and soldiers had mostly gained 
entry by talking to a small number of chiefs.  And without the advantage of living in large 
cities around waterholes, like the Batswana had, communication between the Zambians was 
difficult.   
 
Furthermore, the intrusion of the BSAC did not, at the time, seem to be an event of 
great importance to the people of Zambia.  Often the BSAC had been welcomed as a 
potential source of protection against local, African enemies.  "It took time for the scattered 
peoples of Northern Rhodesia to realise that they were now under different rule.  It was only 
after the British started to collect taxes that the Zambian people realised that a new 
authority has been established in their area" (Roberts 1976: 170). 
 
The annexation of Bechuanaland was completely different.  The establishment of a 
protectorate was initiated by the Batswana themselves in order for Britain to protect them 
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against the threats of their neighbours.  Britain only agreed to this when it realised the 
strategic importance of the area for the preservation of its influence in Southern Africa.  By 
1880 an informal protectorate relationship had developed between the British government 
in Cape Town and the various Batswana chiefs, much unlike the situation just sketched for 
Northern Rhodesia (the present day Zambia).   
 
In 1884 the British declared a protectorate over the southern parts of Batswana 
territory (British Bechuanaland) and in 1885 over the northern territories (Bechuanaland 
Protectorate) (Picard 1985).  In 1895 the area south of the Limpopo, British Bechuanaland, 
came under the rule of Rhodes’ British South African Company (BSAC).  In practice this 
meant that British Bechuanaland was ruled from the Cape Colony.  It was the British 
government’s intention that Bechuanaland would eventually join the Cape Colony, because 
the cost of administering the whole area promised to be considerable.  The Union of South 
Africa Act even provided for the eventual transfer of Bechuanaland to South Africa, but the 
Batswana strongly opposed the transfer49.  The South African government periodically 
raised the transfer issue, but it was always firmly opposed by the indigenous people.  This 
allowed Botswana to survive as an entity and not to be split up between different countries.  
But because its mineral wealth was still unknown, Britain left as much as possible of the 
administration to the local people. 
 
With copper already being discovered during colonial rule, Zambia was of much 
greater importance to Britain than just strategically.  The extent of Britain’s control in 
Zambia was therefore much more intense.   
 
 
6.4 COLONIAL RULE IN BOTSWANA AND ZAMBIA 
 
The three main periods in the formation of modern Zambia were:  mining company 
rule from 1891-1924; Colonial Office rule from 1924-1953; and Federation from 1953-1964.  
Each of these periods contributed a different element to the country's development.  
However, mining interests dominated political and economic decisions throughout the three 
periods.  Even after independence the large mining companies remained a major political 
factor not to be ignored by the new government50. 
 
                                          
49 A visit of Chiefs Bathoen, Sebele and Khama to Britain and the discrediting of the BSAC after the 
Jameson Raid, resulted in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, north of the Limpopo, remaining under 
direct Imperial British control.   
50 The nationalisation of the copper mines will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
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Company rule refers to the rights the BSAC of Cecil John Rhodes received from the 
British government that were referred to in the previous section.  The BSAC gained mining 
rights throughout Barotseland, which became a Company protectorate in 1891.  This meant 
that the company was administering the area in the name of the British Crown.  According 
to Hall (1976: 34) the Church of Scotland evangelists opposed this "infiltration from the 
white-supremacist south" with the following words: "A Chartered Company is not a 
government and never can be.  To be ruled by such is to be ruled for commercial ends by 
absentee directors and shareholders, whose real interest are only served by tangible 
dividends".  With the benefit of hindsight these words do seem very true.  The Company 
had no intention to develop the country other than providing the infrastructure it needed for 
its operations and had no long-term perspective on how the country was to develop.   
 
At first the Company mainly used Northern Rhodesia as a corridor for removing 
copper from Katanga by means of a railway which were completed in 1909.  But the 
Company was in financial trouble due to high spending on the railway and on defence 
against German troops from East Africa.  The income from the minerals in the territory did 
not cover these costs, therefore the Company started to look for ways to reduce its 
expenditure.  One such possibility was the amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia, because 
that would have made administration cheaper and more efficient (Roberts 1976).  
Unfortunately for the Company, settlers in both Rhodesias opposed amalgamation and the 
Company ended up by handing over control over Northern Rhodesia to the Colonial Office in 
1924.   
 
Just before the transfer took place vast deposits of copper were discovered.  This 
coincided with a large demand for copper internationally due to the expansion of electrical 
and automobile industries during and after the First World War.  But in the end the transfer 
of power proved to be advantageous to the BSAC, because it handed over most of its 
responsibilities, but kept most advantages.  Turok (1989: 18) explains it as follows:  
 
  In handing control to Britain the Company remained true to its character – it retained 
monopoly mineral rights over the territory in perpetuity.  Henceforward Company 
royalties were to be safeguarded by British Government rule, which would also 
ensure the existence of a reserve army of labour for industry throughout the region.   
 
The extraction of copper in Northern Rhodesia was for the first time a profitable 
operation, but with an important prerequisite: a source of cheap labour was essential.  The 
colonial administration supported and enforced the mechanisms already established by the 
BSAC for this purpose.  For instance the imposition of taxes forced adult males to seek 
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wage-employment in mines owned by the Company.  Furthermore, there were restrictions 
on land use51 and limits on the scope for earning cash outside of wage employment.   
 
In a short time a migrant labour system emerged where male workers were paid less 
than what a family could survive on (Turok 1989).  Although the rest of the income was 
supposed to be made up by agricultural income back home, agriculture was negatively 
affected due to the absence of all the able-bodied men.  Roberts (1976) adds another 
consequence, and that is the slow disintegration of the traditional African way of life that 
started with the male population earning a living away from their families.   
 
Hall (1976: 44) describes the conflicting opinions on what the people lost due to this 
new way of making a living.  “On one side there is the portrayal of African life in pre-
European days as happy, moral, courageous and free.  On the other it is shown as vicious, 
fear-ridden and depraved".  Hall suggests that the truth lies, probably, somewhere in 
between.  “For some of the Zambian tribes the change was gradual, so they retained much 
of their ancient social structure, but for others, such as the Ngoni whose political formation 
was shattered by military conquest, or the Lamba whose tribal areas were swamped by 
white settlement, the change was overwhelming”.  Yet for all the tribes the new conditions 
quickly reduced the status of chiefs in the eyes of their people.  Thus the chief was no 
longer the most powerful person in the tribe, and became subject to the administration.   
 
As mentioned earlier, the Bemba chief did not accumulate a lot of personal 
belongings, and private property was subordinate to tribal ownership.  The imposition of a 
hut tax by the Colonial office, therefore, had two consequences.  Firstly, the chief could not 
pay the hut tax for his people because he had no cash income, and secondly, he lost his 
young men to cash employment on the mines.  Even at the spiritual level, there were new 
pressures, because the missionaries were promoting Christianity to replace the traditional 
worship of the ancestors.  The chief, who was previously seen as a person with supernatural 
powers, now "lost" even that power (Hall 1976).   
 
In 1949 the introduction of the Native Authority system brought an even more 
dramatic change in the Bemba political structure.  This system introduced educated 
councillors who assumed various clerical and semi-technical functions.  From the chiefs’ 
viewpoint the influence of this new element reduced the authority they had under Colonial 
rule because these councillors meant an increased involvement of the colonial government 
in traditional politics (Simon 1970).  The councillors and messengers, "formerly fed by the 
chief while doing his work, were increasingly unwilling to serve the chief because the 
                                          
51 This happened through the creation of reserves for Africans.   
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Colonial government discouraged tribute labour and supplied alternative means for these 
people to accumulate an income" (Whiteley 1951: 28). 
 
Not only did this create a significant threat to the political autonomy of the chiefs, 
but for the bakabilo this was even more of a threat.  “They were no longer the only 
privileged commoner group, nor were they the most influential.  The new councillors moved 
into prestigious quarters, received the admiration of commoners in the capital, and 
displayed privileged behaviour in the presence of chiefs, etc.” (Simon 1970 :27).  The 
bakabilo responded by aligning themselves against the councillors, but eventually they too 
lost their power. 
 
It was not only through the imposition of taxes and the installation of the Native 
Authority that the colonial administration changed the everyday life of Zambians, but also 
through a number of other restrictions.  Because of their small numbers, the whites in the 
territory felt insecure and this led to the combined pressure of mining companies, colonial 
administration and settlers to sustain white privileges and prevent African advancement.  
Although they were few in number, the settlers continued to exert pressure on the British 
government for greater powers, which meant in practice greater control over the African 
population.  This seemed justified because the smooth operation of the mines depended on 
skilled white labour.   
 
Not only were political rights to Africans restricted, but also the extent to which they 
could participate in economic activity.  They were restricted to unskilled labour and their 
earnings were far less than those earned by whites.  In the 1930s the ratio of European to 
African earnings on the mines was around 30:1 (Turok 1989).   
 
Furthermore, Africans were denied the right to settle the territory’s best land.  
According to Roberts (1976) about 60 000 people were moved to reserves under Colonial 
rule, of which much was unsuited to cultivation and several reserves were soon 
overcrowded.  As previously discussed, the Bemba had to move from time to time due to 
the poor soil quality, but because movement was now restricted, neither soil nor trees were 
given enough time to regenerate and it was not long before soil erosion and the destruction 
of woodland had further reduced the resources for African food production.  According to 
Roberts (1976) much of the land next to the reserves remained quite uninhabited because 
the expected white farmers never arrived.  
 
This stands in sharp contrast to what is generally understood under the theory of 
indirect rule, which was peculiarly British.  According to Hall (1976: 51-52) the British 
philosophy was that “they would stay while they could, impart what it felt was good for the 
 154 
indigenous people and then retire gracefully – but keeping the trade going after the flag had 
been lowered”.  Implicit in this philosophy of "indirect rule" was that Africans would be 
guided towards running their own affairs.  It was also cheaper administratively.  In contrast 
to the British, the French saw it as their duty to strengthen the links with the metropolitan 
power and turn Africans into Frenchmen.  The Portuguese and the Belgians had somewhat 
similar notions.  Yet in Northern Rhodesia there were factors that made the implementation 
of indirect rule hazardous and difficult.   
 
For Hall (1976) the most obvious was the presence of settlers, who were quite 
determined that when power was to be handed over to anyone, they would be the ones to 
receive it.  Opposite them stood weak tribal organisations, offering little to which 
responsibility could be transferred to.  And complicating the situation even further was the 
response of the few educated Africans who looked with disfavour on what was regarded as 
"a reversion to tribal rule"52 (Hall 1976: 51-52).   
 
The insecurity of the small number of settlers in Zambia also featured in the 1950s 
when they petitioned for a closer association with the white settler regime in Southern 
Rhodesia.  Both Rhodesias joined Nyasaland in a Central African Federation on 23 October 
1953.  Roberts (1976: 176) takes the view that this suited settler interest and satisfied 
Britain that was anxious to be rid of “the massive problems of accommodating African 
pressure for political and economic advance”53.   
 
Unlike the satisfaction settlers derived from it, the drive towards the formation of the 
Federation stimulated Africans to make a counter-bid for political power.  According to 
Roberts (1976), Africans in Northern Rhodesia feared any form of union with the south for 
the same reason that most Europeans welcomed it: union would strengthen European 
domination.  The campaign for amalgamation gave the first stimulus to an African political 
awakening throughout the territory.  Because the chiefs and councils were unable to 
organise political action on a large enough scale to challenge the Europeans, a political 
body, the Northern Rhodesia Congress (hereafter referred to as the Congress), was formed 
                                          
52 This was unlike the situation in Botswana, especially with the strong tribal tradition, and that it 
was the most capable and strong tribal leaders that eventually broke away from the tribal 
tradition. 
53 It is interesting to note that this was a change in British policy that was indicated in 1899 when 
the British High Commissioner to South Africa, Lord Milner, argued that the Zambezi was the 
natural frontier for a future British Africa in the southern part of the continent; the countries to 
the north should become a “black dependency”.  With the formation of the Federation this 
clearly aligned Northern Rhodesia closer to white southern Africa than to the “black 
dependencies” in East Africa (Roberts 1976: 195-196). 
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in 1948.  They were, however, unable to successfully oppose the formation of the 
Federation. 
 
After the failure to oppose the Federation it took the Congress a number of years to 
consolidate again and to form new strategies and objectives.  By 1958 it once again had a 
network of branches over most of the country.  One of the most important reasons for the 
revival of the Congress was the influx of new leaders as more young men emerged from 
secondary schools and obtained further education abroad.  Some of these young men were 
committed to the idea of creating an independent African state.  This aim, they believed, 
could only be achieved by refusing to compromise in any way with the Federal political 
system.  In Roberts’ words “they dedicate themselves to uniting Africans and any Europeans 
who cared to listen, in a sense of belonging to a new nation to be called Zambia” (Roberts 
1976: 219-220).  At first the influence of these young men remained limited, because the 
territory was still divided along tribal lines and this made it hard to unite an African front.  
 
 The first steps towards a united front were taken outside the framework of 
traditional institutions.  This happened within the mining community.  The reason is that a 
large proportion of Africans were drawn outside the sphere of their traditional tribal 
authority and made it easier for them to form new relationships and see themselves as 
separate from their tribes.   
 
Kenneth Kaunda, who had been secretary-general of the Congress since 1953 broke 
away from the Congress in 1958 and formed a new party, the Zambia African National 
Congress (ZANC).  His clearly expressed view that Zambia should be an independent nation 
caused the ZANC to be banned in 1959 and Kaunda to be sent to prison.  This repression 
only hardened African resistance.  A new party was formed, the United National 
Independence Party (UNIP) and when Kaunda was released form prison in January 1960, he 
took over the leadership of UNIP (Roberts 1976). 
 
With rising African pressure against the Federation and many Southern Rhodesians 
supporting the idea of a fully independent Southern Rhodesia, the British government 
realised that the Federation could not be held together.  Thus in 1961 the Colonial Office 
proposed a constitution for Northern Rhodesia that would make possible an African majority 
in the legislature.  The pre-independence Constitution aimed at the following: liberation 
from undemocratic, imperial and colonial rule, abolition of race discrimination, freedom of 
the press, the raising of standards of living, equitable production and distribution of wealth, 
protection and help for traders and commerce (understood to be African), minimum wages 
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for workers, social security, equal opportunities, facilitation of education, free health 
services, etc (Turok 1989)54.   
 
In the election of October 1962 the UNIP and the old Congress together won two-
thirds of the total vote.  The Federation was doomed and it was finally disbanded at the end 
of 1963.  Early in 1964 another election was held, based on universal adult suffrage.  This 
gave the UNIP a decisive majority.  Kaunda became Prime Minister of an all-UNIP 
government with full control of internal affairs, except defence.  Constitutionally the way 
was then clear to full independence and this was arranged for October of the same year 
(Roberts 1976). 
 
With the benefit of hindsight two events at independence can be isolated as 
indications of things that were still to come in independent Zambia.  The first one happened 
the day before Independence Day when the chairman of the British South Africa Company 
agreed to surrender its mineral royalties in return for token payments by the British 
government and the incoming Zambian government.  The second event was the fact that no 
white heads of state attended the Independence celebrations55.  These two events were 
indicative of Zambia’s drive to get rid of the European influence in the country and to align 
itself closer to the independent black north.   
 
As previously mentioned the colonisation of Bechuanaland was mainly for strategic 
reasons and the mineral wealth was discovered only after independence.  This is an 
important difference between Botswana and Zambia, because the colonial government had 
different designs of the two countries.   
 
After the establishment of the Bechuanaland Protectorate a dual administrative 
system was agreed on between the Imperial Government and the chiefs.  All lawmaking 
authority was placed in the hands of the High Commissioner, while African affairs were left 
to the chiefs as long as they did not fundamentally contradict imperial rule.  A skeleton 
European administration supervised, rather than administered African affairs (Samatar 
                                          
54 It is interesting to note that the post-Independence Constitutions of the UNIP showed a shift of 
emphasis: the achievement of African democratic socialism became “point number one” and it 
was claimed that “the mutual aid society way of life is peculiarly African both in origin and 
pattern – it borders on the one hand on capitalism and on the other on communism” [quoted in 
Turok 1989: 25]. 
55 In a discussion with Prof Neil Parsons (Department of History, University of Botswana) the author 
became aware of the fact that Queen Elisabeth of the United Kingdom, who was the head of 
state of British colonies in Africa at that stage, did not attend, but had sent a local representative 
from each country.  
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1999).  The British administration could intervene in the morafe’s56 affairs and overrule the 
chief, but the administration did not exercise this power frequently.  This lack of 
intervention was due to the fact that Britain tried to minimise administration costs in the 
protectorate.  
 
While colonial rule brought all Batswana morafes under one authority, it also 
maintained an explicit form of division between them.  The protectorate was divided into 
administrative units and these units’ defining feature was the “tribe”.  The chief was the 
principal native administrator and judge of the unit, and the chief’s representatives acted as 
junior judges.  According to Samatar (1999) the consequence of this was that the morafe’s 
traditional administration was adapted to the colonial one, while still maintaining the 
traditional authority as a basis for the running of everyday affairs.  The chiefs made use of 
small tribal administrations of secretaries, clerks and teachers who were dependent on and 
accountable to them.  This differs greatly from the Zambian situation where these people 
were paid by the colonial government, and the chiefs thus lost their power over them. 
 
The scope of rule by Batswana chiefs changed with the promulgation of the 1934 
proclamation.  Up to 1934 the chiefs ruled themselves pretty much as before, but with the 
passing of a new law in 1934, British administrative officials could suspend, fine and depose 
uncooperative or troublesome chiefs (Mgadla 1998).  The legality of these proclamations 
was challenged by Tshekedi Khama, the paramount chief of the Ngwato, speaking as 
representative of the other chiefs.  He argued that the implementation of the proclamations 
would alter the treaty between the chiefs and His Majesty, which was the very foundation of 
the Protectorate.  The proclamations were challenged in a special court in 1936, but the 
judge ruled against the chiefs.  The proclamations became law, but afterwards the 
administration realised that the chiefs could subvert its intentions and the proclamations 
were therefore reformed in 1943.  To make sure they had the cooperation of the chiefs, the 
chiefs were consulted and closely involved in this reformation (Samatar 1999).  Again this 
increased the importance of the chiefs in the eyes of their people, and their persistent and 
successful defence against the British influence enhanced their prestige.   
 
An important change brought about by the British intervention in tribal politics was 
to make it a more authoritative system.  Before British intervention the chief’s power was 
limited by tribal laws, which, for example, meant that if a chief committed an offence 
against one of his subjects, the victim could get some prominent person to intervene.  
Schapera (1940: 80-81) describes it as follows:  
 
                                          
56 community 
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  often enough the victim had no real remedy except to leave the tribe and transfer his 
allegiance to some other chief.  If the chief flagrantly misruled the tribe the leading 
headmen would withdraw their support and publicly attack him at tribal gatherings.  
The imposition of European rule deprived the people of the principal remedies they 
formerly possessed against oppression and abuse.  The administration has 
intervened in local disputes, but since the official policy was to rule as much as 
possible through the chief, the Administration tended in most cases to uphold his 
authority.  Freed from fear of the sanctions formerly restraining him, he became 
more arbitrary in action and jealous of any challenge to his authority. 
 
Important changes happened within the Tswana society, even without the 
interference of the British government.  The chiefs were able to successfully challenge most 
of the British influence, but they were not immune to the changes taking place within the 
Tswana society.  The first change came when Khama III abolished his ownership rights over 
the cattle traditionally kept by the tribe.  According to Samatar (1999: 52) “the decline in 
patronage, the growth of private property, and the commoditisation of what was heretofore 
collective property melted away traditional bonds”.  Another landmark change started with 
conflict between Tshekedi Khama and his nephew Seretse Khama in the Ngwato reserve in 
the late 1940s and early 1950s, which brought into focus the decline of another tradition, 
that of the hereditary chieftainship57.   
 
The absence of a direct colonial influence made it possible for the Batswana to 
gradually move to a system of private property ownership and a system where the rulers 
are chosen by the people and not by birthright.  This is unlike Zambia where these changes 
were forced onto the society without the necessary time to adapt to the changes.  
Moreover, in Botswana the changes were brought about and communicated to the people, 
                                          
57 Seretse Khama was the son and heir of Sekgoma II, and was four years old when his father 
died.  Seretse’s uncle, Tshekedi Khama ruled as regent while Seretse grew up, and later went to 
Oxford University in England.  It was during his stay in England that he met and eventually 
married an English woman, Ruth Williamson, on 29 September 1948.  This had serious 
consequences for the whole Protectorate.  Not only was it uncommon for a ruler to marry outside 
the Batswana group - even Africans who did not belong to the Batswana group was not usually 
acceptable - but “a European woman was totally out of the question” (Tlou and Campbell 1984: 
213-214).  Furthermore, the white people of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa strongly 
opposed the marriage.  The British government did not want to offend these countries, because 
they did a lot of business with rich South Africa and did not want to anger the white 
governments there.  This led to the banning of Seretse and Ruth from the protectorate (Morton, 
Murray and Ramsey 1989).   
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by their trusted chiefs.  Seretse Khama, the Paramount chief of the biggest tribe, for 
instance, initiated the end of the chieftainship in Botswana. 
 
The conflict between Tshekedi and Seretse Khama was settled in 1956 when both 
agreed to renounce their bogosi58.  On his return in 1956 Seretse declared his intention to 
form a political party.  Together with Quett Masire, he recruited local notables and created a 
strong network of support throughout the Protectorate.  This drive eventually led to an 
independent Botswana.   
 
At independence the chiefs lost most of their power.  Instead, a House of Chiefs, 
similar to the House of Lords in Britain, was created to give the chiefs a forum through 
which they could still voice their opinions.  According to Samatar (1999) a final indication of 
the passing of the era of chiefs was Bathoen’s resignation from the chieftainship and the 
House of Chiefs to run for parliament in 1969.  He defeated the then Vice President of the 
Botswana, Quettt Masire.  His victory underscored both the strength of chieftainship and its 
weakness.   
 
Only the most educated, experienced and activist of them all had the courage and 
conviction to completely reject the symbolic role of the chief in Botswana.  The other 
chiefs were unwilling, and perhaps unable to challenge the government and risk 
losing their remaining authority (Samatar 1999: 56-57).   
 
As mentioned at the start of the chapter, the economy was poorly developed at 
independence.  According to Picard (1985) the uncertainty over the issue of transfer is a 
partial explanation for the lack of British commitment to the educational, social and physical 
infrastructural development of the territory.  Another reason was Britain's own financial 
difficulties resulting from the First World War.  Britain did not have the means, or the 
commitment to develop its protectorate and left a country with extremely backward 
economic and social conditions.  But the advantage of the Protectorate structure, however, 
was that through its creation Britain enabled a substantial part of Bechuanaland to survive 
as a separate entity and to become the independent nation state of Botswana.  Fawcus and 
Tilbury (2000: 19) conclude that  
 
there can be little doubt that, had the protectorate not been declared, 
Bechuanaland would soon have been divided up between the land-hungry Boer 
Republic of the Transvaal on the east, and Germany, seeking an African empire and 
having already seized the substantial territory now known as Namibia on the west.  
                                          
58 The title, power, authority and institution of the chief (Morton, et al. 1989). 
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Without the Protectorate, no Botswana would have existed today.   
 
At independence, politics in Botswana was in the hands of capable people who had 
previously shown that they could act together in the best interests of the country.  These 
leaders have also had practical experience in governing a country, through learning 
administrative skills from the colonial authorities.  Since 1962 each nonofficial Executive 
Council member was paired, as a trainee, to work closely with one of the Protectorate’s 
administrative secretaries.  This step left Botswana with people experienced in the 
administration of their country and a good working relationship with Britain. 
 
The difference in the relationship between the two countries and Britain is reflected 
in some of their policy decisions after independence.  The following chapter will shed some 
light on these issues, and especially on how strong the link is between colonisation and 
post-independent policies.   
 
 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
 
Botswana and Zambia had different experiences during colonial rule.  The British had 
a more cooperative attitude towards Botswana than that demonstrated towards Zambia.  
There are two reasons for this.  The most obvious one is that a British company extracted 
copper during colonial times, and therefore the administration of Zambia was important for 
Britain. With almost no skilled labour in Zambia, the British made heavy use of skilled 
expatriate labour. 
 And secondly, the British administration not only had to secure cheap labour for the 
copper mines, but it also had to secure the position of the small settler community that 
were responsible for the extraction.  To secure cheap labour, exploitive policies, for example 
the hut tax, was introduced.  And to secure the position of the settlers, they introduced 
employment practices that discriminated against the local workers. 
 
Since Botswana's mineral wealth was unknown until independence, the country was 
treated with as little intervention as possible to keep costs down.  Furthermore, the British 
rulers also made use of local people in administrative positions in order to reduce their costs 
in the protectorate as far as possible. 
 
But, these are not the only differences between Zambia and Botswana.  The two 
countries had different tribal structures before European intrusion.  And these different 
structures are important for the analysis of post-colonial policies.  Firstly, the leaders of the 
Batswana tribes had experience of the capitalist tradition of private property through their 
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ownership of cattle, whereas the Zambians were indifferent to the accumulation of private 
wealth.  It was shown that the Bemba chief had no incentive to generate private wealth, 
because he had no certainty that his son would be the next chief. 
 
Secondly, the large tribes that settled around water forced the Batswana to develop 
a system of cooperation and consultation.  This formed a solid base for the democratic 
system they inherited at independence.  This is unlike the people of Zambia who were 
always on the move in search of virgin lands for their crops.  There was no history of 
cooperation, rather a history marked with slavery by the biggest tribe.   
 
To provide a thorough understanding of how the abovementioned can be linked to 
the divergent growth paths witnessed, these two countries are analysed in the following two 
chapters according to two important institutional features.  Chapter 7 discusses the lowering 
of transaction costs and the protection of property rights, whilst Chapter 8 focuses on the 
constraints on government.   
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7 CHAPTER 7 
TRANSACTION COSTS AND THE PROTECTION OF 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN BOTSWANA AND ZAMBIA 
 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The minimisation of transaction costs and the protection of property rights are two of 
the essential requirements for sustained economic growth.  The purpose of this chapter is 
two-fold.  Firstly, it discusses comparable examples (of transaction costs and property 
rights) from the two countries’ post-colonial rule in order to determine whether historical 
evidence underscores the empirical findings.  And secondly, it determines to what extent 
these examples can be linked to the type of colonisation the two countries were subjected 
to.  In other words: the issue is whether colonisation can be blamed for higher transaction 
costs and insecure property rights in Zambia, relative to the experience in Botswana. 
 
On the latter issue Pettman (1974: 34-35) describes three factors that had, directly 
or indirectly, an influence on the perceptions of Zambia’s leaders. All three can be linked to 
Zambia’s experience with extractive colonisation and will be incorporated in the discussion 
below.   
 
1. The first one is anti-colonialism, where Zambia’s memories of colonial humiliation 
created a “tendency to interpret an advance of colonial forces in one place as a threat 
to all of Africa”.  He sees this as the reason why Zambia’s leaders felt obliged to 
support the nationalist movements against Portugal and South Africa despite the 
obvious dangers of retaliation. 
2. Related to this are the anti-white feelings that prevailed in independent Zambia.  He 
claims that “the bitter heritage of pre-independence race relations in Zambia is 
aggravated by the continued existence of a large white minority within the country, of 
whom many made no attempt to identify politically with Zambia”. 
3. The last factor is a fear of neo-colonialism.  The Zambian government felt uneasy with 
the extent of foreign ownership in the country.  Although Zambia gained political 
independence, there was still uncertainty about the influence the British had through 
their economic power.  The economic vulnerability was compounded by a transport 
and supply network which tied it to the white-ruled south.   
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The fear of losing their independence was a major determinant of Zambia’s foreign 
and domestic policies.  The application of these policies seemingly did not take the 
opportunity costs inflicted on the economy into account. 
 
Section 2 focuses on transaction costs and section 3 on property rights.  Section 4 
concludes the chapter. 
 
 
7.2 TRANSACTION COSTS 
 
In section 4.3.1 a distinction is made between economic transaction costs and 
political transaction costs.  Economic transaction costs consist of the costs of using the 
market and costs related to personnel management, public relations, and lobbying.  It also 
includes all costs related to the management of labour and the costs of intra-firm 
transportation.  An important part of economic transaction costs is the cost of uncertainty in 
the market, the so-called unobservable costs.  And it is often these unobservable costs that 
restrain trade, like for instance in SSA where the bad state of the transport and 
communications infrastructure create difficulties for the trading partners.  Another 
unobservable cost present in SSA is the bad neighbourhood.  It is this cost, imposed upon 
countries by the neighbourhood where they are situated, that is discussed first. 
 
 
The Neighbourhood 
Being landlocked must, theoretically, have restricted the economic growth of both 
Zambia and Botswana.  Both countries depend on neighbouring countries for access to a 
shipping port.  However, due to a number of exogenously enforced and endogenously 
determined policies since independence, they ended up in totally different positions with 
regard to international trade.  And it was especially the unobservable transaction costs that 
are caused by trade instability that influenced transaction costs to such an extent that it is 
necessary for this section to focus specifically on incidents that contributed to an increase in 
these unobservable costs.   
 
Botswana and Zambia both depended on their southern neighbours for trade routes at 
the time of independence.  But for different reasons, which can partly be traced back to 
their different experiences under British rule, they reacted differently to these vulnerable 
positions.  At independence Botswana was highly dependent on the South African economy, 
both as a market, a transport route to Europe for its beef exports, but also for income via 
its membership of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU).  It became a member of 
SACU in 1910 when it, due to its status as a British protectorate, became one of the 
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founding members together with the Union of South Africa, Basotholand and Swaziland (as 
these regions were then known).  SACU was formed to facilitate trade amongst these 
integrated economies.   
 
Although Botswana wanted to lessen its dependence on South Africa after 
independence, it realised that it would be an unwise decision to end its membership of 
SACU.  One reason was that one of the earliest sources of revenue for the post-colonial 
Botswana government was income derived from SACU.  Botswana even went one step 
further and asked for new negotiations after independence in order to secure a better share 
of the customs revenue.  A new, more favourable agreement was reached in 1969.  The 
additional revenues received from the customs union partly enabled Botswana to balance its 
budget for the first time in 1972/73 (Tlou and Campbell 1984).  The other objective of the 
renegotiations was to retain access for Botswana’s exports to the South African market59.   
 
This positive attitude towards trade with South Africa must be seen against the 
background of Botswana's opposition towards the apartheid policy of the South African 
government.  In its relationship with South Africa, Botswana decided to take a middle-of-
the-road strategy.  Coetzee (1986: 68-69) explains it as follows: “Botswana’s foreign policy 
towards South Africa was two-fold.  On the one hand it stood critical towards the policy of 
apartheid, but its economy depended on the Republic.  It criticised the apartheid policy, but 
also tried to secure peace in the region”.  It did, however, try to lessen its dependence on 
South Africa through the creation of the Southern African Development Co-ordination 
Conference (SADCC).   
 
The SADCC was formed by a group of nine African States consisting of Angola, 
Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Zambia.  
These countries previously formed a regional group, called the Front Line States60, which 
cooperated in the liberation struggle.  As early as 1977 the Front Line States decided to 
cooperate in economic development as well, and this gave birth to SADCC.  The Botswana 
Government did most of the planning for the establishment of SADCC and was one of the 
founder members at its formation in 1979.  The aim of SADCC was to encourage regional 
development and to reduce members’ economic dependence on South Africa (Tlou and 
                                          
59 It was expected that enterprises would establish themselves in Botswana and sell their products 
in the Customs Union Area as a whole.  Unfortunately this hope has not realised, apart from beef 
and karakul pelt exports.  Botswana is a high cost area compared with the rest of the Customs 
Union Area, especially South Africa itself.  South Africa has cheaper electricity and water, a 
developed transportation system, an industrial labour force, and easier availability of skilled 
manpower, and benefits from economies of scale (Mogae 1983). 
60 The group was formed in 1974. 
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Campbell 1984)61.     
 
Even before the formation of SADCC, Botswana had tried in a limited way to reduce 
dependence on South Africa, and to some extent on Rhodesia.  With regard to Rhodesia, 
Botswana decided to take over the railway line inside Botswana that was administered by 
Rhodesia, and to reduce its dependence on South Africa, an international airport was built 
near Gaborone.  A telephone system, which linked Botswana to the outside world without 
passing through South Africa, was established, and in 1976 Botswana introduced its own 
currency (the Pula) (Tlou and Campbell 1984).   
 
Through these carefully planned actions Botswana succeeded in securing a stable 
environment for its international trade and internal environment.  This Botswana 
accomplished without losing sight of its greater dependence on its southern neighbour.  But 
taking its vulnerable geographical position into account, it made sure it minimised the 
unobservable costs related to the international trade environment by securing a workable 
relationship with South Africa. 
 
Zambia was more forceful in its striving to lessen dependence on its southern 
neighbours and through that action indirectly inflated economic transaction costs.  Some 
reasons were exogenously induced, such as the closing of the border between Zambia and 
southern Rhodesia by the Rhodesian government, but also partly to reasons that can be 
traced back to its colonial experience, as was mentioned in the introduction to this chapter.   
 
At independence Zambia’s main lines of access to the sea ran through Southern 
Rhodesia (today Zimbabwe) to South Africa.  It was especially this link that soon after 
independence turned into a source of grave embarrassment.  Not only did Rhodesia become 
unfriendly, but it also became an actively hostile neighbour. In November 1965 Ian Smith 
took over the Rhodesian government and rebelled against British rule by unilaterally 
declaring Rhodesia independent (UDI) from Britain.  Not only did this complicate trade 
through Rhodesian territory, but Rhodesia’s deteriorating relationship with the outside world 
also affected Zambia.  For instance, when the United Nations applied sanctions to Rhodesia, 
the closure of the oil pipeline from Beira to Rhodesia was detrimental to the Zambian 
economy because the country immediately had to find alternative ways to import oil 
(Roberts 1976).   
 
                                          
61 It was only after 1992 that South Africa became a member of SADCC (now called the Southern 
African Development Community) and made it possible for these two countries to work together 
towards economic development for the region. 
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In January 1973 Smith closed the border between Zambia and Rhodesia.  With the 
closure of the border Zambia lost its principal southern supply and export route.  The 
Zambian government reacted to this incident by upholding the closure even after Smith’s 
government softened their stance (Burdette 1988).  The closure of the border can be linked 
to President Kaunda’s commitment to end colonial rule.  Right from independence Zambia 
took a leading part in efforts to extend the frontiers of African political and military powers 
south of the Zambezi.  According to Roberts (1976: 229) “the independent government lost 
no time in giving support to African guerrilla movements in Portuguese Africa and 
Rhodesia”.  As a result Zambia found itself in the front line of conflict between black and 
white Africa.   
 
Acting upon a commitment to end colonial rule, President Kaunda permitted liberation 
fighters to use Zambia as a sanctuary on the condition that no military actions would be 
permitted within or launched from Zambia.  In 1970 Kaunda signed the Mogadishu Accord, 
accepting the need for some violence to overthrow the racist regimes in the region.  
According to Burdette (1988: 137) this new policy “brought Zambia more in line with 
Tanzania but lessened the credibility of its claims of non-interference in the eyes of Pretoria, 
Salisbury and Lisbon”.   
 
Zambia’s decision to provide sanctuaries for guerrillas and to join in the international 
boycott against Smith’s Rhodesia disrupted trade patterns with Rhodesia, but also resulted 
in military conflict.  Wars of liberation erupted to the east and west of the country, as 
Angolan and Mozambican nationalists began the long struggle to overthrow repressive 
Portuguese colonial regimes.  By the mid-1970s the South African military was invading 
western Zambia, pursuing Namibian freedom fighters, and partisans in the civil war in 
Angola moved in and out of Zambia (Burdette 1988).   
 
Already after Rhodesia’s UDI, Zambia started to explore other transport options.  
The country’s plans to create alternative transport routes culminated in the construction and 
improvement of two key roads, the Great North Road, which runs from central Zambia to 
Tanzania’s seaport capital Dar es Salaam, and the Great East Road, which runs east from 
Lusaka to Chipata and then to Salima in Malawi.  From there goods could be railed to the 
Mozambican port of Beira (Burdette 1988).  The new routes, and the source of its financing, 
were signs of new alliances Kaunda formed.  Kaunda sided more with northern black African 
leaders, than southern white leaders.  Not only did it show a closer alliance with Tanzania, 
but it also signified an alliance with the communist regime of China. 
 
The financing of the railroad was not without its problems.  Several western 
governments and aid agencies were approached but to no avail.  This was probably because 
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it was not seen as a profitable venture.  In 1968 the People’s Republic of China agreed to 
supply an interest free loan for the purpose, as well as manpower, equipment and initially 
the supervisory personnel.  But it was only in 1970 that the Chinese began to build the 
1600 kilometre railroad (Burdette 1988).  In the mean time, Zambia had no secure 
transport route, adding to the unobservable costs created by uncertainty. 
 
The whole drive to divert the trade routes created inefficiencies that became harder 
to finance as income received from copper started to decline.  For example between 1975-
80 two of the three major railroads for the country were either blocked or inefficient.  The 
third route (the Tanzania-Zambia Railroad to Dar-es-Salaam) failed to live up to its 
planners’ expectations because it was not able to carry the total mass of the imports and 
exports.  Therefore, Zambia’s dependency on the southern transport system continued.   
 
It would be unfair to attribute all the costs of these conflicts to decisions made by 
the Zambian government.  It was, however, possible for them not to have sided with the 
liberation movements.  Their decision to support the liberation movements directly 
influenced their economic progress due to the extra costs it imposed on the Zambian 
economy.  Botswana did not provide sanctuary for guerrillas and retained its economic links 
with South Africa through a process of negotiation.  In comparison the country's reaction to 
white-ruled Southern Africa was markedly different from that of Zambia.  Zambia not only 
tried to end its dependence on its southern neighbours, but was also much more openly 
sympathetic to the post-colonial struggles in these neighbouring countries.     
 
By focussing more on the prosperity of their own country, the Botswana government 
made an effort not to estrange itself from its more prosperous southern neighbour, and by 
doing so kept transaction costs as low as possible.  For Zambia its colonial experience made 
it more committed in its resistance to any form of domination from white southern Africa, 
even if that meant higher economic transaction costs to the Zambian economy through the 
instability it created in the trading environment.   
 
 
Labour issues 
The examples in this section focus specifically on how the Zambian and Botswana 
governments respectively reacted to a shortage of skilled labour.  The way they reacted to 
the shortage influenced economic transaction costs in the countries.   
 
For managers to be able to minimise transaction costs, they have to be able to make 
the right choices, in other words they have to be suitably skilled.  At independence both 
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Botswana and Zambia had a shortage of skilled labour and were reliant on expatriate labour 
to supply the skilled labour.  However, the countries reacted differently to this shortage.   
 
The examples below show that unskilled Zambians took over from skilled expatriates 
after independence.  It is not possible to draw statistical correlations between the 
replacement of expatriates and the subsequent economic stagnation, but it can be assumed 
that the replacement of qualified and experienced personnel by those less qualified and 
experienced must have detrimentally influenced decision making in the economy.  And as 
will be shown below, Botswana had a much more cooperative relationship with the British 
citizens residing in the country, both before and after independence.   
 
The reality post-colonial Zambia had to deal with had much to do with the treatment 
they received during British rule.  As discussed in Chapter 6, the need for cheap labour in 
colonial Zambia culminated in a situation where rural societies were destabilised through 
the imposition of a hut tax.  This was supported by a system that safeguarded European 
employment by blocking opportunities for Zambians in the mining industry.   
 
To make matters worse, the colonial administration also opposed the emergence of 
an informal sector economy.  According to Turok (1989: 33) "prior to independence Africans 
were actually prohibited in major urban trading areas and those who were commercially 
active were either very poor shopkeepers or hawkers".  This process was sustained by the 
establishment of political control and was achieved first by direct company rule and then by 
the colonial administration.  This created the institutional framework where those with 
political power created rules that benefited them at the expense of those without power.  
Although it does not excuse the making of poor policies after independence, the institutions 
created during colonial times can explain the decisions made in post-colonial times.  
 
Until independence, expatriates, many from South Africa, were mostly employed as 
skilled personnel while local Africans were employed as unskilled labour.  According to Turok 
(1989) the mining companies assumed that settlers and expatriates would continue to 
manage the economy for a long time after independence, but the Zambian post-colonial 
government was determined to install Africans in positions of responsibility notwithstanding 
their lack of experience or expertise.  Therefore, following independence, the status of all 
the non-Zambian mineworkers was changed to that of expatriate.  These expatriates could 
only be employed if no qualified Zambian could be found, and then only on a renewable 
two-year contract.  To further discourage the employment of expatriates, employers had to 
pay a selective employment tax of 15 percent on the wages and salaries paid to non-
Zambians.  The effect of the replacement policies was that expatriate employment in the 
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copper industry dropped from 16 percent of the total number employed in 1964, and 19 
percent in 1971, to 3.5 percent in 1983. 
 
The extent of the impact of the decision to replace skilled expatriates with Zambian 
citizens, becomes apparent only if it is taken into account that the mining industry fully 
depended on expatriates at the technical and managerial levels at that stage (Obidegwu and 
Nziramasanga 1981).  According to Obidegwu and Nziramasanga (1981) the policy of 
replacement led to inefficiencies in all aspects of mine operations: planning, maintenance, 
and production.   
 
Although the harmful effect on transaction costs cannot be quantified, it must have 
been considerable due to the replacement of skilled personnel with people inexperienced in 
the operations of the mining industry.  Proof of the lack of the ability to contain costs is the 
fact that the policy was reversed in April 1982 and efforts were made to attract expatriates 
once again to skilled positions in Zambia.  Under the revised policy, expatriates received 
compensation comparable to international standards along with a tax-free expatriation 
allowance (Gulhati 1989, Obidegwu and Nziramasanga 1981).  To change a policy of 
substituting locals for expatriates to a policy designed to attract expatriates again, shows 
that there must have been serious draw-backs in the initial policy.  A policy reversal of that 
nature brought about the direct costs of incentives to attract skilled expatriates and implied 
an admission of the indirect costs of the bad decisions that were made by unskilled 
Zambians. 
 
The example above shows how economic transaction costs in the Zambian economy 
were increased due to inefficiencies created in the economic environment.  This was not 
only due to an unwillingness of Zambians to work together with the expatriates, but also 
due to the employment of Zambians for political reasons rather than for efficiency purposes.  
Furthermore, the Zambianisation of the labour market proved detrimental to the economy, 
not only due to the high costs it created, but also due to the fact that people without the 
necessary experience had to deal with problematic economic issues, such as a volatile 
copper price.  It is then not surprising that Aron’s (1999: 20-21) conclusion regarding the 
copper price reads as follows: “the decline in Zambia's economic fortunes between the 
positive and negative shocks was drastic, and the boom was not managed so as to smooth 
the transition into recessionary circumstances”.  Decisions regarding the labour market 
were taken by an independent post-colonial government, greatly influenced by their colonial 
experience. 
 
The situation in Botswana proved to be different, starting off with the same basic 
constraint of an excess supply of unskilled workers and a serious shortage of skilled labour.  
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The policy response to these shortages was largely in the form of heavy investment in 
training by the public sector, including a similar investment in training by the state-owned 
enterprises.  The remaining shortages were met by employing expatriates on term 
contracts.  This is similar to the situation just sketched for Zambia in terms of ending up 
with expatriate workers on term contracts.  However, the way they independently got to 
that point, differs.   
 
It is mentioned in Chapter 6 that the British government wanted to minimise its costs 
in Botswana, and it was therefore to their advantage to secure a situation of cooperation 
with Botswana citizens.  Furthermore, to smooth the transition at independence Botswana 
citizens were paired with British expatriates in the civil service for a considerable time 
before independence.  Also the relationship between Botswana citizens and outsiders before 
independence needs to be considered.   
 
Botswana has had a long tradition of using friendly outsiders to help cope with 
unfriendly ones.  For example the three principal tribal chiefs took the lead in proposing 
protectorate status for Bechuanaland, but they had help from the London Missionary Society 
in convincing the British government (Stedman 1993).  These institutions of cooperation 
were also present in independent Botswana, when the government for instance made use of 
external consultants in dealing with foreign banks and companies.  In the negotiations 
between the Botswana government and the mining companies after independence, the 
Botswana government strengthened its position by the use of skilled advisers on its 
negotiating team.  According to Stedman (1993) a culture to learn from others, both about 
their successes and failures, was present in Botswana and helped them to cope with post-
colonial skilled-labour shortages. 
 
 
Political transaction costs 
The civil service in Zambia was politicised through the patronage system.  The 
Zambian example discussed in the previous section can be traced back to their colonial 
experience.  The following example, however, cannot be ascribed to their colonial history.  
It explains a situation where political transaction costs were created by a tremendous 
growth in the civil service.   
 
The move to expand the civil service created extra costs, not only through the direct 
costs brought about by these extra workers, but also costs brought about by unskilled 
workers making the wrong decisions.  The unit cost of production was raised due to the 
extra, unproductive, workers that had to be supported.  Gann (1986: 186) describes the 
situation as follows: 
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  State managers earned high salaries and lived well.  Their projects routinely received 
favours for credits, supplies and state contracts, but nevertheless incurred heavy 
losses because of inefficiency, high overheads and lack of adaptability in marketing.  
A commission of inquiry into the parastatals appointed in 1980 revealed a sad tale of 
heavy debts, forged cheques, misappropriated funds, inefficient management, and a 
number of other irregularities. 
 
The reason for the lack of performance in the civil service can be traced back to the 
lack of skills in the country.  At independence only 4 percent Africans occupied senior civil 
service posts, compared to Ghana’s 60 percent. Most local Africans were unskilled.  Zambia 
had no university at independence and there was a shortage of training facilities for civil 
servants.  At that stage there were only about 100 university graduates and 1500 high 
school graduates (Gulhati 1989).  But this did not deter the post-colonial government from 
expanding the civil service.   
 
During 1964-74 the civil service increased six-fold and became almost fully 
Zambianised.  And furthermore, the new governing elite made heavy use of government 
patronage for personal advancement, but this lowered the standards of the civil service very 
sharply.  A survey concluded that 38 percent of those in supervisory posts lacked sufficient 
qualifications, and that such deficiency was even greater at higher levels of management.  
In 1969 67 percent of mid-level civil servants did not even have secondary school 
qualifications (Gulhati 1989).   
 
The result was that efficiency in many public services began to decline.  In 1970 
Kaunda himself complained that since independence Zambia has been forced to cope with 
both a sharp drop in labour productivity and a serious increase in wages and prices.  
Absenteeism in industry, drunkenness and nepotism increased rapidly, and investment 
suffered.  This lack of efficiency that increased transaction costs was supportable only 
because of the high income generated by the copper mines.  The problems only became 
apparent when the income from the mining activities started to falter. 
 
Not only were people employed in jobs for which they did not have a sufficient level of 
skills, but they were also at the mercy of the President because appointments were made at 
his discretion.  In a move to incorporate all tribes in the government, Kaunda made sure to 
provide employment opportunities to all tribes in the government administration.  In theory 
this seems to be a sensible move, but in practice it created more friction than anticipated.   
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The struggle for independence had produced powerful politicians with their own 
regional and class power bases and their own distinct notions of what the new government 
should do.  In 1964 Kaunda appointed his trusted friends and colleagues at senior level, but 
after ethnic hostility erupted in February 1967 in a by-election campaign and particularly in 
the intra-UNIP elections in August 1967, Kaunda developed a new form of “ethnic 
balancing”.  Each ethnic-linguistic group was to be granted a certain number of high-level 
positions based in part on the numerical, political or bargaining strength of a particular 
group within the ruling party.  But according to Burdette (1988: 72-73) the root of the 
problem was not an ethnic dispute but one of “factions within the newly formed upper class 
trying to get access to power and prestige”. Ethnic balancing did not end the struggles.   
 
It only created a civil service that was not politically neutral, with political appointees 
reflecting competing political interests that became enmeshed in personal and sectional 
disputes.  According to Burdette (1988) it sometimes brought the administration to a 
standstill.  To deal with such bureaucratic paralysis and ministerial infighting, Kaunda and 
his advisers devised a strategy that involved frequent changes at the senior levels of the 
party, the bureaucracy and the parastatal bodies.  This tactic of reshuffling involved both 
officeholders’ being shifted from one post to another, and restructuring of the jobs.  A 
reshuffle could happen at any time and without prior warning, and was simply announced at 
a presidential press conference.  Burdette (1988: 69) provides the following examples: 
 
In the first republic this meant that many ministries and departments went through a 
bewildering change of identity and personnel.  For example, between September 1964 
and June 1971 there were eighteen major shifts of ministries.  The national economic 
planning body, potentially key to the transformation of the economy, was shifted from 
the Ministry of Finance to the Office of the President in 1965, put under the guidance 
of the vice president until early 1969, after August 1969 reabsorbed in Finance and 
Development, then rehoused in the Ministry of Development Planning and National 
Guidance in late 1971 and then back to Finance. 
 
One of the worst features of this system of frequently replacing top-level people was 
that office holders hardly felt it worthwhile to master any specific skills related to the job 
before they were shifted to a new position.  Furthermore, since their positions could change 
“at the whim of the President, officials tend to play safe and do nothing rather incur the 
wrath of the President by taking what may be an unwanted initiative” (Turok 1989: 150-
151).  It can be deduced that this motive to break up tribal cliques within departments 
exacerbated inefficiency, and therefore also increased political transaction costs through the 
uncertainties and inefficiencies that were created.  
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Although the governments of both these countries were much involved in the 
economies, they differed radically in their approach to employment in the civil service.  Not 
only did the Botswana government take time to learn the ropes from their European 
colonisers and made use of skilled foreigners, while the Zambian government tried to get rid 
of them as soon as possible, but the incentives for the civil servants also differed 
considerably.  In Zambia civil servants were employed because they were, for instance, 
representative of a specific tribe, and could be replaced again at any moment.  The 
uncertainty this created must have made most of them ineffective in their positions.   
 
In Botswana the situation was somewhat different, especially on two grounds.  
Firstly, while employed, civil servants could still earn an income from their cattle herds.  
Harvey and Lewis (1990) highlight the fact that there was no ban on civil servants owning 
cattle.  Secondly, they could retire at 45 with pension.   
 
These two facts led them either to enter the private sector after retirement, or to 
return to their cattle herds.  The advantage of such a system was two-fold.  Firstly, it gave 
young civil servants the opportunity to get promoted after the retirement of the older ones, 
and secondly, while in service of the state, the civil servants had the incentive to promote 
the private and the agricultural sectors.  An additional benefit was that senior government 
officials regularly travelled to the rural parts, which made them aware of conditions in these 
areas. 
 
Furthermore, for Harvey and Lewis (1990) the most distinguishing feature of the 
Botswana civil service, was the extent to which attention was paid to put able people into 
key positions and keeping them there for extended periods.  And because the country was 
open and democratic, it did not lose talented people to political exile or other international 
organisations. 
 
Civil servants were also willing to learn from the experience of other countries.  For 
more than a decade after independence, it was common for visiting consultants or 
academics to present evening seminars attended by Ministers, Permanent Secretaries, and 
other senior officials. In addition, meetings of Cabinet frequently involved presentations by 
visiting experts, who were encouraged to share the comparative experience of other 
countries both in Africa and other parts of the developing world.  “Despite relatively limited 
budgets, small delegations involving Ministers and senior officials visited successful 
development projects in a number of countries.  Travel to countries farther north in Africa 
which have been making better and worse choices of economic policy, for some years 
before Botswana achieved its budgetary independence, provided a variety of lesson for 
Botswana citizens” (Harvey and Lewis 1990: 61). 
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In chapter 3 it is mentioned that the Botswana government was good at planning 
ahead.  It is shown that the National Development Plans offered a detailed outline of what 
the government set out to achieve in a five-year period.  The certainty that these plans 
created in the economy probably lowered political transaction costs as well.  All government 
departments knew what to expect.  These plans set priorities, and once achieved the 
departments could move on to other projects.  According to Stedman (1993: 19) 
“Fundamental to setting those priorities was the practice of looking ahead to anticipate 
problems that would be likely to arise in the future, and preparing ahead of time to deal 
with them”.  For example, as soon as Botswana achieved budgetary independence, it 
established reserve funds to see it through difficult times.   
 
  Since then it has built up reserves in good years and run them down in bad, enabling 
its development efforts to proceed almost uninterrupted for nearly twenty-five years.  
Perhaps the best illustration of anticipation in the policy process involved drought.  
The government started to think about drought relief measures during the wettest 
part of the weather cycle.  By the time the next sustained drought hit Botswana in 
the 1980s measures were in place to run a major drought relief programme 
(Stedman 1993: 19). 
 
The example just mentioned was probably also due to the fact that civil servants 
were still part-time cattle owners.  They had the incentive, therefore, to ensure a smooth-
functioning agricultural sector.   
 
It can be concluded that the Zambian civil servants had little incentive to do their 
work properly.  They were employed not so much for their skills, than for appeasing the 
tribe they represented.  With few other forms of profitable employment to fall back on, they 
were hesitant to annoy the president (who could replace them at any moment).  In 
contrast, the situation sketched for Botswana shows civil servants with an incentive to 
support the private as well as the agricultural sectors.  Colonisation cannot be blamed for 
this difference.  The difference in colonisation could, however, be held responsible for the 
extent to which local civil servants got along with expatriates, and to what extent they were 
willing to learn from them. 
 
 
7.3  THE PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
 
The different colonial experiences of Zambia and Botswana also have explanatory 
power for their attitudes towards property rights after independence.  Botswana, which was 
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subjected to "benign neglect”, eventually had more secure property rights than Zambia that 
was subjected to extractive colonisation.  The difference in their property rights protection is 
graphically shown in Chapter 5.  But, as discussed in Chapter 4, colonisation does not 
inevitably lead to stagnation.   
 
The discussion so far has centred on the fact that post-colonial policies can, in many 
instances, be explained by colonial experiences.  In this section another dimension will be 
taken into consideration: the link between post-colonial policies and the situation that 
existed in pre-colonial times.  The reason for this is to establish whether colonialism is 
indeed the sole explanation for post-colonial behaviour. 
 
 
Examples of confiscation 
Political independence for Zambia did not bring about economic independence.  For 
the newly independent country to feel secure in its independence, it had to become fully 
independent from the previous colonial power.  But this was problematic given that the 
copper industry was essentially in the hands of foreign businesses, and this relationship was 
particularly strained due to the extractive nature of their colonisation.   
 
The Zambian public regarded the companies as insensitive to the needs of the 
country, since these companies made no other investments during colonisation, other than 
those necessary to extract the minerals62.  The relationship was also strained by the mining 
industry’s strong support of the Federation that preceded independence63.  Furthermore, 
many foreign companies operating in Zambia were subsidiaries of multinationals also 
operating in Ian Smith’s Rhodesia and therefore seen as unsympathetic to the wish of 
Africans to rule themselves.   
 
From the companies’ side, they expected their rights to be protected.  As Stiglitz 
(2000: 15) remarks “…when the colonial powers granted independence to their former 
colonies they forgot the abrogation of (implicit) property rights that they perpetrated in the 
first place and strongly urged that the newly independent countries respect property rights 
(including those of white settlers)”64.  The companies did not really trust the new 
                                          
62 Only ₤136 000 was given in development grants between 1930 and 1940, in return for the ₤24 
million in taxes.  This created a country, for example, that was dependent on Southern Rhodesia 
and South Africa for most of its infrastructural needs (Roberts 1976).   
63 The formation and breaking up of the Federation is discussed in Chapter 6. 
64 A discussion on the violation of the indigenous population’s property rights falls outside the 
scope of this dissertation. 
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government and rather than invest in the Zambian operations, paid out most of their profits 
as dividends to their foreign owners.   
 
The post-independence situation, therefore, started with mutual suspicion between 
the Zambian government and the colonial power.  This made it difficult for the two parties 
to find a solution that was mutually beneficial.   
 
Disillusionment with foreign private investment led to a wave of nationalisations, 
starting in 1968.  In a speech in April 1968 at Mulungushi, Kaunda complained about the 
excessive expatriation of profits after independence.  He proposed new reforms which would 
direct available capital to development and ensure that Zambians “individually and 
corporately share in the commercial and industrial life of the country” (Kaunda in Turok 
1989: 42).  Kaunda stated that new measures of state intervention were necessary because 
Zambians lacked the capital and skills to be economically active on their own.  “Only the 
government of the people can participate on their behalf and ensure that the nation has 
control of the vital resources in the country, and also provides avenues for the acquisition of 
skills pertaining to economic development and participation” (Kaunda in Turok 1989: 42).  
The public sector was therefore assigned a leading role in development in independent 
Zambia.     
 
The Mulungushi Reforms permitted the government to acquire 51 percent shares in 
private retail, transport, and manufacturing firms through a parastatal, the Industrial 
Development Corporation (INDECO).  The government bought out 24 large private 
companies that were mainly involved in production and distribution throughout the country.  
But soon the government realised that manufacturing accounted for only 6 percent of the 
GDP; if they wanted “a real hold on the economy it had to come to grips with the mining 
industry” (Turok 1989).   
 
Until 1969 the Zambian government adopted a laissez-faire policy towards the 
mining industry and disclaimed any intention of nationalising it.  Nevertheless, according to 
Roberts (1976) the argument for some form of nationalisation became stronger over time.  
Since the country depended so heavily on the copper industry, the government was likely 
sooner or later to increase not only its share in profits, but also in shaping mining policy.   
 
The private companies had long foreseen that the government would wish to become 
involved in the ownership of the industry.  They did, however, not expect the full 
nationalisation of the mines.  They acknowledged the suggestion of the 1964 United Nations 
mission that the government take a large minority shareholding in exchange for abolishing 
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royalties altogether and for undertaking to limit taxes and not to nationalise the mines 
(Cunningham 1981). 
 
However, this was to no avail as President Kaunda set about nationalising the copper 
industry in 1969.  The first step was a referendum that gave the government the right to 
change the clause in the constitution that had previously prevented them from acquiring 
private property by compulsory order.  The outcome of this referendum encouraged Kaunda 
to announce major changes in the sharing of Zambia’s copper wealth.  Secondly, 
government appropriated all mining rights in the country.  The Mines and Mineral Act of 
1969 provided for the reversion of all mineral rights to the President on behalf of the State 
(Pettman 1974).  And thirdly, the Matero Reforms of 1969 resulted in the government 
purchasing 51 percent shares in the mining companies, Anglo American Corporation and 
Roan Selection Trust, leading to partial nationalisation of the copper industry.  The 
government had no wish, at first, to run the mines itself and undertook to pay the 
companies for continuing management and services (Obidegwu and Nziramasanga 1981, 
Roberts 1976). 
 
Although the government paid for taking over ownership of the mines, it did this 
without any prior consultation with the mining companies’ executives.  This could be 
attributed to strong political pressures within the country at the time, believing that the 
foreign-owned mining companies were one of the last vestiges of colonialism, and that one 
of the controlling interests, the Anglo-American Corporation, was a South African company.  
According to Cunningham (1981: 270-271):  
 
  The president would probably have run into considerable political difficulties if the 
nationalisation had appeared to result from some gentleman’s agreement with the 
private owners.  The political situation demanded that nationalisation appear to the 
Zambian voter as a unilateral action taken by a proud and sovereign nation to break 
the bonds of colonialism and foreign capitalism.  
 
Yet, in spite of all the internal pressure, President Kaunda did negotiate a deal that 
was accepted by his own people and also, reluctantly, by the private owners - a 
considerable achievement if one takes into account the differences in expectations they had 
at independence.  According to Cunningham (1981: 269) “it is to the government’s and 
especially the president’s considerable credit that the terms agreed with the private owners, 
while not exactly generous, were nevertheless not outright confiscatory”.  Cunningham 
(1981) proposes that of the various nationalisations of mining properties in Africa and in 
Latin America during the 1960s and early 1970s, the Zambian case was perhaps the most 
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advantageous to the private shareholders.  The government arranged to pay for its share 
out of its dividends over a number of years. 
 
The take-over had its advantages and disadvantages from the point of view of the 
mining companies.  To the industry it seemed clear that the new partnership was a 
transitional arrangement to help Zambia avoid a costly disruption of its mining operations, 
therefore their primary interest remained the maximisation of short-run profits and high-
dividend payments.  The companies realised that high level investments would decrease 
dividends, since the majority owner, the government, would favour financing investment 
out of profits.  Therefore, the companies decreased their investments and rather paid out 
the profits as dividends.  One of the most important South African mining magnates, HF 
Oppenheimer remarked that the only real advantage of the partnership with the Zambian 
government for the mining companies, was that the compensation payments provided the 
companies with liquid funds that enabled them to broaden their field of operations 
elsewhere (Gann 1986). 
 
When discussing the lessons of the Zambian mining industry for other developing 
countries, Cunningham (1981: 293) concluded “it would be difficult to hold up the partial 
nationalisation and subsequent expulsion from management control of Rhodesian Selection 
Trust and Zambian Anglo-American as examples to follow”.   
 
At Zambia’s independence, the industry was run by two high quality and 
internationally respected organisations that used retained profits to expand production and 
capacity continually and profitably.  Alternatively the objective of the Zambian government 
was different.  It removed the bulk of operating profits to help fulfil its own objectives of 
promoting “the rapid development of mineral resources in order to increase employment 
opportunities, Government revenues, foreign exchange earnings and the development of 
rural areas” (Burdette 1988: 103).   
 
During the “last stage” of Zambianisation announced in November 1970, the 
government appropriated a 51 percent share in the private banks and in five foreign 
companies.  The involvement of the government now went well beyond the copper industry. 
It took over the building societies, and the closed down of all insurance companies—except 
the one owned by the state.  The four foreign owned commercial banks had been under 
attack for applying conventional commercial standards, thus discriminating against 
Zambians borrowers trying to establish their own businesses, so that only 20 to 25 percent 
of total credit went to the Zambian sector of the economy. To overcome this politically 
inequitable situation a state-owned National Commercial Bank was established in October 
1969 to provide extended credit facilities for Zambians (Pettman 1974).  
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To strengthen its perceived control over the mining industry, the government also 
decided to terminate all contracts for services with foreign mining companies in 1973.  It 
also decided to redeem all bonds, despite the penalty of US$55 million.  At that stage the 
government had to borrow US$150 million on the Eurodollar market to finance these 
transactions, which all took place under the euphoria that the income from the copper 
industry would remain at pre-nationalisation levels. 
 
Expectations that the mines under government control would provide more revenues 
to the state proved misplaced.  Not only did the cash flow position of the mines deteriorate, 
but the real copper price also fell.  Profits were not as high as expected, and must have had 
serious consequences for financing these loans.  “Nationalisation [of] the mines had not 
alleviated the fiscal problem, rather the money spent absorbed much of the nation’s 
reserves just as it entered a period of serious fiscal crisis” (Burdette 1988: 103).  The 
government was left indebted.  The result was that, except for a feeling of pride, the 
nationalisation offered small potential short-term gains for the Zambian government.   
 
In conclusion, it can be said that the extractive nature of the mining companies 
before independence allowed little income to trickle down to the Zambian economy as such.  
This, of course, provides no excuse for the outright nationalisation of the copper mines, 
because by taxing the mines the Zambian government could have received an income to 
use on development projects in the country.  If the government had accepted the 
suggestion by the United Nations and had fixed taxes at a nominal rate of 50 percent, for 
example, it probably would have been the best long-term solution for both the industry and 
the country.  The companies would have remained in control of the management of their 
properties, which was a very important consideration for obtaining loan finance, and taxes 
would have been at a level that international investors would have found attractive 
(Cunningham 1981).   
 
The question is: Why did the Zambian government act in such a fashion?  Firstly, the 
government acted on pressure from its constituency to rid the country of European 
influences.  Although this can be understood in terms of their colonial experience, it was 
also short-sighted because it did not take future advantages and disadvantages fully into 
account.  It is unlikely that government was just scared that it would lose its majority at the 
ballot box if it did not respond to pressure from the constituency, because it was in any case 
willing to change the constitution to ensure a one-party state.  It therefore seems as if more 
was at stake than just responding to the will of the majority of the population. 
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Furthermore, if the pre-colonial history of Zambia is taken into account, the vitality 
of property rights protection was not an institutionalised practice.  Chapter 6 shows that the 
Bemba was not accustomed to gathering and protecting private property.  To nationalise the 
mining industry was, therefore, not so much in conflict with an institutionalised tradition of 
the leaders, and the situation during colonisation certainly did not support its creation. 
 
The situation described above contrasts with the experience in Botswana.  The main 
difference was that, although government earned a high income from the diamond mines, it 
did not try to run the whole industry by itself.  It must, however, be acknowledged that the 
situation for Botswana was much easier right from the outset because no international 
mining company operated there on a large scale before independence.   
 
Prior to independence, mineral rights belonged to the local tribes and were 
administered by tribal authorities.  One of the earliest tasks of the post-independence 
government was to vest mineral rights clearly in the national government, so that the 
benefits of any developments would accrue to the national government.  In 1967 Parliament 
passed the Mines and Minerals Act to govern prospecting and mining development and the 
Mineral Rights in Tribal Territories Act that vested mineral rights in the national 
government.  According to Harvey and Lewis (1990) the fact that the President, Sir Seretse 
Khama, was the traditional leader of the Bamangwato tribe, where both the copper-nickel 
concessions and the principal diamond prospecting activity occurred, made an otherwise 
difficult issue more manageable. 
 
Since the mineral discoveries were made after independence, the government 
accepted the fact that it had no capacity – financial, administrative, or technical – to carry 
out any substantial mineral prospecting or development on its own.  Government realised 
that it needed the skills of foreign companies to successfully exploit the mineral resources 
(Harvey and Lewis 1990).  For example, when De Beers discovered a diamond pipe at 
Orapa shortly after independence, the government negotiated a deal with the company that 
secured a working relationship.  The shortage of skilled manpower gave rise to a decision 
that both the mine, the town and infrastructure at Orapa would be developed entirely by a 
new mining company, Debswana, that was formed to exploit the pipe.  Debswana was 
owned 85 percent by De Beers and 15 percent by the Government of Botswana, with De 
Beers providing 100 percent of the capital necessary for exploitation (Harvey and Lewis 
1990).   
 
The willingness of the Botswana government to negotiate with foreign companies can 
be traced back to the attitude of negotiation that was present in the country, before, but 
also during, British rule.  This stands in stark contrast to the Kaunda government that tried 
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to lessen the influence of foreign companies, rather than work towards a close relationship 
with them.  This is illustrative of the difference between extractive colonisation in Northern 
Rhodesia and the more co-operative situation that was present in the Bechuanaland 
protectorate. 
 
Although the Botswana government did not contribute substantially to capital 
projects, it played an important role in mining development.  In compensation for ceding 
mineral rights, the government obtained share capital.  The benefits of shareholding were 
more than just financial, since directors were appointed to serve on the boards of the 
principal mining companies65 (Harvey and Lewis 1990).   
 
Like Zambia, the Botswana government also extended its involvement in the 
economy further than the mining industry, but with the difference that no public enterprise 
has come into being in Botswana as the result of nationalisation (Jefferis 1998).  All public 
enterprises were established from scratch, by acts of parliament.  This was possible because 
of Botswana’s level of underdevelopment at independence.  At independence there was no 
economic base except for the meat industry.  Therefore the government saw itself 
responsible for the scope of economic development that was to take place.  According to 
Jefferis (1998: 321)  
 
  The avoidance of nationalisation reflects two characteristics of Botswana.  Firstly, the 
ruling Botswana Democratic Party did not share the radical nationalist or socialist 
background of their counterparts in other countries, and opted for a pragmatic rather 
than ideologically driven approach to economic and social development.  Secondly, 
Botswana achieved independence later than most other African countries, and when 
developing its own strategies, was able to observe (and avoid) some of the mistakes 
made and problems encountered elsewhere. 
 
One important difference between the Zambian and Botswana strategies was that, 
although both governments tried to maximise revenues from mineral production, Botswana 
did this through negotiating the best possible agreements with the companies, whereas the 
Zambian government changed policy unilaterally.  This must have created a high level of 
uncertainty, and therefore high transaction costs, in the Zambian economy.  For Botswana 
                                          
65 In their negotiations with foreign companies the Botswana government made it clear that, 
although they expected privately-owned mining developments to be geared to the development 
needs of the entire nation, and that the government would take considerable interest in how 
mines were developed, they accepted the need for international companies to earn a financial 
rate of return comparable to what they could earn in alternative projects in other countries 
(Harvey and Lewis 1990).   
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Harvey and Lewis (1990: 116) state that “by the 1980s the Botswana government had a 
track record of agreements which was known internationally in the mining industry”.  An 
example was when the Botswana government decided to increase its share in diamond 
production, it did so through a change in the contract with De Beers that was allowed for in 
the negotiations of the Orapa mine just after independence66.   
 
The level of shareholding seems to be much the same as the shareholding in Zambia, 
but the paths that were taken to get to this point differ dramatically in the two countries.  
Whereas Zambia did it through the outright confiscation of property, Botswana followed a 
path of negotiation.  It is possible to argue that colonialism explains these differences in 
attitudes, but it must also be taken into consideration that the situation regarding land and 
land ownership differed before colonial rule took hold in these countries.  The situation for 
Zambia has already been sketched, and in Chapter 6 it is shown that the Batswana had, 
through their cattle industry, an institutionalised appreciation for the gathering and 
protection of private property.     
 
The cattle owners in Botswana had a tradition of property protection, although 
maybe different from what is common today in an industrial country.  It was more in the 
nature of control rights, which Rodrik claims to be very important, than rights that could be 
bought and sold.  But, what is important, is the fact that people had the right to a specific 
piece of land and could claim the yield from that land67.   
 
                                          
66  The initial Orapa agreement included a clause which provided that, would conditions change so 
that one party was severely disadvantaged, the parties would meet to work out how to correct 
things.  After production started at Orapa, the value of world diamond sales soared as part of 
the general commodity boom of the early 1970s.  De Beers increased its prices, and the 
profitability of the Orapa mine far exceeded what the government, at least, had expected in 
1969.  The government sought to invoke this provision.  New agreements were signed in July 
1975, which saw government’s shareholding increased to 50 percent (Harvey and Lewis 1990).   
 
67 The principal issue for Batswana in their survival was the provision of water for their cattle.  The 
ability to finance a borehole for water provided control over land for grazing purposes, whereas 
surface water sources were communal (Harvey and Lewis 1990).  Traditionally the chief or his 
representatives had control over boreholes and could allocate land accordingly.  Tribesmen given 
land were not required to pay anything for the use of the land.  At the same time, if individuals 
consistently disregarded complaints of their neighbours about their activities, such as tree-
cutting or grazing too many cattle at one place, the ward-head or overseer could require them to 
move to a new area.  “Taking land away from an individual for lack of compliance with the 
decisions of tribal authorities was, however far from common” (Hitchcock 1985: 92).   
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It can be concluded that the Batswana had respect for the general principle of 
private property before colonisation and they possessed a culture of negotiation.  These 
traditions made it a lot easier for them to negotiate deals with the British, whether it was to 
protect them, or to establish deals with the mining companies. 
 
 
Examples of infringement 
One of government’s roles is to intervene in the case of market failures.  This type of 
intervention should, however, be monitored carefully because it sets the rules of the 
economic game and hence the incentives faced by the actors.  Also, intervention can 
become so extensive that it violates property rights (such as a regulatory taking68).  The 
problem with regulation is that governments tend not to take all the consequences of their 
actions into consideration.   
 
Regulation is an example of a popular response to market failures by political agents.  
Some regulations may be justifiable in that they enhance knowledge-creating capacity, e.g. 
by subsidising research at universities.  But regulation may also hinder potential 
competitors, increase the compliance costs for market participants, and limit the freedom of 
contract (Kasper and Streit 1998).  Kasper & Streit (1998) also discuss the use of a tariff to 
stimulate production by local industries, as an example.  They acknowledge the problem 
that this redistributes wealth from many dispersed and unorganised buyers to the few 
organised domestic producers.   
 
Furthermore, if regulation is the result of lobbying rather than the result of an 
attempt to increase efficiency, scarce resources are not put to the most beneficial use and 
the result is poor growth and development69.  By definition regulation should increase 
competition and assist in building knowledge capacity, not hamper economic growth.  If a 
government makes decisions that are to the advantage of a small, well-voiced section of the 
population, and to the disadvantage of the majority, it has failed in its role as protector of 
property rights.   
 
Infringement can be extremely subtle.  One example from Zambia is where people's 
personal security was threatened.  Kaunda saw groups opposing his rule as a threat to 
security and this threat therefore justified the use of violence against them.  When Kaunda 
                                          
68 An example of a regulatory taking was discussed in article written by du Plessis and du Plessis 
(2005), where they show how the overuse of regulations infringe on the property rights of steel 
producers. 
69 In addition if governments spend too much time on regulating the market, they may fail to 
deliver market-supporting activities.   
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faced the outbreak of fighting between Lumpa followers and the police in July 1964, he used 
force to squash the uprising. He had frequently vowed that he would use whatever force 
was necessary against revolting fellow Zambians.  For example he told the secession 
leaders in Barotse Province: “Today I warn, tomorrow I crush”, and repeated these 
warnings to others who used tribalism and threatened to split Zambia  (quoted in Pettman 
1974: 39). 
 
Other examples of infringement are less severe.  At least six important tax and 
institutional changes were enacted between 1964 and the early 1970s, aimed at taxing 
windfall revenue and gaining more control over the mining sector.  For example, after the 
referendum of 1969, the Zambian government changed the royalty and tax system in such 
a manner that the total tax on mining profits was 73 percent.  Such a high tax rate comes 
close to expropriation and provided little incentive for expansion in the mining sector (Aron 
1999).   
 
The Zambian government started to regulate retail trade after the Mulungushi 
reforms of April 1968.  It decided to confine areas of retail trade in which non-Zambians 
could participate to the centres of large towns.  According to Pettman (1974) these 
restrictions affected some 830 retail shops.  By August 1969 restrictions were extended to 
the wholesale trade.  In November 1970 Kaunda removed the existing protection of 
expatriate trading in special areas, but gave all expatriate traders until January 1972 to 
become Zambian citizens or sell their businesses to Zambian citizens.   
 
The regulation of agricultural prices provides another example of infringement that 
distorted the market.  Turok (1989: 195) describes the situation as follows.   
 
  In the late 1970s Namboard, acting on government instructions, paid farmers a 
rather low price for their maze.  This caused farmers to move out of maize leading to 
a serious shortage the next year.  In 1980 maize had to be imported at very high 
prices and was then sold at subsidised prices to consumers, the government having 
to meet a large bill. 
 
One problem often encountered with regulation is that one form of regulation that 
distorts the market, creates the necessity for another form of regulation.  In an attempt to 
regulate the price of basic foodstuffs in the country, the agricultural sector was distorted to 
such an extent that these foodstuffs had to be imported.  Due to the high prices of these 
imports, government again felt obliged to intervene through regulation.  Turok (1989: 198) 
describes the situation: 
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  In 1975 Zambia imported almost 100 percent of its wheat, 85 percent of vegetable 
oils, and 60 percent of its cotton for processing.  Due to the policy of subsidising food 
imports, wheat flour was sold by the milling company at 40 percent below the landed 
cost plus packing materials, while vegetable oil was sold at 15 percent below.  The 
cost of this kind of subsidisation has been huge.  While the masses obviously 
benefited from them, there is nevertheless good reason to question them because 
they reflect on wrong policies in agriculture and because they reveal a too ready 
expenditure of public funds when alternative policies might make this unnecessary. 
 
In Zambia the increasing interventionism of the state did not arouse undue alarm in 
the early years, partly because it was widely recognised that much needed to be done to 
make up for the previous gross neglect, partly because state intervention was an accepted 
principle in the period, and partly because it did not seem to threaten existing interests 
(Turok 1989).   
 
Again, the situation in Botswana proved to be much different.  The main reason was 
Botswana’s membership of SACU, which provided no autonomy in setting trade regulations.  
In Chapter 5 the graphs depicting relative trade restrictions, restrictions on the allocation of 
credit, and business restrictions, show how the situation in Zambia and Botswana differed.  
Zambia’s relative level of these restrictions is much higher than those shown for Botswana. 
 
One form of regulation that was popular with the Botswana government, since the 
middle of the 1970s, is financial market regulations (see for instance Figure 39 which shows 
the relative level of interest rate regulation).  Government’s strategy regarding the financial 
market was set out in a White paper where the regulation of interest rates were 
acknowledged “with a view to satisfying domestic business and general economic 
requirements” (Leith 2002: 54-55).  According to Leith the approach was to change the 
regulated rates in response to changing circumstances, and that it was done successfully for 
a number of years.  But in the first half of the 1980s, the economic circumstances began to 
change so rapidly that it was very difficult for the government to make the necessary 
adjustments in time70.  Again, this shows the inefficiencies created by government 
                                          
70 Leith (2002: 54-55) provides an example: “Substantial balance of payments surpluses, largely 
due to a major new diamond mine, were not fully sterilized by offsetting increases in 
Government balances.  A significant liquidity overhang emerged.  Although the regulated 
commercial bank lending rates were very low in real terms, the banks faced limited lending 
outlets which were not expanding nearly fast enough to absorb the growing deposits. A classic 
tug-of-war between the regulated and regulator ensued as commercial banks turned away 
deposits, and frequently required depositors to hold some portion of their funds in non-interest 
bearing current accounts.  Changes in regulated commercial bank (CB) interest rates were slow 
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regulation.  The prime lending rate of commercial banks was eventually deregulated in 
1986.   The improvement in Botswana’s relative position for “Sound Money” coincides with 
this deregulation. 
 
The examples of regulation discussed above are extreme forms of regulation, but 
each of them had an important influence on the respective economies.  It is not suggested 
in this dissertation that there should be no regulation in countries.  Regulation is used 
throughout the world to ameliorate the effect of market failures, and for that reason it also 
alters the wealth distribution in developed countries.  It is not regulation per se that creates 
a problem, but the extent of the regulation.  Regulation should increase competition, and 
not lessen it through the infringement on the property rights of the role-players. 
 
 
7.4 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter it is shown that the Zambian government became much more 
involved in the economy, and over a much wider spectrum, than the Botswana government.  
Furthermore, Botswana created an atmosphere in which international investors felt 
comfortable to invest, whereas the nationalisation of the copper mines in Zambia created 
uncertainty over the protection of property rights.    
 
It is shown that these different approaches could be attributed to their respective 
forms of colonial rule.  Zambia was subjected to extractive colonial rule where little 
protection was granted to the rights of the indigenous population, whereas Botswana’s 
resources were unknown to Britain and no foreign companies operated on a large scale 
within the country before independence.  But it is also suggested that the policy patterns 
after independence could be traced back to pre-colonial institutions.  The biggest tribe in 
Zambia, and the one to which Kaunda belonged, had no history of gathering and protecting 
private property.  The cattle owners of Botswana, of which the biggest ones became the 
ruling elite after independence, had a tradition of gathering and respecting private property.  
Therefore, although colonial rule in Zambia was extractive, it cannot be accepted straight 
away that the situation would have been the opposite if no colonialism had taken place. 
 
In the protection of property rights, history is one element.  To secure property 
rights it is also necessary that the ruler must be subjected to restraints in using coercive 
force and that there should be limits on its powers to prevent arbitrary seizure of assets 
                                                                                                                                     
and inadequate, with the prime lending rate remaining below the rate of inflation for extended 
periods”. 
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(North 1991).  These formal limits will differ for each country because the supporting 
informal institutions will differ.  Different institutions are appropriate under different 
circumstances and the way in which each country 'decides' on how to restrain their leaders, 
will also differ. 
 
With this in mind, the role of the state in the success or failure of a country is 
highlighted once again.  The success or failure of a country depends on the decisions that 
the government makes, because these decisions directly or indirectly affect the security of 
property rights and transaction costs in the economy.  According to North (1990: 58-59), 
“there is an immense difference in the degree to which there can be relied upon contract 
enforcement between developed countries and Third World countries”.  Why do the nature 
of governments differ between Third World and developed countries?  If governments know 
that the lowering of transaction costs and the protection of property rights are important for 
economic prosperity, why are there still such differences in how governments succeed in 
doing this?  This, and also how the two countries differed in this regard, is the focus of 
Chapter 8. 
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8 CHAPTER 8 
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW 
 
  
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Governments play a central role in institutional change because they define and 
enforce economic institutions.  An essential part of development policy, therefore, is to 
determine how to create polities that will generate and enforce efficient economic 
institutions.  Section 2 will elaborate on the link between political institutions and economic 
development.   
 
The state must not be too powerful in the absence of countervailing powers, but it 
must also be kept in mind that if it is too weak and easily overthrown it may be unable to 
deliver the social and economic goods that groups expect, or to maintain order in the face 
of conflicting group demands.  Acemoglu (2003: 3) found that "countries with greater 
constraints on politicians and elites and more protection against expropriation by these 
powerful groups, have substantially higher income per capita (i.e. higher long-run growth 
rates)", achieve greater investment rates, extend more credit to the private sector relative 
to GDP, and have more highly developed stock markets.  For a country to prosper over the 
long term, governments, therefore, need to be constrained in their decision-making.  Two 
forms of constraints will be discussed in this chapter—namely, democracy and the rule of 
law. 
 
Although Britain left Botswana and Zambia with basically the same constitution, and 
therefore the same formal constraints, their response to these constraints were totally 
different.  It will be discussed in section 3 how Zambia moved to more centralised decision-
making, while Botswana adhered to the principles of democratic decision-making.  Although 
there is no conclusive evidence that democracies fare better economically than autocracies, 
the advantages of a democracy as a restraint on government decisions, will be highlighted.   
 
Section 4 considers the question of why the governments took these different paths of 
economic development.  Why did they respond so differently to the inherited formal 
constraints?  Was the centralisation of power in Zambia a reaction to their colonial 
experience and in accordance with the fashionable ideology of the day?  Or were there also 
other reasons?  North (1995: 25) suggests that “it is hard – maybe even impossible - to 
find a government that consists of wealth-maximising actors who are unconstrained by 
other considerations”.  These “other considerations” will be discussed in section 4.  Section 
5 concludes the chapter. 
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8.2 POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
What role do political institutions play in the process of economic development?  It can 
be argued that malfunctioning political institutions severely harm economic performance 
through a reduction in both incentives and opportunities to invest and innovate, because 
governments are important role players in the economic environment.  Not only do they 
provide security and property rights, they also implement economic policies and provide 
infrastructure and economic services.  Through their policymaking they create an 
environment that either makes a country attractive for international investment or not.   
 
Politics are often the main reason for explaining Africa’s poor economic performance.  
The World Bank, for instance, have stated in the “Berg Report” that economic growth in 
Africa had been undermined by “domestic policy inadequacies” (World Bank 1979: 1.6).  
And again in a Policy Research Bulletin that “at the core of Africa’s economic crisis, lay poor 
public policies and the lack of ‘political will’ to correct them” (World Bank 1994: 99).   
 
Reasons why governments play such an important role in economic growth have 
already been discussed in other parts of this dissertation.  The reasons have all focussed on 
the fact that the expansion of markets necessitate more specialised producers, and for 
these to come into effect impersonal contract enforcement becomes essential.  In the 
absence of effective impersonal contracting, the gains from "defection" are big enough to 
forestall the development of complex exchange.  A capital market, for instance, necessitates 
the security of property rights over time and will simply not evolve where political rulers can 
arbitrarily seize assets or radically alter their value.  And according to North (1991: 100-
101) “establishing a credible commitment to secure property rights over time requires 
either a ruler who exercises forbearance and restraint in using coercive force, or the 
shackling of the rulers' power to prevent arbitrary seizure of assets”.  These constraints are 
discussed in the following section. 
 
Why do governments choose policies that are detrimental to society?  Acemoglu 
(2002: 2) argues that "there are strong empirical and theoretical grounds for believing that 
inefficient policies and institutions are chosen … because they serve the interest of 
politicians or social groups holding political power, at the expense of the society at large”.  
The reason why groups may use their resources (this can either be their time or monetary) 
to influence government in their decision-making, is because economic policies can alter the 
power base in an economy.   
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Political rules lead to economic rules, but powerful groups in society influence these 
rules, and in turn economic rules influence the powerful groups in society, which will again 
influence the political decision-making.  Causality therefore runs both ways: political 
institutions influence economic institutions and economic institutions influence political 
institutions.  For example, property rights and hence individual contracts are specified and 
enforced by political decision-making, but the structure of economic interest will also 
influence the political structure.  North (1990: 48) describes it as follows:  
 
In equilibrium, a given structure of property rights (and their enforcement) will be 
consistent with a particular set of political rules (and their enforcement).  Changes in 
one will induce changes in the other.   
 
With this interrelatedness of influence in mind, it can be concluded that political 
institutions will be stable only if they are supported by organisations with an interest in their 
perpetuation.  This highlights the importance of social conflict, the leadership in the country, 
and the prevailing informal institutions, as will be discussed in section 4.   
 
 
8.3 CONSTRAINTS ON POLITICIANS 
 
8.3.1 Democracy vs. centralised decision-making  
 
Over time a large number of policy devices have been invented and implemented to 
enhance the likelihood that public policy meets the aspirations of the majority of citizens.  
One of these policy devices is the establishment of a democracy.  Lipset (1959a: 71) defines 
democracy as a  
 
   political system that supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the 
governing officials, and a social mechanism that permits the largest possible part of 
the population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for 
political office.   
 
Democratic governments are typically seen as a more politically efficient choice than 
an autocracy.  North (1990: 109), for instance, explains the move towards democracy as “a 
move towards greater political efficiency”.  Different reasons are discussed in the literature 
as to why democracy may result in better economic performance.   
• A democracy compels a nation to hold regular, free and competitive 
(multiparty) elections (Alesina and Perotti 1994).  With the openness and 
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certainty this creates, transaction costs are lower.  It was already established 
that the minimisation of transaction costs in the economic market plays an 
important role in the process of economic growth and development.  It is 
important that, not only in the economic market, but also in the political 
market, there should be a drive to minimise transaction costs.    
The lower the transaction costs, the more willing the voters will be to cast their 
votes.  And one way to lower transaction costs, is to lower information costs.  
This will be lower if there is open debate among opposition parties.  If an 
incumbent’s opponents are able to bring his or her deficiencies before 
constituents, it will not only reduce information costs for the voter, but also 
reduce agency problems. 
• There are more civil and economic liberties available to the population under a 
democracy than under an autocracy.  With no absolute power in the hands of a 
ruler, the infringement on personal property rights are less likely.  This 
contributes to the protection of property rights.  De Long and Shleifer (1992) 
illustrate this point when they show the incompatibility of despotism and 
development.  According to them absolutist states are characterised by the 
subjection of the legal framework to the prince’s will: subjects do not have 
rights, they have privileges, which endure only as long as the prince wishes.  
“His incentive to extract resources is restricted only in that he has an interest 
in keeping the people prosperous enough for him to extract more resources in 
the future, and is augmented by the possibility of using taxes from his current 
domain to conquer other lands” (De Long and Shleifer 1992: 10).   
North (1981) ascribes economic growth in the west to the increasing security 
offered to property rights and freedom to endeavour to make profits.  Such 
security is probably stronger in the absence of a powerful individual autocrat or 
‘absolutist prince.’ Under an absolute ruler the legal framework and property 
rights can be altered from time to time to produce short-term revenue.   
• Under democracy, the range of feasible economic policies is likely to be limited 
to the median voter’s preferences.  This situation is more likely to produce 
moderate results.     
• Political participation allow for greater voice to all the citizens, without the need 
for conflict or civil strife (Rodrik 1997).  This will secure a more stable society. 
• Democracies are less able to withhold economic rewards from the losers in 
political competition. The losers still have an outside chance to benefit in a 
democracy.  This increases the incentives for social groups to partake in 
positive cooperative behaviour (Rodrik 1997).  The more the sources of power, 
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status and wealth are concentrated in the state, the more the political struggle 
tends to approach a zero-sum game in which the defeated lose all.  This, in the 
end, makes it harder for the ruling party to abstain from its hold on power.   
• The greater the importance of the central state as a source of prestige and 
advantage, the less likely it is that those in power – or the forces of opposition 
– will accept rules of the game that institutionalise party conflict and could 
result in the turnover of those in office (Lipset 1994).   
• In a more centralised society, more hinges on the ability of fewer individuals.  
Economic crises are a threat to democracies as well as to dictatorships, but in a 
less centralised society the problem is addressed by a larger number of 
preceptors, which is more likely to span a wider range of characteristics.  
“Diversification here not only reduces risk in a standard, static sense, but also 
as a deeper longer-term advantage in an environment that is changing and is 
essentially unpredictable”71 (Sah 1991: 72).   
• Under an autocracy, consultation and supervision are absent.  Decision-makers 
in the executive are also deprived of feedback that can be crucial both for the 
technical quality of policies and for the political support necessary to sustain 
them.  Economic reforms are thus likely to be unstable and subject to reversal72 
(Haggard and Kaufman 1995).     
• In the case of a crisis a democracy is more likely to survive, because "under 
democracy it is easier to change a government without changing the regime" 
(Przeworski and Limongi 1993:  62).   
• Another reason why democracies will find it easier to survive, is because the 
rulers derive legitimacy from more than their economic performance. 
• Democracy makes government accountable for its decisions.  Accountability 
means that “those who exercise power on a continuing basis are required to 
answer or account for their conduct to others who are entitled to judge it” 
(Sklar 1989 (reprinted 2002): 69).  Elections at regular intervals serve that 
purpose.  In Chapter 4 it is shown that no one can force a government to keep 
its commitments.  And if a government is not accountable, the ability to 
credibly commit to decisions, is weakened.   
                                          
71 The centralisation of power in the person of Kaunda is discussed in section 8.4.  With a declining 
income from the copper mines, economic solutions had to come from only a few people (and 
they were inexperienced in handling such crisis). 
72 This was the case in Zambia during the economic crisis of the 1970s and 80s. 
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• The competition between political parties is an important advantage of a 
democracy.  Monitoring takes place not only within but also across political 
parties.  Competitive political parties are in a good position to monitor any 
shirking.  And because they can gain great advantages by providing evidence of 
the opposition’s shirking, they provide a good monitoring device (Wittman 
1989). 
• Democratic institutions provide a check on governmental power and so limit the 
potential of public officials to accumulate personal wealth by misusing their 
positions of power.  The one-party rule, which has been common in Africa, 
makes it easier for rulers to make decisions that confiscate wealth rather than 
add to it, because there is little cost (e.g. the cost of losing the next election) 
involved.  Ndulu and O’Connell (1999: 45) find that the economic downturn in 
SSA corresponds to a period of “consolidation of authoritarian rule”. 
• Democracy also has the advantage that it makes succession more predictable 
and stable.  When the autocrat dies or is deposed of, there are no formal 
institutions that can be relied upon to select or install a new dictator peacefully.  
Democracies provide the structure for an orderly succession of leaders.  Thus, 
in Olson’s words: “virtually the only societies in the world today in which there 
can be much confidence about what the government will be like a decade or 
two into the future are democracies” (Olson 1991: 153). 
• Related is the advantage of a longer time horizon:  Under an autocracy the 
ruling party cannot credibly commit that the regime itself will last.  This creates 
the problem of decisions influenced by a short time horizon.  When an 
autocratic government, like for instance the Kaunda government, is insecure, or 
for any other reason has a short time horizon, it has no incentive to encourage 
the long-run investment that will increase the output of the domain in the long 
run.  Przeworski and Limongi (1993: 53) put it strongly: “An insecure autocrat, 
in particular, is likely to plunder the society”.  Of course the short time horizons 
of elected politicians also cause severe problems, but it is only in democracies 
where a predictable environment for long-run investment in capital goods and 
in research and development is secured, because there is more certainty that 
the regime will last. 
• Democracy also has the ability to deal effectively with ethnic diversity.  Collier 
(1998: 5) finds that ethnic make-up affects rates of growth only in nations that 
lack democracy.  This might be explained by the fact that "democracy has the 
potential both to discipline governments into delivering reasonable economic 
policies and provide a framework in which groups can negotiate mutually 
beneficial outcomes".  It also provides institutions in which disputes between 
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ethnic groups can be taken care of.  Collier suggests that the low rates of 
growth in the nations of Africa may come not from their ethnic diversity, as is 
often predicted, but rather from their lack of democratic forms of governance. 
 
With all the abovementioned advantages in mind, it is probably not an accident that 
most of the richest countries in the world are democracies.  The correlation between 
democracy and high income is sometimes alleged to be due to a taste for democracy in 
high-income societies, which reduces democracy to a luxury only affordable by rich 
countries.  This assumption started with work done by Lerner (1958) and Lipset (1959b), 
which proposed that nations with a higher income have a greater chance to sustain 
democracy and that prosperity stimulates democracy.  Recently Barro (1999) confirmed the 
Lipset hypothesis as a strong empirical regularity.  He showed that increases in various 
measures of the standard of living forecast a gradual rise in democracy.   
 
Barro (1999) took this analysis further and explained that failing democracies may be 
the result of democracies that arise without prior economic development.  He shows that 
democracies that are, for instance, imposed by former colonial powers or international 
organisations, tend not to last.  Barro’s regression analysis predicts that, as with the African 
experience of the 1960s, democracy that gets installed well ahead of economic development 
will not last73.   
 
Barro (1999: 158) concludes that the net effect of democracy on growth is uncertain.  
He explains it as follows: 
 
   An expansion of political freedom – more democracy – has opposing effects on 
economic growth.  On the positive side, democratic institutions provide a check on 
governmental power and thereby limit the potential of public officials to amass 
personal wealth and to carry out unpopular policies.  But on the negative side, more 
democracy encourages poor-to-rich redistribution of income and may enhance the 
power of interest groups.   
 
This brings the discussion to the inherent problems of democracy.  North (1990: 51) 
equates political markets with economic markets, stating that "…[efficient] markets are 
scarce enough in the economic world and even scarcer in the political world".  The following 
are general problems associated with democracy: 
                                          
73 This, of course, does not correspond to the observations in Zambia and Botswana.  Zambia’s per 
capita income at independence was much higher than that in Botswana, but democracy lasted in 
Botswana and not in Zambia.   
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• One of the advantages of a democracy that was discussed, is the fact that it 
provides more secure property rights.  This can also have a negative side if the 
state specifies a set of property rights that maximises the revenue of the group 
in power, regardless of its impact on the wealth of the society as a whole 
(North 1981, 1997).   
• Similarly, if an effective opposition does not exist, one loses a lot of the stated 
advantages of a democracy.  Under such conditions, the authority of officials in 
power will steadily increase, and popular influence on policy will be at a 
minimum.   
• There is also an incentive problem.  For voters to make the optimal choice at 
the ballot box, they have to be informed.  But generally, voters have little 
incentive to become informed.  This, of course, leaves room for political agent 
opportunism.  With voters not informed, political agents have the opportunity 
to shirk, take bribes, etc., without the treat of being voted out in the next 
election.  But it must be admitted that candidates develop reputations.  If they 
have not kept their campaign promises in the past, they are less likely to be re-
elected or elected to a higher office in the future (Lipset 1959a).     
 
These disadvantages contribute to why North (1990) stresses the importance of 
having rules that eliminate the failure of political organisations.  To be able to benefit from a 
democracy, it is important to ensure that competition gets rid of growth retarding agents. 
 
The economic rise of dictatorships, such as the South Asian tigers, has led to 
arguments that economic growth is facilitated by authoritarianism, not democracy.  
Arguments have been that “the masses would be ungovernable under democracy because 
the social and welfare demands of the working class and the poor would impede economic 
advances” (Lipset, Seong and Torres 1993).   
 
Evidence (see for instance Barro 1999) show that in the post-war era, electoral 
democracies have not grown faster than dictatorships.  And in a review of 21 quantitative 
studies investigating the relationship between regime type and economic growth, 
Przeworski and Limongi (1993: 60) explained that “eight studies found in favour of 
democracy, eight in favour of authoritarianism and five discovered no difference”.     
 
But on closer account one finds that, by not only concentrating on the authoritarian 
regimes that has realised high economic growth rates, but by taking all authoritarian 
regimes into consideration, a different picture unfolds.  In the vast majority of developing 
countries political authority has actually been highly centralised, and that with a handful of 
exceptions, their performance has been poor (Sah 1991).  For instance dictatorships in 
 196 
African and Latin America did not realise the same outcome as the successful dictatorships 
in Southeast Asia. 
 
Olson (1991: 154) discusses an important historical event that also shows the general 
supremacy of democracies.  He shows that “after World War II economic development and 
technological advance spread mainly from democracies to other countries, rather than the 
reverse”.   
 
Both Rodrik (1997) and Alesina and Perotti (1994) accept the fact that there does not 
seem to be a positive functional relationship between democracy and long-run growth, and 
then debate the statement whether democracy is “the safer choice”.  Rodrik finds that 
under a democracy the expected long-run growth rates cluster more closely around the 
mean than under autocratic rule.  There is less variation of outcome.  Rodrik (1997: 3) 
demonstrates that democracies perform better than authoritarian regimes in a number of 
respects and his results show that: “a risk-averse individual not blessed with a lot of capital 
– an individual that is like most of us – is considerably better off living in a democracy”.  
Alesina and Perotti (1994: 353) agree with Rodrik by concluding that “democracies have 
done much better than the worst dictatorships but not as well as some of the most 
successful dictatorships”. 
 
Botswana displays an unparalleled record of political stability in SSA.  Free and fair 
elections have been held at five-year intervals since the pre-independence election of March 
1965.  In each of these elections the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) won with 
large majorities, causing the country to be named "a de facto one party state through the 
ballot box" (Tsie 1996: 600).  The situation created stability and the impression that the 
constituency are satisfied with the work done by the BDP, but on the negative side it has 
created a situation where democracy has not been “tested”.  For a democracy to be seen as 
a truly mature system, it must be tested by a peaceful regime change.  This has not 
happened in Botswana and it is hard to predict whether the BDP will hand power to an 
opposition. 
 
The Botswana government, in principle, accepts the idea that political rights ought to 
be respected.  It has, however, been hesitant to apply them too extensively in practice.  Not 
only has much been written in the literature on the discrimination against the Basarwa74, 
                                          
74 A report released by the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
condemns Botswana's treatment of the 'Bushmen' as racist. The report, released in August 2002, 
criticises Botswana's eviction of the Bushmen (who are known in Botswana as Basarwa) from 
their ancestral land in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve.  Prof Kenneth Good from the 
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but generally the BDP has also made political participation difficult.  Holm (1988: 193) 
describes it as follows: 
 
  Complete democratic rights are only enjoyed by a small group that is educated and 
privately employed.  The freedom to run for office is, in theory, very great.  Anyone 
who can raise the necessary deposit may contest a seat.  There are, however, 
several important restrictions.  Most significantly, no government employee can run 
for office.  This includes civil servants, teachers, and employees of parastatals.  They 
cannot even take a leave of absence during the campaign.  Since this group 
constitutes two-thirds of the wage- and salary-earning public, this means that most 
who are financially able to run for office cannot do so without resigning from 
government, hence bearing not only the costs of the campaign, but also the risk of a 
career change.  For the society as a whole, this restriction effectively excludes most 
of those who are informed and articulate on policy questions. 
 
The democracy in Botswana also has other weaknesses.  Until the mid-1980s, only 
government media, both radio and the daily newspaper, existed.  There are also limitations 
in the electoral system.  Botswana operates a single member constituency system.  Under 
this “winner-takes-all" electoral system only one candidate makes it to the National 
Assembly.  This system benefits established and politically experienced parties that enjoy 
the advantage of incumbency.   
 
Despite being one of the oldest democracies in SSA, voters in Botswana are still 
relatively ill-informed about their civic rights and responsibilities and their political rights 
(Molomo and Somolekae).   
 
The mentioned problems lead to the political marginalisation of a significant proportion 
of the population, rather than a deepening of democracy.  It can therefore be concluded 
that Botswana resembles a democracy, but there is cause for concern.  
 
Zambia received the same constitution as Botswana at independence.  The multi-party 
system was abrogated in 1972 and replaced by a one-party state.  Elections were still held, 
but the only candidates that were allowed to partake were those approved by UNIP.  This 
lasted until 1990 when the multi-party system was introduced again.  Power was 
transferred to the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) after the general elections in 
November 1991.  Therefore, for most of the period under discussion, Zambia was a de facto 
one-party state.   
                                                                                                                                     
University of Botswana has also contributed to this subject (Good 2003). 
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With the exception of the trade union movement, which was already a well-established 
group by the 1970s, no other means of organised opposition to government was allowed.  
The government of President Kaunda, therefore, had to deal with the problems created by a 
fading economy, the hostilities created by the trade union movement, and any other form of 
opposition that they encountered during that period, without having any of the advantages 
of democracy that was mentioned at the beginning of the section.  It would be reasonable 
to speculate that UNIP would have lost control at a general election (or at least much of it) 
during the 1970s and 80s, were other parties free to participate, due to the difficulties 
experienced in the economy.  Therefore, the move to one-party rule can be seen as a 
means for UNIP to cling to power.  Possible reasons for this will be discussed later. 
 
 
8.3.2 The rule of law 
 
The second constraint on government comes from the rule of law.  For economic 
growth to be sustainable, property rights need to be protected, not only from rival private 
parties, but also from government.  This protection not only provides order in the economy, 
polity and society, but also creates a form of predictability that lowers transaction costs.  If 
government has unlimited power, it may easily infringe on the property rights of private 
citizens.   
 
Constraints to the power appear to De Long and Shleifer (1992) to be the most 
important determinants of what Adam Smith calls “security of property”.  And the 
importance of an effective rule of law is shown by Alesina and Perotti (1994) in their 
discussion of the success of the four dragons in Southeast Asia.  These countries are 
undemocratic, but grant a fair amount of individual, and especially economic, rights to their 
citizens.  Long-run economic growth, therefore, entails the development of the rule of law 
for the protection of civil and political freedoms.  The rule of law means the establishment of 
the rules of "due process" and an independent judiciary (Lipset 1994).  In practice this 
means that the rule of law consists of formal rules, which are enforced by an independent 
judiciary, and informal rules that influence the way society responds to the formal rules. 
 
There is no prospect of a laissez faire government under the rule of law, but rather 
that government’s actions must be consistent with the rule of law.  The rule of law prevents, 
or at least greatly hinders, the exercise of arbitrary power by the state that would 
undermine the credibility of the many formal institutions.  The arbitrary infringement of 
property rights by government, for example, would be unlawful and beyond the scope of 
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legitimate government activity.  And if government does not adhere to the principles of the 
rule of law, and power is used arbitrarily, it would increase transaction costs because the 
citizenry will not know how to behave; any such action would produce unforeseen risk.   
 
Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard (2001) tried to establish whether countries that 
experience lawlessness, also experience lower levels of investment because the cost for 
individuals to protect themselves, that is the transaction costs, may be too high.  They 
found a strong association between economic development and legality in their sample of 
countries.  They recognise that rich countries could afford better institutions, but suggest 
that it is more likely that good legal institutions are a precondition for long-term economic 
growth and development.  Good institutions help countries to become rich.  They are not 
alone in this analysis for there are other scholars that emphasise the crucial role of legal 
institutions for sustained economic growth (see for instance Knack and Keefer 1995, North 
1981, 1990).  
 
From the literature three, broadly defined, principles for the rule of law can be 
identified: there must be clear limits to the power of government at all levels; the law 
should be known and certain; the law should be supported by the prevailing informal 
institutions. 
 
 
Clear limits to the power of government at all levels 
In Chapter 4 it is mentioned that the state as third party is the most efficient enforcer 
of formal rules, but that does not exclude the actions of politicians and officials from 
scrutiny under the law.  Kasper & Streit (1998), amongst others, discuss the development 
of a constitution, which subjects the rulers, elected politicians and officials to general 
constraining rules, as a popular device to limit the powers of government.   
 
One of the important constitutional devices is to separate the powers of government 
among the legislative (rule making), the executive (rule-bound implementation) and the 
judiciary (adjudication of conflicts), and to lay down a system of checks and balances 
among the holders of these three types of authority over collective action.   
 
A legislature operating under a written constitution remains sovereign, but it cannot be 
supreme.  It is sovereign in the sense that parliament is the sole legislative authority and it 
alone has the power to make, amend or alter laws for the peace, order and good 
government of the country (Otlhogile 1998).  But it is not above the authority of the courts.   
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Although the separation of powers is most of the times protected by the constitution, 
an independent judiciary (often a constitutional or supreme court) guards over the 
constitution in turn.  This explains the importance of an independent judiciary.  If the state 
controls the judiciary, it produces a system that focuses more on the power of the state and 
less on the private rights of individual citizens.  According to Beck and Levine (2003) cross-
country differences in the independence of the judiciary are critical for explaining, for 
example, cross-country differences in financial development.  
 
Botswana inherited a formal constitution at independence, which provided the 
president with extensive powers.  These powers were kept in check by the independent 
judiciary, as the following example (which shows a clear separation between the legislature 
and the judiciary) illustrates: 
 
  In 1984 parliament amended the citizenship laws to bar Batswana women married to 
non-Batswana husbands from passing Botswana citizenship to their children, 
regardless of whether or not they were born in Botswana.  By 1991 women were 
against the law on the grounds that it discriminated between male and female.  
When the matter was brought to trial, the courts ruled that, although the legislature 
is supreme within its sphere of law-making, those powers must be exercised in 
accordance with the constitution.  In this way, the courts declared the citizens of 
Botswana – male and female – equal before the law (Otlhogile 1998: 157).   
 
Although Zambia operated under basically the same constitution, the relationship 
between the executive powers and the judiciary was totally different.  The executive did not 
accept the authority of the judiciary, especially not where racial issues were at stake, as an 
example from 1969 illustrates. 
 
The High Court, the judicial constraint on the Zambian government’s power, became 
the centre of a major political crisis in June 1969 when a white judge squashed the sentence 
levied against two Portuguese soldiers by a black judge.  Kaunda condemned this as a 
political judgement, while the chief judge defended the ruling saying in a letter: “If the 
Courts of Zambia were to impose excessive sentences… simply because the offenders were 
associated with a foreign regime, then we would be following the example of aggression set 
by the Portuguese Courts” (quoted in Pettman 1974: 34-35).  The publication of the Chief 
Justice’s letter triggered off a violent reaction, including the storming of the High Court by 
members of Zambia Youth Service.  Among the placards carried were “White Men Cannot be 
Zambians” and “Kaunda is the only unchallengeable authority in Zambia” (Pettman 1974: 
34-35).  The crisis resulted in a number of resignations, including the white judge who 
started the controversy, and the gradual Zambianisation of the Court after changes in the 
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law allowed Zambians to be appointed judges after having served five years as magistrates 
(Pettman 1974). 
 
The example illustrates the conflict that was present between the executive and the 
judicial authorities.  There was resentment against the independence of the court and the 
restraint it placed on government– especially in the case of an all-white judiciary.       
 
 
The law should be known and certain 
It is necessary to ensure that all citizens are formally protected from the arbitrary 
use of force by fellow citizens and the government.  According to Kasper and Streit (1998: 
120): “where human interactions are determined by the violence potential of thuggish 
people or groups, ordinary people experience injustice”.  This also means that citizens must 
be able to predict with reasonable certainty the consequences of their actions.  To be 
effective this needs to be done in a low-cost, non-violent way, but to such an extent that 
individual freedom is limited so as to avoid destructive conflicts.   
 
An independent judiciary and impartial tribunals that follow the rule of due process 
and deliver judgement whenever laws are violated, allow individuals to anticipate the 
response to their actions.  If rules are broken, sanctions are applied in a predictable manner 
and all people are treated equally before the law.   
 
This is important because the effectiveness of the enforcement shapes the whole 
character of the game.  According to North (1990: 4) “some teams are successful as a 
consequence of constantly violating rules and thereby intimidating the opposing team.  
Whether that strategy pays off obviously depends on the effectiveness of monitoring and 
severity of punishment”.     
 
The examples of Botswana and Zambia raised in the previous section, show a 
difference that is also applicable to this section.  If government interferes with decisions 
made by the judiciary, uncertainty is created regarding future decisions.  No one is able to 
predict what will happen in the future, because the decisions will be affected by the 
judgement of government.  Therefore, judicial decisions become politically tainted. 
 
 
The law should be supported by the prevailing informal institutions 
Laws must be such that they do not, on the whole, clash with the informal 
institutions of the community and their fundamental values, so that people are able and 
willing to obey the law.  The deterrent value of the penalties depends not only on the ability 
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and willingness of the authority to enforce the relevant regulations, but also on the level of 
acceptance, by the citizenry, of the judgements rendered by the country's institutions.   
 
The rule of law requires a generally law-abiding civil society where formal judicial 
sanctions are supplemented by spontaneous enforcement, such as social disapproval, 
shaming and exclusion.  It is necessary for the sustained rule of law in a community that an 
attitude of legality is fostered and that citizens subject themselves willingly to the laws of 
the land.  This will also reduce the transaction costs of law-enforcement. 
 
Developing norms of behaviour that will support and legitimise new rules is a lengthy 
process, and in the absence of such reinforcing mechanisms, polities will tend to be 
unstable.  Unfortunately, it often happened that with independence the departing colonial 
power left the colony with formal rules to guide the rule of law that were not supported by 
the prevailing informal institutions in the colony.  Djankov, et al. (2003) refer to this as the 
inefficient transplantation of institutions through conquest and colonisation.  Many countries 
have inherited their legal systems, but the institutions, which in the origin country respected 
the rule of law, may not, once transplanted, remain efficient due to the absence of 
supporting informal institutions.  The fact that a transplant country (in)voluntarily receives a 
formal legal order, does not imply these transplanted formal legal rules are compatible with 
its initial conditions. 
 
Scholars have long noted that the quality of law on the books does not ensure their 
actual enforcement.  In their paper, Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard (2001) highlight the 
importance of supporting informal institutions, rather than the quality of the law on the 
books.  They explain that the transplantation of formal legal systems from European 
countries to their colonies has shaped the legal order in most of these countries, but that it 
often happened that the imported law did not match demand in the new country.  If the law 
is not adapted to local conditions, or if the population within the transplant was not familiar 
with the law, then it can be expected that initial demand for applying these laws will be 
weak (Berkowitz, et al. 2001).  Furthermore, the judges, lawyers, politicians and other legal 
intermediaries that are responsible for developing the law must be convinced of its 
appropriateness for their country.   
 
Even though the transplant effect is strongly path dependent, the institutions can 
indeed be modified.  A few countries, like Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Spain and 
Portugal, received better legality ratings than the Berkowitz-model predicted.  An 
explanation being that most of them have made considerable investments in reforming their 
legal systems. 
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Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard (2001) state that countries that developed a formal 
legal order on their own should develop more effective legal institutions than counties that 
received a complete package from a colonial power. There could however be situations 
where the transplanted law is relatively compatible with the original needs and this could 
offset the fact that the laws were transplanted. This was true for Botswana.   
 
Botswana and Zambia inherited a written variation of the Westminster model of 
government from Britain at independence.  Both countries are therefore perfect examples of 
countries subjected to the transplant effect.  The constitution was not established by the 
people at a referendum or a constituent assembly elected specifically for that purpose, but 
by the colonial power.   
 
The British left their former colonies with constitutions as the framework of powers, 
procedures and rights that are vested in the government.  Most written constitutions 
provide for the separation of the functions of government organs, but the one these 
countries received does not.  The constitutions vested all executive powers with the 
president who was the head of the state and government.  It leaves the president with the 
power to be commander-in-chief of the armed forces; the president appoints all ministers, 
assistant ministers, and permanent secretaries; may exercise the prerogative of mercy; and 
appoints a vice-president (Parson 1984).   
 
Although Zambia started out with the same constitution as was presented to 
Botswana, there was internal pressure to change it to something perceived as "more 
suitable" to the needs of post-colonial Zambia.  In June 1969 a constitutional referendum 
did away with the requirement for referendums to amend the previously entrenched clauses 
within the Zambian Constitution. This step ensured that as long as a single party such as 
UNIP controlled the National Assembly, it could change the constitution without first getting 
the approval of the nation (Pettman 1974).   The government made use of this amendment 
to change the constitution to instate the one-party democracy that was referred to in the 
previous section.   
 
The effective power both within the Party and the state was vested in the President 
of UNIP, who was simultaneously the President and Head of State/chief executive (Ollawa 
1979).  The new constitution made it clear that the party was to be supreme over 
government as the phrase 'the party and its government’ implies.  The main purpose of the 
cabinet was to implement policies, rather than policy formation (Burdette 1988).   
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In practice this meant the concentration of power in the President of UNIP and also 
served to subordinate all other organs of the state such as the Cabinet and the legislature 
to himself.  Ollawa (1979: 261-262) describes it as follows: 
 
   This strong constitutional and power position of the President within Zambia's one-
party system thus enables him in actual fact to determine personally the broad 
outline of major national policies or to make many important decisions.  This view is 
enhanced by the realisation of the fact that many policies and decisions promulgated 
by the Party are usually made by the President himself and presented by him to the 
Party's highest policy-making body, namely the National Council. 
 
President Kaunda not only consolidated all political power, but also silenced the 
judiciary as oversight agency.  During the Second Republic the important constraints on the 
government (opposition parties and the judiciary) were silenced.  This seems to be a 
plausible explanation for the unresponsiveness of the Zambian government to the changing 
needs in the Zambian economy, while raising transaction costs and thwarting the protection 
of property rights.   
 
Reasons for the change of the constitution are difficult to identify.  It could have 
been in response to colonisation and the drive to get rid of European influence, since it was 
fashionable at that stage in Africa to move to more authoritarian rule, or it could be due to 
the personality of President Kaunda.  And, related to this, why did the informal institutions 
allow such a move?  The following section discusses possible reasons for the centralisation 
of power.   
 
The situation in Botswana was from the onset of independence, and even before that, 
different.  According to the judgement of Colclough and McCarthy (1980) both Khama and 
Masire were personally deeply committed to the constitutional rule of law.  For instance, in 
colonial times the characteristic response of traditional leaders to dissatisfaction with the 
administration was not to provoke dissatisfaction in public, but to take legal action.  
Seretse’s uncle, Tshekedi Khama, also initiated several legal actions against the British 
administration75.   
 
                                          
75 Tswana political culture does not support extremist organisations.  Both the BNF and the BPP 
started out with radical socialist and antiracial platforms.  Both soon concluded that such politics 
would not gain them popular support.  Even opposition to South Africa has been handled in a 
very low-key fashion.  The traditional Tswana values of public discussion, community consensus, 
non-violence, and moderation are critical elements of a democratic political culture (Holm 1988). 
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Since independence the same attitude has prevailed.  As Adamolekun and Morgan 
(1999: 590) concludes: "The few minor changes to the constitution that were made have 
been approached with considerable reluctance and caution, while the constitution itself has 
rarely been flouted.  This gave Botswana the reputation of a country in which the rule of 
law, assured by an independent court system, is predictable". 
 
 
8.4 POSSIBLE REASONS FOR THE CENTRALISATION OF POWER 
IN ZAMBIA 
 
8.4.1 Colonialism  
British colonial rule had a great impact on the character of central government in 
both Botswana and Zambia.  Political accountability to parliament by public officials had 
been adopted from the British style of administration.  Botswana stayed on this path, 
whereas Zambia did not.  It is possible to relate this to the different forms of colonisation, 
with Botswana's experience of participatory colonisation and Zambia's of the extractive 
form.  According to Acemoglu and Johnson (2003a: 86) “there is a great possibility that 
extractive colonisation leads to extractive institutions, where the majority of the population 
faces a high risk of expropriation by the government, the ruling elite, or other agents”.  
Extractive institutions are therefore characterised by few checks on the power of ruling 
elites and little protection for private property, as was the case in Zambia.  
 
Many of the decisions the post-colonial Zambian government made can be related to 
the extractive nature of the colonisation they were subjected to.  Colonisation creates path 
dependency and in Zambia many policies can be explained by the drive to rid the country of 
any further European influences.  This is illustrated in the previous chapter's discussion of 
transaction costs and the infringement of property rights through nationalisation.   
 
Another example where colonial rule can be more directly linked to post-colonial 
decisions, is the choice of the person that came to power after independence.  In Zambia 
the traditional structure of Chiefs was broken down and Kenneth Kaunda came to power 
without the same legitimacy Khama had.  Kaunda was the strong, charismatic leader of the 
resistance struggle, but this was ineffectual to bring about unity in a much-divided society 
after independence.  Reasons for the social conflict are discussed below. 
 
Botswana had a different experience during colonial rule, with much less British 
influence, not as much discriminatory policy, and fewer European companies, to deal with.  
It cleared the way for greater cooperation between the post-colonial government and these 
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companies and expatriate workers.  With no extractive colonialism the traditional structure 
of the people of Botswana remained very much intact and the “rightful heir” came to power 
after independence, although not as a monarch, but as part of a democratic system.   
 
Was Zambia therefore destined for failure because of extractive colonialism?  That 
they had to deal with problems due to this type of colonialism cannot be ignored, but "path 
dependency is not a story of inevitability".  If the Kaunda-government were convinced of 
the advantages of a democracy, it would not have turned in the opposite direction as their 
routine reaction to the colonial power.  Since the post-colonial Zambian government did 
change the formal institutions left by Britain (e.g. the constitution), the country was 
therefore not merely an inevitable victim of the decisions of the colonisers.  Furthermore, it 
was not as much the extractive institutions created during colonisation that were 
transplanted into post-colonial Zambia, but rather a reaction towards the very existence of 
extractive institutions during colonial rule (i.e. reactive institutions came about).  These 
“reactions” were taken by autonomous leaders, which were not mere victims of colonialism. 
 
The next question is to what extent these reactions were tainted by social conflict 
and to what extent the social conflict was due to colonialism. 
 
 
8.4.2 Social conflict 
Social conflict may take on a variety of forms.  It can either be violent, like a war over 
control of land, or it may be in the form of industrial conflicts (strikes and lockouts) or even 
legal conflicts (lawsuits) (Hirschleifer 1987).  In Chapter 4 a distinction is made between de 
jure and de facto political power and how conflict between them can be detrimental to the 
economy due to the resulting inefficient policy choices.   
 
Conflict gives rise to a wide variety of efficient and inefficient institutions, and if the 
inefficient institutions are in the majority, the country will not grow.  Social conflict is, 
therefore, costly for the economy and bad for growth.  It is harmful both because it diverts 
resources away from economically productive activities and because it discourages such 
activities through the uncertainty it generates.  But where does social conflict come from?   
 
Economists generally find the reason for social conflict in the problem of scarcity.  All 
living things compete for their means of existence.  Acemoglu (2002) explains that 
whatever decisions are made, there will always be winners and losers (especially in the 
short term).  For example, income or profits may go up for some individuals or groups as a 
consequence of a given policy, while it may fall for others.  Even if the net social outcome of 
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a policy decision is positive, the losing groups will be aware of their loss (Goldsmith 1998).  
To reach Pareto optimality, some form of agreement has to be reached between the winning 
and losing parties in order to force the winners to compensate the losers.  For this to be 
successful and enforceable, some form of contract or formal promise needs to exist.   
 
This is easier said than done, because the process of contracting seems to be an 
intricate one.  Sened (1997) ponders the question of how parties can reach an agreement 
while mutual suspicion exits between them.  Even without suspicion it is difficult for a 
group, where each individual has their own objective, to reach a conclusion that satisfies all 
contracting parties.  "Human history is richer with examples of how mutual suspicion 
prevents players from improving their conditions than with examples of how mutual 
confidence makes individuals co-operate to reach mutually beneficial institutional changes" 
(Sened 1997: 74-75).     
 
Furthermore, as is explained in Chapter 4, this even becomes more difficult if one of 
the contracting parties is the state.  With the state as the ultimate enforcer of contracts, no 
commitment between the state and the other contracting parties is possible and powerful 
groups in society may find it easy to influence the decisions. 
 
In Chapter 7 two examples from the Zambian history are discussed in which 
transaction costs were raised and property rights infringed because of mutual suspicion.  
Mutual suspicion existed between the mining companies and the post-colonial Zambian 
government.  It is shown that this conflict was part of the decision that led to the 
nationalisation of the copper mines and that the nationalisation created no long-term 
advantages for the Zambian economy.  This stands in contrast with the situation in 
Botswana where cooperation was the order of the day.  In Chapter 7 these reactions are 
linked to the two countries’ colonial experience, but in this section two other sources of 
social conflict in the Zambian economy that cannot be attributed to the colonial process, are 
discussed.   
 
It is not possible to relate these conflicts, which are the conflict within government 
itself and also the conflict between government and the trade union movement, to colonial 
rule, but rather to the increasing centralisation of power that has come about in Zambia 
since independence.  These types of conflict, their origin, and the reaction to them, are 
discussed and contrasted with how the Botswana government averted possible conflict with 
the chiefs who lost their power at independence. 
 
In the years immediately after independence, infighting in the Zambian government 
was at the order of the day.  It is possible to attribute this infighting to colonial rule, 
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because violence was institutionalised, especially at the end of colonial rule.  The use of 
violence was, however, not confined to violence against the colonial administration, but it 
was also extended to any opposing group.  In practice this meant that anyone or group 
opposing UNIP leaders before independence, were subjected to violence.  This has set a 
pattern for post-independence conflict, because the leaders who used violence before 
independence held senior posts in local and central government after independence.  The 
result was inter-party and inter-tribal fights during elections (Roberts 1976).   
 
Before independence the fighting was focused on the removal of the colonial 
administration, but after independence when that motivation had faded away, infighting was 
still the order of the day.  Why did it happen that way?  Were the informal institutions 
formed during colonisation to blame, or were there other reasons (not related to 
colonisation)?   
 
Ollawa (1979) suggests that the different tribes only worked together for the removal 
of the colonialists, but that there was never real unity as such.  It was a compromised 
solution to oppose colonisers, but that disappeared at independence.  The motto, ‘One 
Zambia-one nation’, used during the fight for independence, masked tribal conflict.  Wills 
(1985) even goes as far as saying that the division between tribes was more threatening 
than that between races.   
 
Furthermore, it must be kept in mind that the nationalist movement in Zambia 
involved only a small minority of the African population.  For instance, although a good 
number of the early radical elements within the nationalist movements, most of whom later 
teamed up with UNIP, were of Lozi origin, it is doubtful if “most members of the Lozi 
aristocracy, especially the traditionalists, ever regarded the new Zambian state as 
something more than a vague abstract on the basis of which they could defend their 
regional interest or autonomy” (Ollawa 1979: 233).  Although UNIP was successful in 
mobilising the different tribes at the end of colonisation, and won a clear majority in the 
first general election under universal adult suffrage, large sections of the community over 
which it was to exercise political control, were alienated from it.  The absence of sustainable 
unity left Kaunda with a complicated task of forming a transitional government (Ollawa 
1979). 
 
It can be suggested that the large number of tribes was the result of the drawing of 
the borders of African countries at the Berlin conference, but the tribal character of Zambian 
politics was not always seen as detrimental to Zambian politics by Kaunda’s UNIP.  The 
differentiation of tribes provided an opportunity for UNIP-leaders to secure their positions in 
by-elections.  UNIP leaders tended to seek support in those regions where they were best 
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known and understood and stressed their tribal relation.  It is mainly for this reason that 
political competition in Zambia has taken on a “tribal” character (Roberts 1976).   
 
Kaunda tried to end this by a drive to artificially include almost all tribes in the 
government.  He deliberately composed the UNIP government of leaders from almost all 
parts of the country.  This did not help, but rather intensified the tribal issues in the 
country.  For example, the first post-independence elections for the members of the Central 
Committee were held at the Mulungushi Conference in August 1967.  Posts in this 
committee were crucial because those who held them “wielded tremendous power and 
influence over the decision-making process that allocated scarce resources to regions, 
communities and individuals in Zambia” (Hamalengwa 1992: 137).  Thus stiff competition 
arose in UNIP over the posts in the Central Committee, almost causing UNIP to collapse.  
Lobbying for support was mainly along tribal and regional lines, and resulted in victory for 
Bemba and Tonga candidates, and the destruction of the previously existing delicate 
balance between the different factions within UNIP.  The continuing power struggle caused 
such bitterness that Kaunda resigned briefly in February 1968 (Pettman 1974).   
 
Meanwhile, factional competition within UNIP continued, leading to the departure of 
leaders from UNIP, causing more inter-party conflict76.  For example in 1969 those 
politicians who had been edged out in 1967 began to form coalitions to fight the next round 
of elections that were to be held in 1970.  And even more important, the vice-president 
Simon Kapwepwe resigned his post in 1970 and formed the United Progressive Party (UPP), 
a formidable opposition party to Kaunda’s UNIP.  Kapwepwe, whose constituency was based 
on the Copperbelt and in the Northern Province, quickly gathered support from some key 
members from UNIP, the Copperbelt, Northern Province and elsewhere.  Members were 
defecting from UNIP and there was a likely coalition with the ANC-Zambia (Hamalengwa 
1992).   
 
                                          
76 Edwards and Tabellini (1991) have argued that political instability weakens a government, 
making it difficult if not impossible, for the government to develop and implement the economic 
policy reforms necessary for long-term economic growth.  Because of political weakness 
resulting from political instability, governments are likely to implement policies that encourage 
rent-seeking activities as a means of survival.  Gyimah-Brempong & Traynor (1999) found that 
political instability affects economic growth both directly and indirectly through reduced 
investment in the current period as well as inter-temporally.  Good policies are useless unless 
they are effectively implemented, and effective implementation of policies may not be possible 
without political stability.   
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UNIP reacted to the conflict by banning the UPP just before the elections.  The 
reaction of the UPP leaders was to strengthen the power of the ANC by supporting them in 
the election.  The result was that the ANC-Zambia gained some seats due to the increased 
membership.  To UNIP this indicated that the ANC-Zambia was not going to suffer a natural 
death, as had been hoped77.   
 
It was within this political context that Kaunda saw the one-party system as a viable 
option.  He saw the constitutional structure inherited at independence and based on the 
multiparty model as a “failure”, because it created competition he was probably not ready 
or able to deal with.  At that stage, no wider political system had developed in Zambia that 
could contain the conflict.  Rather than facing the different parties involved in the bargaining 
process to determine their bargaining positions and political power, the Second Zambian 
Republic was established in 1972 and the UNIP became the only legal political party.   
 
It is possible to attribute the unstable situation to the colonial history of the country.  
The presence of the colonial authorities did disturb the power balance in the country.  At 
independence a government came into being that had no existing, previously developed 
political and governmental system in place.  As Pettman (1974: 34) describes it: "they had 
to establish their own legitimacy, win popular support for themselves as the government, as 
opposed to their previous status as nationalist leaders against the government, and extend 
effective control of government over the whole territory".  Not only were unity in 
government and the nation underdeveloped, but almost nonexistent.  And the way Kaunda 
reacted to the problem only intensified the lack of stability. 
 
It is difficult to say what other options were available to Kaunda, but the choice of a 
one-party system proved not to be the solution he was looking for.  The one-party system 
did not eliminate all opposition, and with all the constitutional ways by which the population 
could express dissatisfaction gone, Kaunda was left to become an insecure autocrat.  
Prominent members of his own party, leading scholars and activists openly challenged his 
domination of Zambian politics and his ability to continue in power.  Within this sphere of 
insecurity, Kaunda saw any criticism as a threat to his one-party rule.  To secure his 
position he instructed the security forces to “fish out and detain any person or persons 
found to be in sympathy with the idea of multiparty politics" (Jhonvbere 1996: 64-65).  A 
state of emergency enabled the security forces to detain those opposing Kaunda. 
                                          
77 Kaunda was under the impression the one-party system would be imposed through the ballot 
box, and not through imposition.  However the resistance proved so resilient – and UNIP was so 
badly fragmented by the power struggle among its leaders – that rather than declining in 
strength, the UPP and ANC seemed to be gaining support (Tordoff and Scott 1974).  
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Although these were drastic efforts, it did not deter those supporting a multi-party 
system.  Many of the prominent UNIP members who had been dismissed, demoted, 
disgraced or discriminated against (Jhonvbere refers to them as 'fragmented party 
members') began to get together to discuss how to alter the country’s political balances.   
 
In his “Logic of Collective Action” Mancur Olson (1965) describes how difficult it is for 
groups to form.  For the ‘fragmented party members’ it was difficult to coordinate and to 
focus their opposition.  But the trade union movement was a group already formed and it 
had a defined purpose.  With all opposition parties banned, they were the only formally 
arranged group through which Zambians could voice their disapproval with their ruling 
government.  This was especially true of the Mineworkers Union of Zambia (MUZ) that was 
active on the Copperbelt.  Gulhati (1989: 25) finds it ironic that “although Zambia received 
most of its income from the activities in the Copperbelt, the Copperbelt was also a source of 
social conflict in Zambia”.   
 
The relationship between the Kaunda government and the trade unions, and especially 
the MUZ, had already started in colonial Zambia.  Together they struggled for independence 
against the colonial power.  After independence UNIP expected the trade unions to promote 
national unity by working together for the development of the whole nation, rather than 
promoting the interest of their members only.  An umbrella trade union organisation, 
ZaCTU, was created by UNIP for this purpose.   
 
Although the trade union was more committed to promote the interests of its 
members, relations between the government and the leadership of the trade union were still 
positive at the time.  This is illustrated by the fact that many trade union leaders left their 
unions to work actively within UNIP.  The process of absorbing trade union leaders into 
UNIP was intensified in 1968-71.  One reason was that UNIP wanted to attract mature and 
responsible leadership into the party, but another was that Kaunda wanted to ensure close 
cooperation between UNIP and ZaCTU (Nordlund 1996). 
 
This process had an unintended consequence, in the sense that it continued to such an 
extent that soon only union leaders who were not particularly loyal to UNIP, remained in 
ZaCTU.  This led to a deterioration of UNIP’s legitimacy in ZaCTU.  With ZaCTU not as loyal 
to UNIP any more, it began to see itself as an autonomous force that could match UNIP in 
terms of organisation, membership and bargaining power (Nordlund 1996).  
 
The reaction to the institution of the Local Administration Act (LLA) serves as an 
example of the mounting conflict between UNIP and ZaCTU.  The LLA was an act that would 
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have incorporated the mining townships with local authorities.  Although not intended to be, 
the act was seen as weakening the position of the labour movement, making it more 
vulnerable to UNIP demands for industrial peace and development.  The labour movement’s 
opposition was intensified when no consultation about the bill was allowed before it was 
brought before Parliament in 1980.  According to Norlund (1996: 72): 
 
Noticing the determination of the Party to enforce the new system, ZaCTU soon felt 
that the implications of the new legislation could affect the running of all unions and 
that the issue therefore should be regarded as a policy matter for the whole union 
movement.  The extent to which the trade union movement felt seriously threatened 
by the new piece of legislation can be illustrated by the statement of the ZaCTU 
chairman Frederick Chiluba at an Executive Committee meeting of the ZaCTU in 
December 1980, where he called the LLA ‘the real test of the labour movement in the 
post-independence era’. 
 
It seems ironic that in his drive to contain social conflict, first by appointing union 
leaders in government, then by abolishing all opposition parties, and then by increasing 
control over the trade union movement, Kaunda each time created even more conflict.  By 
suppressing social conflict, without giving it a voice to object, Kaunda’s position became 
increasingly more fragile and insecure.   
 
The discontent in the Zambian labour market culminated in wage demands and other 
forms of conflict.  The strike days in 1980 more than doubled from that in 1979, and the 
trade union movement's resistance to adjustment programmes after copper mining faltered, 
added to the declining economic situation that started in the mid-1970s (Nordlund 1996). 
 
This situation of suppression can be contrasted to the way the Botswana government 
reacted to a situation that had the possibility to disrupt its young democracy at 
independence.  The following example from Botswana shows how democracy provides a 
safer route to deal with social conflict than autocracy. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the chiefs lost most of their power at independence.  This 
was the beginning of a new power struggle between the traditional authority and the 
younger, more educated leaders of the BDP.  For Colclough and McCarthy (1980) this 
conflict overshadowed the conflict between different parties (especially because the BDP 
easily asserted its dominant position).   
 
Legislation removed the powers of traditional leaders or chiefs and vested them either 
within the central government or local government authorities.  Since they lost their 
 213 
traditional power as chiefs, they were accommodated in the new democratic structure by 
their incorporation in the House of Chiefs, but only in an advisory position.   
 
The chiefs were not altogether happy with their new position, and felt that their role 
was reduced to the role of legitimising the new political structure.  A number of chiefs were 
a source of continual difficulty for the government.  Because the chiefs saw themselves as 
advocates of the village community, they did, for example, not hesitate to flounder 
development projects which they saw as only beneficial to one segment of the community, 
e.g. cattle owners (Holm 1988). 
 
But, importantly, these errant chiefs were not suppressed.  Each modern, democratic 
institution that was brought into existence to replace a chiefly function incorporated the 
chief as an ex-officio member or even chairman.  In spite of everything chiefs were paid a 
stipend for the exercise of the traditional functions that they still retained (Colclough and 
McCarthy 1980).  Chiefs were also not held back from competing in the democratic process.  
But it was only Bathoen who took the chance, and succeeded, by giving up his income 
received as chief and even ousted the then vice president, Masire78.  The advantage of such 
a system was that only the best-educated and capable chiefs were incorporated in the 
government of the country. 
 
It can be concluded that the chiefs were the losers in terms of their position in society, 
but they were compensated financially as well as with a position in the House of Chiefs.  
Although they lost their power, society as a whole benefited in terms of the containment of 
social conflict.  This is in stark contrast with the situation in Zambia where the reaction to 
opposition was met by suppression and where the incorporation of all the tribes in the 
government led to more inter-party and intra-party conflict.  The containment of conflict in 
these two countries seems to coincide with the difference between democracy and 
autocracy, these being distinctive features of the governance of the two countries.   
 
Another explanation for the durability of more intense conflict in Zambia than in 
Botswana is the fact that conflict tends to be higher in divided societies.  The leaders in 
post-colonial Zambia chose the autocratic route, rather than accepting that democracy 
offers mechanisms to overcome economic discrimination of ethnic groups and to ensure that 
the rights of ethnic or other constituent groups are respected (Hameso 2002).  Democracy 
                                          
78 Masire was brought back into the National Assembly by using the constitutional provision which 
permits the National Assembly to co-opt four additional members to its numbers (Colclough and 
McCarthy 1980). 
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enables the citizenry to see the polity as including all societal elements, not only those in 
power.  That way the electorate becomes part on the legitimating structure.   
 
It can be concluded that Botswana successfully dealt with social conflict through the 
democratic process, unlike the situation that pertained in Zambia.  Zambia suppressed 
conflict, but through that created even more conflict.  Conflict should be resolved in a 
structured manner through consultation and cooperation, not through taking away people’s 
right to voice their dissatisfaction.  The question that needs to be resolved is why the 
different governments reacted so differently to the probable sources of conflict.  The 
following section focuses on the incumbent post-colonial leaders and where their different 
attitudes possibly originated. 
 
 
8.4.3 Leadership 
In section 8.3.1 it is suggested that although economic performance does not directly 
correlate with democracy, performance under democracy is indeed much less diversified 
than under an autocracy.  Both democracy and autocracy display disadvantages.  For 
example, democratic leaders have to secure their own re-election and are therefore 
tempted to make policy decisions that will facilitate their re-election and not necessarily 
those that are to the long-term advantage of the country.  Alternatively, autocrats are in a 
position to exploit the country directly to their own benefit (Olson 1991).  In the previous 
section it is suggested that the more democratic state of Botswana benefited from 
democracy in terms of dealing with social conflict.   
 
This does not suggest, however, that centralised states cannot perform well, as the 
examples of China, Singapore and South Korea would suggest.  It is, however, safe to 
conclude that more centralised societies will have more volatile performances.  And the 
reason being that in a centralised society a lot more depends on the person in charge of 
that centralised state, than in a decentralised democracy.  An autocracy can either be in the 
hands of someone like Lee Kwan Yu of Singapore or the late Chung Hee Park of South 
Korea, who are regarded as having made substantial contributions to their societies.  But an 
autocrat can also be of the opposite persuasion like Idi Amin of Uganda (Sah 1991).  Since 
Zambia turned into an autocracy, it is important to explore the leadership in both Botswana 
and Zambia as an explanation for their different growth performances.  How did Khama and 
Kaunda end up as presidents and why did they embark on the different paths of policy-
making, which in the end led to such different economic outcomes?   
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With both countries starting out as democracies, the first question will be why 
Botswana stayed a democracy but Zambia did not.  The answer lies in the legitimacy of 
democracy in the different countries.  Political stability in democratic systems cannot rely on 
force and the alternative to force is legitimacy.  Theories of democracy stress that 
democratic stability requires a widespread belief among elites and masses in the legitimacy 
of the democratic system.  The next question that will be addressed is whether the 
President and the ruling party had legitimacy in the eyes of the population.  In other words 
did they have the "title to rule"?   
 
In the process of clarifying legitimacy in the two countries, much emphasis will be on 
the prevalence of supporting informal institutions.  As explained below, the informal 
institutions in Botswana supported democracy, whereas the same cannot be said for 
Zambia.  Exploring this process will provide possible reasons for the instability in the 
democratic process in Zambia, relative to the experience in Botswana.  But before the 
discussion focuses on Zambia and Botswana, theoretical issues regarding legitimacy will be 
touched on. 
 
 
Legitimacy of the democratic process 
By definition, authoritarian regimes are less legitimate than democratic ones; they 
rely on force rather than legitimate power79.  Theoretically a constitution can provide a basis 
for legitimacy by limiting the state’s power, and by providing free political and economic 
rights.  But, unfortunately, for a system to be legitimate in practice, more is necessary.  In 
order to achieve a situation of support for the constitution, it is necessary to have 
supporting informal institutions, a well-performing regime, and enough time for both to 
develop. 
 
Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1990: 16) identify several informal institutions that play an 
important role in a stable democracy: “belief in the legitimacy of democracy; tolerance for 
opposing parties, beliefs and preferences; a willingness to compromise with political 
opponents, and, underlying this, pragmatism and flexibility; some minimum of trust in the 
                                          
79 Such regimes are inherently more unstable and likely to collapse in the face of a crisis.  
However, a brittle, unpopular system need not collapse – Zimbabwe seems to be an excellent 
example of such a system.  Repressive police authority, a powerful army, and a willingness by 
rulers to use brute force may maintain a regime's power almost indefinitely.  The breakdown of 
such a system may require a major catalytic event, a defeat in war, a drastic economic decline, 
or a break in the unity of the government elite (Lipset 1994). 
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political environment, and cooperation, particularly among political competitors; moderation 
in political positions and partisan identifications; civility of political discourse; and political 
efficacy and participation”.  For the democratic process to be legitimate, there has to be the 
belief that “it is the best form of government (or the least evil), [and] that in spite of 
shortcomings and failures, the existing political institutions are better than any other that 
might be established, and that the democratic regime is morally entitled to demand 
obedience – to tax and draft, to make laws and enforce them” (Diamond, et al. 1990: 9).  If 
a political system is not characterised by a value system allowing the peaceful “play” of 
power, democracy becomes chaotic.   
 
Democratic legitimacy (gained both economically and politically) stems from a 
perception that the system is stable and secure, and from the performance of the 
democratic regime, it becomes so both economically and politically.  The performance of the 
regime is measured by the extent to which the system fulfils the basic functions of 
government as interpreted by the majority of the population, and by such powerful groups 
as big business and the armed forces.   The more successful a regime has been in providing 
what people want, the greater and more deeply rooted tends to be its legitimacy.   
 
For both the informal institutions and the stable regime to become supportive of 
democracy, time is necessary.  Norms do not change rapidly and for procedures to become 
effective, it has to go through change to adapt to local circumstances.  It also takes time for 
most political parties to recognise the existence of rights of the opposition and to react 
constructively to their criticism.  Lipset (1994: 4) shows that “almost all the heads of young 
democracies, from Johan Adams and Thomas Jefferson to Indira Gandhi, attempted to 
suppress their opponents”.  It takes time for policymakers to extend the rule of law and to 
recognise the independence of the courts.   
 
It is no wonder that almost everywhere the institutionalisation of democracy has 
occurred, the process has been a gradual one in which opposition and individual rights have 
emerged in the give and take of politics.  As a result democratic systems have tended to 
develop gradually, at first with suffrage, limited by and linked to property and/or literacy.  
Elites yielded slowly in admitting the masses to the franchise and in tolerating and 
institutionalising opposition rights.  Lipset (1994: 4) makes another interesting point by 
saying that  
 
  Democracy never developed anywhere by plan, except when it was imposed by a 
democratic conqueror, as in post-World War 2 Germany and Japan.  From the United 
States to Northern Europe, freedom, suffrage and the rule of law grew in a 
piecemeal, not in a planned fashion.   
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At independence, Africa's formal political institutions were young. Most countries 
lacked a tradition of mass political participation.  Political constitutions granted at 
independence were modelled on their European counterparts—the British colonies were 
given parliamentary systems and the French colonies republican systems with stronger 
executive positions.  In theory the stage was set for political liberties and political 
contribution by many, but these sought-after beneficial aspects did not last.  By 1975 nearly 
all the African regimes had replaced democratic rule with authoritarian structures (Ndulu 
and O'Connell 1999). Zambia is such an example.  In Zambia, Kaunda saw the democratic 
process as a failure because it could not deal with political and social conflict, but 
alternatively it seems as if the lack of legitimacy might explain much of the conflict.   
 
After the downfall of the Soviet Union, democracy, again, spread to many African 
states, and the ex-Soviet nations were also under international pressure to become or 
remain democratic.  But examples like Haiti, shows that these newly democratic regimes 
also experience a high probability of failure.  For Lipset and his co-authors (1993) one way 
these countries can survive long enough to create legitimacy, is through high economic 
growth and development.   
 
Regimes that lack deep legitimacy depend more on current performance and are 
therefore vulnerable to collapse in periods of economic and social difficulty.  This explains 
the vulnerability of new democracies because they will have had no time to secure 
legitimacy and are therefore especially vulnerable to economic instabilities.  Diamond and 
his co-authors (1990: 10) describe it as follows:  
 
   Because of the combination of widespread poverty and the strains imposed by 
modernisation, regimes that begin with low legitimacy also find it difficult to perform 
effectively and regimes that lack effectiveness, especially in economic growth, find it 
difficult to build legitimacy 
 
 
Legitimacy of the president and the ruling party  
Another form of gaining legitimacy, especially in the case of a democracy that has 
had no time to mature, is through the legitimacy of the president and the ruling party in the 
eyes of the population.  A leader gains legitimacy when he (or she) is believed to be 
endowed with great personal worth, either from God, as in the case of a religious prophet or 
simply from the display of extraordinary talents –the so-called "charismatic leader" (Lipset 
1994).  The "cult of personality" surrounding many leaders is an illustration of this.   
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Legitimacy in Botswana and Zambia 
For Botswana legitimacy of the political system was established and strengthened in 
more than one way.  Botswana has had a history of popular participation in political 
decision-making through the kgotla, which resembled a democracy closely enough to serve 
that purpose.  Botswana has also had able traditional leaders for at least a century before 
reaching independence.  The successful resistance of the chiefs to the incorporation into 
South Africa (discussed in Chapter 6) serves as an example of this.  And these chiefs ruled 
through the kgotla, where there was an opportunity to express one's view and a need to 
achieve a degree of consensus.  Openness and consultation were, therefore, always part of 
the political structure in Botswana80.   
 
The advantage of the kgotla that is stressed by Harvey and Lewis (1990) is that 
through it, the system of consultation and feedback was already established at 
independence.  The perceived openness such a system creates probably added much 
support for the legitimacy of the newly established democratic government.  The ruling 
party made use of this system already in place to discuss all new policies with the local 
community in the kgotla before any [local] implementation. 
 
One can argue that the countervailing power, which the kgotla represented against 
that of the chief, was weakened during the colonial period.  The British administration, not 
understanding the subtleties of this traditional structure, regarded the chief as the sole 
representative of the tribe and on occasion supported him against the will of his own 
people.  By the end of the colonial period many of the chiefs, including Tshekedi Khama and 
Bathoen II, were accustomed to behave in a very autocratic way (Colclough and McCarthy 
1980).  But this was not how the system traditionally functioned, and it was relatively easy 
to revert to the more democratic version after independence81.  This was, of course, 
strengthened by President Khama’s strong support for a democratic system. 
 
                                          
80 This tradition was strengthened after independence, where in addition to Parliament and elected 
local governments, there have been frequent presidential commissions on national issues.  Their 
membership was often broadly based; they held public hearings and issued public reports that 
were debated in Parliament.  Public education has been a major function of these commissions, 
as has been consensus-building (Stedman 1993). 
81 The kgotla did undergo important changes after independence.  For example, after independence 
women were beginning to attend kgotla meetings and while not participating as fully as the men, 
women were increasingly able to speak out and make themselves heard (Odell 1985). 
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It can therefore be argued that the democratic system itself had legitimacy in the eyes 
of the Batswana.  And, although poor at independence, the economic prospects of the 
country soon after changed for the better.  This strengthened the system adopted at 
independence.  The next question is whether the leaders had legitimacy. 
 
Samatar (1999: 77) discusses five reasons why the chiefs had legitimacy in the eyes 
of their subordinates at independence.   
 
1. the traditional Botswana elite retained a significant degree of autonomy by 
resisting British colonial rule and Pretoria’s attempts to incorporate 
Bechuanaland into South Africa 
2. the traditional leadership maintained its hegemony over the masses during the 
period of colonial transformation 
3. the destructive behaviour of South African leaders, and the enslavement and 
dispossession of their people, ingrained in the Botswana leaders a strong sense 
of themselves and their role as guardians of their society 
4. the traditional, political and economic elite were almost one and the same, 
unlike other African societies 
5. the dominant class was unchallenged by any other indigenous group.   
 
Traditionally, the chiefs had wide executive and judicial powers over their tribesmen.  
But they were not, or were not supposed to be, absolute dictators.  A Setswana proverb has 
it that a chief is a chief only by the will of the tribe, implying that the tribe could, if 
necessary, remove the chief.  In practice this implied that the chief had to govern with the 
consent of the kgotla.  Professor Isaac Schapera described it as follows after he did his 
research during the 1930s and 1940s on the Tswana (quoted in Odell 1985: 64):   
 
  All matters of public policy are dealt with finally at an assembly open to all the men 
of the tribe…  Such assemblies are held very frequently, at times almost weekly… 
Since anybody present is entitled to speak, the tribal assemblies provide a ready 
means of ascertaining public opinion…  The discussions are characterised by 
considerable freedom of speech, and if the occasion seems to call for it, the chief or 
his advisors may be severely criticised…  Such assemblies are frequently used by the 
government as a means of informing the tribes about new legislation and other 
developments or of inquiring into local disputes…   
 
Seretse Khama’s legitimacy was strengthened through his association with the long 
tradition of capable rulers in Botswana.  It is no wonder that Harvey and Lewis (1990: 9) 
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explain Botswana's successful growth record as partly due to an "unusually high quality of 
leadership.  As the paramount chief he embedded both his right to rule and the institutions 
of his state into the pre-existing Tswana system, and conferring upon the new state a high 
degree of historical legitimacy".  His legitimacy as national leader was therefore rooted both 
in the traditional ruling system and in the Westminster parliamentary system transplanted 
by the colonial power (Adamolekun and Morgan 1999).   
 
Harvey and Lewis (1990: 9) describe both Seretse Khama and his right-hand man, 
Quett Masire, as "remarkable men".  To them Khama's political skills, his vision and his 
stature as a person added immeasurably to the ability of his party.  He has set the tone of 
government with "common sense, good humour, honesty and a desire to learn lessons from 
other countries".  He has also set the tone for depersonalised political power82.   
 
Until his death in 1980, Khama occupied a central political position.  His status as a 
traditional leader extended beyond a narrow regional or ethnic base.  Parsons (1984: 50) 
describes him as follows:  
 
   He materialised the ideological connection between the governing elite and the mass 
peasantariat base.  He was also the focal point of the otherwise uneasy coalition of 
senior bureaucrats and the socio-economic group that governed through the BDP.  
Seretse Khama moved easily between these apparently contradictory groups. 
 
The abovementioned conditions made it possible for the post-colonial leadership to 
build effective institutions to lead the transformation and growth of the economy.  Good 
governmental management further strengthened legitimacy.  Hope and Somolekae (1998: 
13) provide an account of this:  
 
  Government was able to create a reasonably honest and competent bureaucracy that 
enjoys the reputation of having an outstanding record of ability to formulate and 
efficiently execute national development projects.  Botswana has a relatively open 
and accountable government and is outstanding in creating and maintaining effective 
structures of control, including independent audits. 
 
                                          
82 Khama also openly supported a capitalist development.  He opposed communism and jokingly 
characterised himself as a capitalist.  Khama “often used to joke about being a capitalist among 
socialists, wryly commenting at one meeting that, although he was a capitalist, he was the only 
member of the front line team to come to a meeting in a hired rather than private plane” 
(quoted in Samatar 1999: 83). 
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From the onset at independence the situation in Zambia was different.  Zambia had no 
history of popular participation in political decision-making.  This situation was made even 
worse with the combination of different tribes in one government.  The instability in the 
functioning of the political process was seen as due to the fighting amongst the tribes, while 
political representatives who wanted to further their own political aspirations contributed to 
it.  Furthermore, although the economy prospered at independence, that soon changed and 
increased the already-present instability.   
 
Kaunda received legitimacy from being a leader in the resistance that led to 
independence.  It was reinforced by his appearance as an individual “above tribe”, made 
possible by the fact that his parents originally came from Malawi.  He was a schoolmaster, 
but had no extensive overseas education in Western universities, although he did spend six 
months in Britain studying the organisation of the Labour Party.  His political education was 
gained largely as a provincial party organiser (Pettman 1974). 
 
Although a leader in resistance, Kaunda only had sustained legitimacy over a much 
smaller percentage of the population.  And his legitimacy had little time to develop before 
the economy started to falter.  The point was already made that the establishment of a 
stable legitimacy takes time to develop.  Having a charismatic leader or rational-legal 
legitimacy will be beneficial, but sustained stability takes time to develop.  In Botswana time 
was provided both by the fact that the paramount chief of 80 percent of the population 
came to power after independence, and the economy went into a growth phase at that 
stage.  In most of the northern European and British Commonwealth nations, a continuing 
monarchy provided ‘traditional legitimacy’ while it gave time for democratic institutions to 
develop.  Botswana enjoyed the same advantage, where the paramount chief came to 
power at the onset of democracy after independence. 
 
There was no leader with historical legitimacy in Zambia.  The struggle for 
independence was led by leaders who had some privileges either through education or 
family backgrounds that propelled them to political prominence.  These people, called a 
'petty-bourgeois' by Jhonvbere (1996: 48), were able to join the people of Zambia in their 
fight against the colonial powers, and became part of the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' after 
independence.  Unfortunately, these characteristics did not restrain them from political 
opportunism, and they, soon after independence, lost the legitimacy they gained during the 
struggle.  According to Pettman (1974: 34-35) "these authorities were not fitted for the 
demands of nation building and development and their difficulties were compounded by 
shortages of manpower and funds, and by severe security problems, political discontent and 
lack of popular support".  The government did not exist as part of an established political 
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system like the kgotla.  And in its search for legitimacy, the focus turned to a political 
structure (they thought) could deal with all these problems. 
 
Within this search for a suitable political structure, Kaunda played a prominent role.  
The efforts to discover and develop a political system, more in accordance with Zambia’s 
own needs, were only partly reflected in constitutional amendments and other changes to 
the formal arrangements of government.  The dominant personality and powerful position of 
Kaunda, coupled with the relative absence of competing national figures for the post of the 
Party's presidency, enabled him to implement his own ideological orientations in the 
country.  Kaunda was a firm supporter of, what he called, humanism, or else socialism.   
 
According to Pettman (1974), Kaunda’s powers in office and his party were reinforced 
by his particular style of leadership.  He was suspicious of colleagues, disliked delegation 
and consultation, and preferred a highly personalised rule.  The move towards autocracy 
was already apparent in the late 1960s when he announced major administrative reforms 
and the nationalisation of the copper industry without either consulting or informing his 
Cabinet colleagues.   
 
Kaunda dissolved the Central Committee of UNIP and personally assumed all 
responsibility for party affairs.  At one stage he held six portfolios, including defence, 
foreign affairs, and government participation in industry.  In late 1970 and early 1971 he 
off-loaded several of his portfolios, claiming that "his decision in previous years had fully 
established the direction in which he wishes the government to move, and suggested that 
others could not have pursued that direction at that stage" (Pettman 1974: 34-35).   
 
At the same time he strengthened his position as leader of UNIP under the new 
constitution which was adopted in 1973.  The new constitution asserted the supremacy of 
the Party over the government and Parliament.  And with the President as the head of the 
Party and the State, he commanded enormous power in both capacities83.   
 
Kaunda has always acknowledged that survival, not principle, is the key to politics.  
His conception of his own key position as the unifying focus for national unity led him to 
regard his continuance in office as essential for the good of the nation.  “If the President is 
                                          
83 For instance, according to the Mwanakatwe Commission, Under Article 132 (1) of the 
Constitution of Zambia the power to appoint persons to any office in the public service is vested 
in His Excellency the President.  And, as discussed in Chapter 7, Kaunda used these powers 
extensively.  A large number of top politicians, administrators and managers owned their 
appointments directly to the President in this vast patronage system.  According to Turok 
(1989) Kaunda even appointed managers in parastatals where he did not have similar powers. 
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to direct the people’s loyalty to the state over a period of time, he must first be in 
undisputed possession of it" (quoted in Pettman 1974: 34-35). 
 
It can be concluded that post-colonial Zambia started with no institutions supportive of 
a democratic state, and an incumbent President who concentrated power in himself.  This 
can be attributed to the legacy of colonial rule: it was lacking hegemony, credibility, 
stability, and legitimacy.  But the decisions that led towards Presidentialism and 
authoritarian rule was made by Kaunda himself, and was helped by the absence of the 
necessary informal institutions to enable the elite to oppose the increasingly dominant 
position of the president.  This made it easier for the state to become a direct instrument of 
oppression and exploitation.   
 
 
8.5 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter shows that two constraints necessary to ensure that governments stay 
responsive to the needs of the majority of the population, i.e. the democratic process and 
the rule of law, were both inherited at independence by Botswana and Zambia.  These 
constraints proved to be effective and enduring in Botswana, ensuring high-quality 
institutions supportive of economic growth and development.  Zambia faltered on both 
these constraints, ending with a society divided by social conflict and a stagnating economy.  
Why did Botswana stay on the path left by the colonial power, and Zambia not? 
 
One possibility is that Zambia wanted to be rid of everything related to their colonial 
power due to the extractive nature of their colonisers.  But, alternatively, if the ruling elite 
in Zambia was convinced of the advantages of democracy and judicial independence, 
nothing (except maybe pride) forced them to change their constitution.  
 
It is suggested in the chapter that the answer can be found in the countries’ history, 
apart from their colonial experiences, and the prevailing informal institutions.  It is 
explained that democracy is a safer choice to reduce transaction costs and protect property 
rights, but that informal institutions must support it.  Informal institutions in Botswana that 
supported democracy and a free judiciary, came from patterns established by open 
discussion in the kgotla.  Also the tradition of solving conflict through a judicial process, 
rather than protest, was firmly established before independence.  Although not resembling a 
mature democracy, the Botswana political system has all the checks and balances in place 
that (in theory) will remove the ruling party if the majority of the population would seek 
that.   
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In Zambia democracy, open discussion and a free judiciary were seen as in opposition 
to the government.  Supportive informal institutions did not exist at independence and this 
brought the formal institutions left by the colonial power into conflict with the ruling elite. 
 
But the consolidation of democratic rule also depends not only on a system regarded 
as legitimate, but also on a leader with legitimacy in the eyes of the constituency.  The 
paramount chief of the biggest tribe that came to power in Botswana established his 
legitimacy from the onset.  Khama’s legitimacy was supported by a growing economy, 
which gave democracy enough time to create its own legitimacy. 
 
Kaunda did not have the same kind or level of legitimacy.  At independence the 
country experienced social conflict, not so much between the local people and the departing 
colonisers, as between different parties and different tribes.  Kaunda dealt with the conflict 
by closing down the routes of opposition and discussion.  This only intensified the conflict 
and his insecurity.  The whole process of conflict and insecurity was intensified by the 
stagnating economy.  And with increasing insecurity, Kaunda reverted even more to 
authoritarian rule and the suppression of opposition.  By enforcing authority, Kaunda lost 
the legitimacy he was actually trying to secure. 
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9 CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Cross-country empirical research provides useful information regarding reasons for 
growth differences.  All these reasons—ranging from geography, to years of schooling, to 
direct investment—exhibit a strong correlation with economic growth.  But they do not fully 
explain the experience of individual countries in the sample; neither do they explain what 
lies behind these correlations.  To broaden the understanding of reasons for growth 
differences, case study research proves a useful tool. 
 
For the case study method to be applicable for a comparison between countries, the 
countries should show a number of similarities to make it easier to identify the actual 
differences that were instrumental in their divergent growth performance.  Botswana and 
Zambia display a number of similarities that make them suitable for a comparative case 
study.  Among these the most applicable similarities are the fact that both were subject to 
colonial rule, they are landlocked neighbours in Sub-Saharan Africa, both are richly 
endowed with minerals and are also mineral dependent in their exports.  But within these 
similarities enough differences are present to shed light on the divergent growth paths they 
exhibit. 
 
The most obvious difference that may be instrumental in their divergent growth 
experiences is the nature of their dominant minerals.  Zambia primarily exports copper and 
Botswana diamonds.  Often in the literature a declining real copper price is presented as an 
explanation for Zambia’s economic decline.  However, there is no direct correlation between 
the copper price and Zambia’s economic growth.  The present analysis therefore 
incorporates policy choices made by the Zambian government in reaction to a declining 
income from copper mining.     
 
Botswana is a clear example of a country able to manage its mineral resources in 
such a manner that the country has been able to enjoy long-term economic growth.  The 
potentially negative effect of the resource curse was overcome through prudent spending 
and a good working relationship with the foreign companies extracting its minerals.  In 
Zambia this was not the case.  The post-colonial government was unwilling (or unable) to 
curb public spending in the face of declining income from its copper industry.  With an 
unpromising relationship between Zambia and its colonial power, the Zambian authorities 
made decisions such as the substitution of experienced expatriate workers with 
inexperienced Zambians.  And it was these inexperienced workers who had to deal with the 
crisis created by the declining copper income.   
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These are interesting differences, and by exploring them, more light falls on the 
reasons for these two countries’ growth differences.  But these differences should be 
explored against an acceptable theoretical background.  In an overview of historical 
explanations for growth differences, it is shown that these traditional theories cannot fully 
explain growth differences in general—they all lack a deeper understanding of the incentives 
people are subjected to.  The New Institutional Economics are currently perceived as one of 
the most important explanations for growth differences.  And an analysis of the institutional 
empirical data for the two countries does indeed reveal a worse performance of the 
Zambian economy relative to that of Botswana.  Different institutions, therefore, can explain 
the divergent growth paths of these two countries. 
   
In general countries have different combinations of formal and informal institutions–
where some institutions are supportive of growth and others not.  For a country to grow the 
growth-enhancing type of institution should be in the majority.  There is no prescription as 
to which institutions should be present to enhance growth, but for a country to grow, 
institutions should bring about the minimisation of transaction costs and protect property 
rights.     
 
Botswana, for example, has experienced higher levels of property right protection.  
This is especially well illustrated in work done on “contract intensive money”.  Countries 
where property rights are perceived to be protected, will display higher levels of contract 
intensive money than countries where governments are perceived to infringe on property 
rights.  The data shows that Botswana's property rights are perceived to be well protected, 
relative to those of Zambia. 
 
These two mentioned factors—the lowering of transaction costs and the protection of 
property rights—do not seem so difficult to adhere to, but many countries still find it 
impossible to acquire and sustain high growth rates.  These countries have institutions that 
do not support growth.  A variety of reasons exist for the survival of bad institutions.  
Research done on the relationship between colonisation and economic growth suggests a 
negative correlation between extractive colonisation and post-colonial economic growth.   
 
Being a protectorate was to the advantage of Botswana since it helped the country to 
survive as a unit and prevented it from being incorporated into South Africa or divided up 
into smaller pieces among its neighbours.  But what was even more of an advantage is the 
fact that diamonds were only discovered in Botswana after its independence.  The British 
had no real incentive to extend their influence in that country and in order to reduce their 
expenditures in Botswana, established a co-operative relationship with the chiefs.  The 
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relationship between the Batswana and the British was therefore one of cooperation and not 
exploitation. 
 
With copper production already under way in 1924 Zambia was not so fortunate.  
Because there was much to gain from the mining industry, the British had a clear presence 
in the country without protecting the property rights of the local people—to give one 
example of the colonial stance.  This was essentially extractive colonisation and it did not 
establish a basis for cooperation. 
 
It is, however, suggested that there must be more previously unanalysed factors 
impacting on the theory, because path dependency does not automatically lead to 
stagnation.  As it was possible for the colonial powers to change the formal institutions in 
the colonies, the post-colonial governments have similarly had the opportunity to change 
the path created by the colonial rule.  Colonisation is not deterministic.  
 
What colonisation did influence, and which cannot be changed over a short period, 
are the informal institutions.  Colonisation created a “memory” (whether positive like the 
cooperation between Botswana and Britain, or negative like the exploitative relationship 
between Zambia and Britain) and many of the post-colonial policies can be understood in 
this context.  With a drive to rid them of everything resembling colonialism or imperialism, 
Zambia not only increased transaction costs, but also infringed on property rights.  For 
example, transaction costs were raised through the diversion of trade routes from the south 
to the north.  And in order to "complete" their political independence while simultaneously 
gaining economic independence, Zambia nationalised industries formerly run by European 
companies. 
 
The Botswana government has also been active in the economy, but this 
involvement happened through consultation and cooperation.  The process they followed 
created an atmosphere of certainty – and this assurance lowered transaction costs. 
 
Although colonisation provides an understanding of post-colonial policies, it cannot 
provide an excuse for all poor post-colonial policies.  As an independent government Zambia 
has chosen to implement drastic turn-around post-colonial policies.  One policy-change that 
proved detrimental to the Zambian economy was the move from democracy to autocracy.  
The empirical institutional measures show a bad score for Zambia, relative to Botswana, for 
this reason.  Zambia has faltered on both restraints that are meant to ensure that 
government stays responsive to the majority of the people in the country: democracy, and 
the adherence to the rule of law.  Although some reasons are given as to why these policy 
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changes can be related to colonial rule, other reasons not linked to a colonial past are also 
provided. 
 
The theoretical discussion shows these ‘other reasons’ to be an inability to commit by 
politicians, and the prevalence of social conflict.  Due to the fact that the government is 
unable to commit to policy-decisions (because of its function as the ultimate enforcer of 
contracts), the ameliorating constraints that were previously mentioned were indeed 
necessary.  
 
Social conflict proved detrimental to the Zambian economy.  There was social conflict 
between local Zambians and foreigners, but also among the Zambians themselves.  Kaunda 
tried to deal with the latter by forcing representatives of different tribes into one 
government, and later to disband all parties except UNIP.  The move to a one-party state 
only aggravated the existing conflict because by now the routes to express opposition were 
closed. 
 
Botswana dealt with a possible source of social conflict, i.e. the chiefs, by giving 
them a voice of opposition in the House of Chiefs.  Chiefs also had the right to stand for 
election to Parliament.  Again the feature of cooperation and consultation of Botswana 
society supported the growth-enhancing institutions and thus creating an atmosphere of 
stability and certainty. 
 
To fully understand post-colonial policy choices, the pre-colonial and colonial 
situations in the two countries needed to be explored.  The dispersed pre-colonial tribes in 
Zambia created an easy opportunity for the British South African Company to enter the area 
and to start mining without having to deal with unified resistance.  The fact that one of the 
biggest tribes, the Bemba, had a history of slave trading did not enhance the prospects of 
national cooperation.   
 
In Botswana the chiefs were better able to cooperate with one another and to resist 
external influences.  The scarcity of water has forced the Batswana cattlemen to live 
together and deal with one another in harmony in the vicinity of water sources.  In pre-
colonial Zambia the majority of people made a living from the land that required them to 
move regularly to fresh land when the fertility of the soil deteriorated.  Consequently they 
never built big cities and therefore created no institutions to regulate cooperation, such as 
the kgotla of Botswana.  
 
The kgotla provided the Batswana with an acceptance of the tradition of democracy 
that created the necessary supportive institutions for those democratic institutions the 
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British left on departure.  There was no such history, and therefore no democracy 
supporting informal institutions, in Zambia. 
 
At independence both Botswana and Zambia received basically the same constitution 
from Britain.  This constitution provided for democratic rule, an independent judiciary, and 
strong powers for the executive.  For Botswana it was easy to continue within these 
parameters, because supporting informal institutions were present.  Not only were they well 
versed in the traditions of democracy because of their kgotla system, but their first 
president was also accepted as a legitimate ruler because of his position as the paramount 
chief of the biggest tribe.  These factors created an atmosphere of social and political 
stability, which was further enhanced by the post-colonial economic prosperity. 
 
The Zambians had no schooling in democratic rule when the British left.  By using 
tribal differences to secure their own positions in parliament politicians created political 
instability.  Kaunda’s solution to instability was to incorporate the opposing tribes into his 
government.  This created even more tension and paved the way for patronage 
employment.  Kaunda did not see consultation and cooperation as a solution to the political 
conflict and instead declared a one-party state in which he had wide-ranging powers.  With 
no opposition allowed, the trade union movement was the only organised group in Zambia 
to oppose government.  Kaunda met the resistance from the trade unions with force and 
more curtailment of their freedom.  Again consultation and cooperation were not an option:  
the president chose suppression instead. 
 
Although Kaunda was a charismatic leader, he did not enjoy legitimacy throughout 
Zambia.  And a faltering economy did nothing to improve the situation.  As Kaunda gained 
personal power, opposition to his rule increased.  With no legal way to voice this opposition, 
social conflict was inevitable.  This placed not only politics, but also the economy in a 
downward spiral.  To counter the social conflict Kaunda made random adjustments to 
economic policies, leading to higher transaction costs and less secure property rights.  When 
the income from copper mining faltered, the un-coordinated adjustments (especially those 
regarding spending) increased the instability. 
 
A typical pattern in Africa, and observed in Zambia, is that the educated, urban-
resident population takes over the government.  This has serious consequences for politics 
in general.  Being insulated from the mass of the rural population and having only limited 
legitimacy, governments are acutely exposed to pressures from their own narrow base of 
supporters.  This often results in an increase in public sector employment with wages 
rewarded to fraternal groups rather than being based on skills. Those policies implemented 
favour redistribution rather than accumulation.  This was evident in Zambia where 
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Zambians without the necessary skills were appointed in the public sector and the leaders of 
the trade union movement were given government posts to ensure cooperation between the 
unions and government. 
 
Furthermore, if the state’s economic power is not counterbalanced by private means 
for economic accumulation and creating opportunity, upward social mobility and the 
accumulation of personal wealth depend on getting and maintaining control of, or at least 
having access to, the machinery of the state (Diamond, et al. 1990).  In Zambia this raised 
the premium on political power to the point where the ruling party was not willing to 
consider the prospect of defeat.  The result was a zero-sum game where control of the 
unstable political environment and economy was in the hands of the president.  The 
president was, therefore, totally unable to enjoy any of the benefits of a democracy. 
 
This contrasts starkly with the situation in Botswana, where the elite not only had 
the political power, but also enough economic power to provide them with little incentive to 
exploit the state and ruin the economy.  Much of Botswana's successful policy choices can 
be attributed to the fact that the ruling elite came from a strong capitalist, agricultural 
background.  The class that inherited political power at independence is one that was 
already involved in cattle production and wealth accumulation before independence.  This 
dominant class of accumulators became conscious of the fact that its interest would be 
better served by private capitalist accumulation rather than state capitalism because the 
state itself was in dire financial problems at independence and could not be the sole means 
of accumulation.  Consequently, this class did not necessarily see the state as a source of 
self-enrichment.  The fact that many of the country's leading politicians and bureaucrats 
have extended or acquired business interests while holding, or upon vacating, public office 
has given them a strong commitment to maintain a strong, open economy. 
 
Extractive colonialism in Zambia was detrimental to the post colonial situation due to 
the drive it created to get rid of everything resembling European influence and imperialism, 
i.e. there was a drive to get rid of the memory these created.  But, not all post independent 
policies can be ascribed to colonial rule.   
 
It is therefore true that much of the growth differences between Botswana and 
Zambia can be explained by their colonial rule.  But, with the onset of colonial rule, Zambia 
did not have the institutions to secure a prosperous democratic society and they certainly 
did not gain these during extractive colonisation.  It is unclear what would have happened 
without colonial rule.  The different tribes were probably too small to create economically 
prosperous units, but maybe if they were left to create institutions of cooperation over time, 
they would have been able to make the transition to a modern democratic entity. 
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But by reviewing the surveyed facts it is clear that much of Zambia's decline can be 
attributed to post-colonial policy making, to a centralising drive by the ruler, and an 
unwillingness to face opposition.  As for Botswana: good, prudent policies by the ruling elite 
have established an economy that realised the highest average economic growth in the 
world since independence.   
 
The beneficial growth-supporting parameters set by the New Institutional theory, i.e. 
the lowering of transaction costs and the protection of property rights, provided a good 
structure to analyse growth differences between Zambia and Botswana.  It is not the 
intention to present this analysis as the one and only explanation for the growth differences 
between the two countries, but it does answer questions other theories could not fully 
explain.  It must therefore be seen as an addition to other explanatory frameworks and not 
the final word on this issue. 
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